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To Members of the Forty-fifth Colorado General Assembly:
As directed by the terms of House Joint Resolution
No. 25 (1963), the Legislative Council is submitting
herewith its report and recommendations concerning revision of Colorado's substantive criminal law. The report
covers the specific offenses defined in Chapter 40 of the
revised statutes; however, because of the complexity and
scope of the assignment, the committee was not able to give
full study and consideration to a number of other important
subjects.
The committee appointed by the Legislative Council
to make this study submitted its report on November 23,
. 1964, at which time the report was approved by the Legislative Council for transmission to the General Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,
C. P. Lamb
Chairman

iii

OFPICEII
Rep. C. P. (Doc) limb
Chelnnen
len. Pay Deltr11d
Vice Chairman

COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
MEMBERS

STAFP
Lyle C. Kyle

lt. Gov. Robert L. Knou,
Sen. Wllllam E. llledao,
S.n. Edward J. lyme
Sen. Frank L. GIii
Sen. Floyd Ollver

Director

Harry O. llwlOl'I
Senior Analylt
Phllllp I!. JonH
8enlor Analyst
David F. Morrl1My
ReMarch Aall1tant
Myren H. lchledlte

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

R11ur11:h A11l1tant
Janet WIiton
ReMarch Atal1tant

ROOM 3-41, STATE CAPITOL
DENYER 2, COLORADO
222-ttl I-EXTENSION 2215

Speaker John D. Vanderhoof
Rep. Jonph V. CalabrRep. John L. Kine
Rep, Wllllam o. Lenno•
Rep. John W. Nichols
Rep. Clarence H. Qulnlen

November 11, 1964

Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
341 State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Transmitted herewith is the report and recommendations of the Legislative Council's Criminal Code Committee,
appointed pursuant to House Joint Resolution No. 2~ (1963).
This report includes the committee's preliminary revision
of the substantive criminal laws of th• state of Colorado.
Because of the scope and complexity of the field
of criminal law, the committee did not have sufficient
time to consider non-substantive criminal law, including
such subjects as arrest and arraignment, sentencing, _parole
and probation, and criminal responsibility. The committee
therefore is recommending that further interim consideration
be given this subject, with a final report thereon being
submitted in 1966.

Respectfully submitted,
Edward J. Byrne, Chairman
Criminal Code Committee
EJB/mp
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FOREWORD
This study was made under the provisions of House Joint
Resolution No. 25 (1963). This resolution directed the Legislative
Council to appoint a committee to study Colorado criminal statutes and
their application, including but not limited to such subjects as
crimes against the person, crimes against property, crimes against
public health and safety, arrest and arraignment, sentencing, parole
and probation, narcotics control, and criminal insanity.
The Legislative Council committee appointed to make this
study included Senator Edward J. Byrne, Denver, chairman; Representative William E. Myrick, Englewood, vice chairman; Senator Vernon A.
Cheever, Colorado Springs; Senator William B. Chenoweth, Denver;
Senator James E. Donnelly, Trinidad; Senator Dale P. Tursi, Pueblo;
Representative Joseph R. Albi, Denver; Representative Robert S.
Eberhardt, Denvei:; Re.presentative Don Friedman, Denver; Representative.
John Kane, Northglenn; and Representative Walter R. Stalker, Joes.
Representative C. P. Lamb, Legislative Council Chairman, served as an
ex officio committee member.
The Council's committee in turn appointed an advisory committee whose members represented a cross section of knowledge and interest
in criminal law. This advisory committee included Judge Addison M.
Gooding, 14th Judicial District; Judge Mitchel B. Johns, 2nd Judicial
District; Judge Henry E. Santo, 2nd Judicial District; Judge Francis
L. Shallenberger, 13th Judicial District; Judge Max c. Wilson~ 11th
Judicial District; District Attorney Fred E. Sisk, 16th Judicial District; Assistant District Attorney David J. Hahn, 18th Judicial
District; Deputy District Attorney Melvin Rossman, 2nd Judicial Distric•t; Professor Fred Cohen, University of Denver School of Law;
Professor Austin S. Scott, University of Colorado School of Law; Mr.
C. J. Berardini, Denver; Mr. Fred E. Dickerson, Denver; Mr. Walter L.
Gerash, Denver; Mr. William V. Hodges, Sr., Denver; Mr. Robert T.
Kingsley, Denver; Mr. Dean Mabry, Trinidad; Mr. Vasco Seavy, Pueblo;
Mr. Robert Swanson, Denver; and Mr. William L. Rice, Denver •.
Mr. Phillip E. Jones and Mr. Harry O. Lawson, Legislative
Council senior research analysts, had the primary responsibility for
the staff work ,on this study, and were assisted by Mr. Myron H.
Schlechte and Mr. Roger M. Weber, research assistants. Mr. James C.
Wilson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Legislative
Reference Office, also assisted the committee.
Fifteen meetings, including three two-day meetings, were
held by this committee between April, 1963, and November, 1964. One
meeting was held to discuss sex offenses and offenders with Doctors
James Galvin, psychiatrist and former Director of Institutions,
Bernardo Gaviria, staff psychiatrist, Fort Logan Mental Health Center,
and Charles Oppegard, psychiatrist and Medical Director, Bethesda
Hospital· Colorado State Hospital Staff Psychologists George Stark
and William Ross; and Mr. Frank Dillon, Chief Probation Officer, 2nd
Judicial District. Also, this same subject was discussed with Mr.
Edward Grout, Executive Director, Division of Adult Parole, and Dr.
Mark Farrell, a psychiatrist formerly with the Division of Adult
vii

Parole. One meeting was held to discuss tentative drafts of proposed
definitions of several offenses with the Colorado Bar Association's
Criminal Laws and Procedure Committee at the Association's 1964 convention in Colorado Springs.
Professor Austin S. Scott, Jr., University of Colorado School
of Law, drafted the proposed homicide sections of the committee's
revised code and the committee is indebted to him for this and other
valuable aaslstance. The committee also is grateful for the assistance of Denver District Court Judges Mitchel B. Johns and Henry E. Santo:
Assistant District Attorneys David J. Hahn, James P. Johnson, and
Mel Rossman: and Messrs. Walter L. Gerash, Robert Kingsley, Dean
Mabry, William Rice, and Vasco Seavy, all of whom attended the committee's meetings on their own time and at their own expense.

Lrle C. Kyle
D rector

November 11, 1964
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CC1W~ITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings
If a "criminal code" is a catalogue of statutes defining
major crimes that are placed in appropriate categories and reasonably
related to fair penalties, and statutes comprehensively defining
general criminal law, including liability, justification, and responsibility, then Colorado has no criminal code. In place of a codified,
systematic body of law, Colorado has a collection of laws, narrow in
scope, separately enacted over a period of years and decades, scattered throughout the majority of 154 chapters,.requiring the supplementation of that vast accumulation of British pre-seventeenth century
judicial decisions known as common law.
Chapter 40 of the revised statutes, which includes the larger
portion of Colorado criminal laws, is a collection of statutes, the
majority of which are obsolete, unconstitutional, duplicative, or
highly specialized in scope. It contains many statutes that were
enacted in other jurisdictions prior to Colorado's admission into the
union. The model for much of the language of Colorado's present murder
statute, as well as the classification of murder in degrees, was the
Pennsylvania statute enacted in 1794. Chapter 40 contains statutes
enacted upon statehood and statutes enacted prior to the twentieth
century that have never been amended. Further, it contains statutes
that have been amended in such a manner as to cause additional duplications and to make distinctions between other crimes uncertain. Few
statutes cannot be criticized on the ground of verbosity.
A person convicted of murder in the first degree, if the
sent~nce of death is not imposed, becomes eligible for parole after
serving 10 years,l but a person convicted of second degree murder, a
lesser grade of murder, may have to serve 15, 20 or more years, before
becoming so eligible.2 The maximum penalty for de$troying a house
with fire is 20 years;3 with explosives, 10 years.4 The maximum
sentence for stealing a dog is 10 years; 5 and for ' killing the dog, six
month and a $500 fine.6 For driving another's automobile w;thout his
consent, the maximum sentence is 90 days under one section, 12 months
under another,8 and 10 years under a third.9 Indeed, there are over 50
sections defining some type of theft or another. Fourteen years is the
maximum penalty for both robbinglO and assaulting with intent to rob.11

1. 40-2-3(1) and 39-18-7(3), CRS 1963.

40-2-3(3) and 105-4-7, CRS 1963.
40-3-1, CRS 1963.
40-18-1, CRS 1963 (assuming the value of the house exceeds $500).
8-2-31, CRS 1963.
6. 40-18-1, CRS 1963 (assuming the value of the dog does not exceed
$500).
7. 40-18-37, CRS 1963.
8. 13-13-2, CRS 1963.
9. 40-5-9 and 40-5-2(4), CRS 1963.
10. 40-5-1(1), CRS 1963.
11. 40-2-34, CRS 1963.

2.

3.
4.
5.

xvii

Although a thorough revision of Colorado's criminal laws has
been advocated by some for many years, it was not until 1959 that a
legislative effort was made to examine this problem. In that year
the Legislative Council's Committee on Administration of Justice w~s
directed to make a report and recommendations on judicial organization
and administration as well as Colorado's criminal laws. The latter
subject, however, was not that committee's major concern, but its
report did contain an examination of the state's sentencing structure,
licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen, and the recommendation
that there be created, either on a single or multi-county basis, the
office of public defender.12
In 1961, the Legislative Council's Criminal Code Committee was
created for the sole purpose of examining Colorado's criminal laws.
The committee spent its two-year life examining the total penal system
in Colorado, including sentencing, licensing and regulation of bail
bondsmen, counsel for indigent defendants, inchoate crimes, consolidation of theft offenses, criminal insanity, robbery offenses, control
of narcotics, and the effect of the then proposed Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure on existing statutes.13 During that time, Legislative Council staff members addressed themselves to compiling and
publishing a comprehensive index of all offenses, misdemeanor and
felony, contained in the revised statutes. This index was prepared to
provide a basis for revising the substantive criminal code.
In 1963, the present Criminal Code Committee was created, pursuant to House Joint Resolution No. 25 to study criminal statutes and
their application, including such subjects as crimes against the person,
crimes against property, crimes against public health and safety, arrest and arraignment, sentencing, parole and probation, narcotics
control, and criminal responsibility. In effect, this resolution
directed the Legislative Council to create a committee to examine the
total penal system.
In deciding how to carry out its assignment best, the committee
agreed that its concern should be a major reexamination of the crimes
defined in Chapter 40, rather than a mere reorganization and reclarification. Although it recognized that the duty to examine other
facets of criminal law was necessary, it agreed that an attack on the
substantive provisions should be the first and major concern, and the
committee proceeded accordingly.
Comparisons of Colorado criminal statutes defining offenses
directed against persons and property, and offenses affecting public
decency, health, and safety, and public administration were made with

12.

Colorado Legislative Council, Judicial Administration in Colorado,
Research Publication No. 40, A Report of the Legislative Council
Committee on the Administration of Justice, December, 1960, pp.

13.

Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado Criminal Law, Research
Publication No. 68, A Report of the Legislative Council Criminal
Code Committee, December, 1962.

131-160.
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the newly revised codes of Illinois (1962), Louisiana (1942), New
Mexico (1963), and Wisconsin (1956), and the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code (1962). Many of the newly-revised laws enacted in
these jurisdictions and proposed in the Model Penal Code were adopted
by the committee, while other proposed changes were drafted by committee and advisory committee members. The remainder of the sections
proposed in this code of substantive law are merely restatements of
the present law,
Limitation of time has prevented the committee from undertaking
a reexamination and redrafting of the majority of the provisions
adopted. Only one meeting was held following the adoption of the complete code. Consequently, the committee is aware that coverage of
some sections overlap the scope of others, and . that some gaps exist.
A definition of the offense of wire tapping or eavesdropping is not
included, and an open act of sexual intercourse is an offense under
both the proposed adultery and fornication sections and the proposed
public indecency section. What is presented in this report is a firm
foundation, an adequate base, upon which the committee recommends
future effort should rest.
Limitation of time has also precluded the committee from assessing the relative seriousness of each offense. Proposed statutes were
adopted without regard to the possible penalty each might provide.
The committee agreed that the relative seriousness of each offense
should be assessed only after all offenses were defined. Also, each
offense should be labeled as to class, and the classification should
be dealt with in separate sections. Felonies and misdemeanors were
tentatively graded as follows:
MINIMUM PENALTY

CLASS

N'.AXIMUM PENALTY

Felonies
1
2
3
4
5

6

Life Imprisonment
Not Less Than 1 Year
Not Less Than 1 Year
Not Less Than l Year
Not Less Than 1 Year
Not Less Than l Year

Death
Life Imprisonment
20 Years
15 Years
10 Years
5 Years

Misdemeanors
Months or $500

1

6

2
3
4
5

3 Months or $250
30 Days or $100

No Imprisonment or Fine
No Imprisonment or Fine

12 Months and $1,000
6

Months and $500

3 Months and $250

30 Days and $100
$100

No minimum terms of imprisonment for felonies, other than for
a class I felony. were set by the committee. However, the minimum
term should be fairly low so as to give the court the maximum choice
in selecting the penalty to fit the offender. Also, because of the
possibility of probation, high statutory minimum penalties are almost
meaningless.
xix
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The accompanying pages contain the results of the committee's
work. Comments are presented to explain generally what is and is not
criminal within the scope of each section, and the reasons for such
inclusion or exclusion.
Recommendations
This committee recommends that a legislative committee be
created upon the adjournment of the 1965 Regular Session for the purpose of:
1) Placing in final form the definitions of the specific
offenses presented in this report and general provisions;
2) Preparing a rational classification of penalties and
grading the offenses accordingly;
3) Discussing the proposed substantive code with interested
members of the bench, bar, and other groups following its distribution.
Much can be gained if this committee and the Colorado Bar Association's
Criminal Laws and Procedure Committee meet en bane well before the
session in which this recommended committee intends to introduce its
proposed substantive code;
4) Examining the vast number of procedural and regulatory
provisions that provide incidental criminal sanctions. These sanctions,
for the most part, are misdemeanor offenses and many, through reference
to the code of substantive criminal law, can be omitted; and
5) Codifying and, where the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure conflict or where injustices or abuses of the present law are
known to exist, revise Colorado's non-substantive code of criminal law.
This codification of criminal procedure should encompass arrest and
bail through venue, information and indictments, and probation and
sentencing to appeal and parole. The enactment of a new code of substantive criminal law should be followed by the enactment of a new
code of criminal procedure.
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PART A.

OFFENSES DIRECTED AGAINST THE PERSON
ARTICLE 1.

40-1-1.

Murder.

(1)

HOMICIDE

Any. person who kills another person

without lawful justification and not under circumstances which reduce
the killing to voluntary manslaughter commits murder if, while engag~d
in the conduct which cauaes the death:
(a}

He intends either to kill or do great bodily harm to that
per.on or another; or

(b)

He •ngag•s in such conduct ~eckleasly under circumstances
·revealing his extreme indifference to the value of human
life, even though he has no intent to kill or do great
bodily harma or

(c)

He is attempting or committing, or is an accomplice in
attempting or committing, or la in !light after attempting
or committing, the crime of arson, rape, robbery, mayhem,
burglary or kidnaping, even though he haa no intent to
kill or do great bodily harm.

(2)

In order for any such killing to constitute murder, the

death must occur within a year and a day after the cause of death w11
inflicted, in -the computation of which the whole of the day on which
the cause of death was inflicted shall be ·considered the fir,t day.
(3)

If the person charged with murder pleads not guilty, he
I

,

shall be tried to a jury, which shall first determine his guilt or
innocence by its unanimous verdict without determining the penalty.
If the jury finds him guilty of murder, the same court shall conduct
a separate proceeding, before the same jury which determined his

guilt, to determine the penalty.
J

At this proceeding the jury shall,

by a unanimous verdict, fix the penalty at death, or at imprisonment
in the penitentiary for life, or at imprisonment in the penitentiary
for an indeterminate term of not less than ten years nor more than
twenty-five years: provided, that the death penalty shall not be imposed upon one who, at the time of the conduct causing death, was
under the age of eighteen years, nor upon one who has been convicted
upon circumstantial evidence alone.

If the jury is unable to reach

a unanimous verdict to fix the penalty, the court snall discharge the
jury and impose the sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
an indeterminate term of not less than ten years nor more than twentyfive years.
(4)

If the person charged with murder pleads guilty to the

charge, the co~rt shall impanel a jury for the sole purpose of imposing one penalty among the three alternative penalties set forth in
subsection (3): but if the district attorney informs the court that
he does not seek the death penalty, th~ jury shall, by unanimous
verdict, fix the penalty at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life
or for the indeterminate term of years set forth in subsection (3).
In either case, if the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict,
the court shall discharge the jury and impose the sentence of imprisonment for the indeterminate term of years set forth in subsection (3).
(5)

In the proceeding to determine the penalty, evidence may

be presented by the district attorney or the defendant as to any
matter which the court deems relevant to the imposition of the penalty,
including the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical condition, and
any other of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in
subsections (6) and (7).

Any such evidence which the court deems to

have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissability
- 2 -

under the exclusionary rules of -evidence, provided that the defendant
is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence.

The jury

shall not impose the death penalty unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (6) and further finds that
there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency.

The district attorney and the defendant shall be per-

mitted to present argument for or against the ~eath penalty.
(6)

Aggravating circumstances:
(a)

The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.

(b)

The defendant was previously convicted of another
murder or of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to the person.

(c)

At the time the murder was committed the defendant
also committed another murder.

(d)

The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of
'
death to many persons.

(e)

The murder was committed while the defendant was
attempting or committing, or was an accomplice in
attempting or comm_itting, or was in flight after
attempting or committing, the crime of arson, rape,
robbery, mayhem, burglary or kidnaping.

(f)

The murder was committed for the purpo~e of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from lawful custody.

(g)

The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.

(h)

The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.
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(7)

Mitigating circumstances:
(a)

The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity.

(b)

The murder was committed· while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.

(c)

The victim was a participant in the defendant's
homicidal conduct or consented to it • .

(d)

The murder was committed under circumstances which
the defendant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.

te)

The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation in
the homicidal conduct was relatively minor.

(f} .The defendant acted under duress or under the

domination of another person.
(g)

At the time of the murder, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental
disease or defect or intoxication, although he was
not criminally insane.

(h)

Thi youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.

Comment
A major portion of the proposed code contains sections which
are restatements of existing law put in modern language, but there are
several sections which radically depart from the present law. The
proposed murder statute is one of these departures. Following is a
section-by-section
analysis of the proposed murder statute.
,
(1) Murder. The present statute defines murder as the''···
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought •.• "
-
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(40-2-1 CRS 1963). Malice is either express malice(" ••• deliberate
intenti~n unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature which
is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof ••• " (40-2-2,
CRS 1963)) or implied malice ( 11 • • • when no considerable provocation
appears, or when circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963}).
The committee rejected the use of the phrases "malice aforethought" and "abandoned and malignant heart." Malice is not an easy
word to define. Courts have ruled that malice signifies a condition
of the mind and heart at the time of the act; the deliberate intent
unlawfully to kill, but does not necessarily mean ill-will toward the
person killed or toward any particular person; and a general recklessness of the lives and safety of others, or a condition of the mind
that shows a heart devoid of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.
An "abandoned and malignant heart" has often been defined as extreme
indifference to the value of human life. Not only are these phrases
archaic, but they often result in confusion among lawyers as well as
non-lawyers, particularly jurors. The committee did retain, however,
the deliberate intent and recklessness elements of malice.
The committee has redefined murder as the killing of a person
under the following conditions:
(1) the killing is without lawful justification, and
(2) not under circumstances which reduce the killing to
voluntary manslaughter if:
(a} the actor intended to kill or seriously harm the
victim or another; or
(b) the actor without intending to kill or seriously
harm the victim or another:
{i} engages in reckless conduct which reveals his·
extreme indifference to human life, or
{ii) is attempting, committing, aiding in the attempt
or commission, or fleeing from the attempt or
commission of a major felony (arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, burglary, and kidnaping}.
Es~entially, the three types of homicides contained in the proposed murder draft (intentional, unintentional but caused by reckless
conduct and extreme indifference to human life, and violent felony homicides} are contained in the present murder statute as first degree
murder. All other homicides committed with "malice aforethought" but
not denominated as first degree murder are defined as second degree
murder in the present statute. The· committee felt it was unwise to
define what murders should be subject to punishment of death and what
murders should not. (Presently, death can be handed down only if the
jury decides at the same time the defendant 1) is guilty, and 2) guilty
of first degree murder.) As a consequence, every person, if found
guilty of murder under the proposed statute, can be sentenced to death
provided:
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(1) the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time he
inflicted the cause of death (present death penalty cannot
be imposed if the defendant was 17 years of age or younger
at the time of his conviction rather than at the time of
the offense), and
(2) the defendant was not convicted solely upon circumstantial
evidence, and
(3) at least one aggravating circumstance, not offset by mitigating circumstances, was present.
(l)(a) Purposely or Intentionally. A homicide resulting from
an intention to kill or seriously harm another (whether the victim was
the intended victim or an innocent bystander) clearly is murder.
Obviously, such a homicide must have occurred without substantial
provocation, excuse, or justification. Such a homicide under the
present law is an act of first degree murder -- "All murder which shall
be perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture, or any
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing ••• or perpetrated design, unlawfully and maliciously, to effect the death of any
human being other than him who is killed ••• sha~l be deemed murder of
the first degree ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963).
(l)(b) Recklessness. A homicide resulting from extreme indifference to human life, coupled with reckless conduct, is also defined
as murder. Present law, in different language, defines this type of
homicide also as first degree murder -- "All murder which shall be •••
perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and
indicating a depraved mind, regardless of human life, shall be deemed
murder of the first degree ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963). -Examples of
this type of murder include shooting-into an occupied automobile or
train, and guiding a speedboat through an area expressly reserved for
swimmers. Although chance is against the specific act causing death,
extreme indifference to the value of human life is exhibited. If
recklessness exists but is not considered extreme, the homicide is
involuntary manslaughter.
(l){c) Felony-Homicide. Felony-murder is considered first
degree murder under present law -- "All muraer which shall be •••
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary ••• shall be deemed murder of the
first degree ••• " (40-2-3~ CRS 1963)
-- and is also defined as
murder in the proposed statute. Felony-homicide will only constitute
murder if it is committed purposely or knowingly, or recklessly where
the recklessness demonstrates extreme indifference to the value of
human life. However, recklessness is presumed if the actor is
attempting, committing, aiding the attempt or commission or fleeing
from the commission of arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, burglary, and
kidnaping (kidnaping is not included in the present law; its inclusion
in the proposed law is based on the similar threat of harm present in
the other specific and violent offenses). If extreme recklessness
cannot be proven, the homicide constitutes involuntary manslaughter.
(2) A Year and a Day. In order for a killing to constitute
either murder or manslaughter under the present law, it is essential
the victim.die within one year and one day after the cause of death
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was inflicted. In computing this period of time, the cause of death
is considered to be inflicted on the first day (40-2-9, CRS 1963).
With the exception of changes in language, this proposed section
contains the same limitation. However, this limitation is not available under the proposed sections as a bar to prosecution for manslaughter. During the days of English common law, the time when this
bar to prosecution developed, it was difficult for medical experts to
know for certain the exact cause of a person's death beyond the expiration of a year. Medical science has improved since common law
days, and now the cause of a death which occurred 20 or 30 years prior
to death can be detected. Inhalation of mustard and other World War I
gases, for example, are being listed as the cause of death today of
many veterans.
However, the committee did not believe it to be wise to remove this limitation. As an intended murder victim continues to live
beyond the moment of harm inflicted, the chances of his eventual death
being caused by erroneous or unskillful medical treatment, in addition
to the inflicted harm, are increased. Also, gross neglect or improper
treatment by the victim, such as not submitting to a necessary operation or adopting a new and necessary diet, climate or occupation, can
contribute to his death. With the passage of time, in~ervening
factors can and sometimes do affect the victim's longevity.
(3) Bifurcate Trial. Normally, a court before whom a defendant has been convicted of a non-capital offense felony will investigate the defendant's background, including his prior criminal record,
if any, his character, and his mental and physical condition. This
investigation is made to inform thoroughly the court concerning the
defendant, and is helpful in determining the defendant's sentence.
Much of this information cannot be submitted during the trial, however, as it would be considered irrelevant, if not prejudicial, in the
determination of guilt or innocence.
Under the present law, the verdict of guilt or innocence, and,
if the verdict of guilty and guilty of first degree murder, the
punishment of a defendant is determined by a jury without the assistance of a pre-sentence inquiry. The committee, to inform fully the
jury in capital cases, recommends that a procedure analogous to that
of non-capital cases should be included in the murder statute. The
committee recommends that during the trial all evidence which does
not have a bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence be excluded
(present practice). However, upon the completion of the presentation
of evidence, the jury will retire to deliberate solely upon a verdict
of guilt or innocence. Upon the jury's verdict of guilty (a verdict
of not guilty naturally would terminate the proceedings), a special
and separate trial or hearing would be commenced. During this
proceeding both defense and prosecution will present any aggravating
or mitigating evidence which the court would deem relevant to the
imposition of the penalty, including the nature and circumstances of
the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, and mental
and physical condition.
The same court and jury are retained for this second proceeding so that evidence relating to the crime will not have to be repeated.
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Because of the severity of the maximum penalty allowed for
murder (the same reason for the special proceeding), the jury must
unanimously fix the penalty. If the sentence of death or life or the
indeterminate term of years cannot be agreed upon unanimously, the
jury is dismissed, and the court then must sentence the defendant,
prescribing the lowest possible penalty. (Unanimity is presently
required by the rules of criminal procedure.)
Similar to the death penalty limitation contained in the
present law, the jury,under the proposed law, may not set the penalty
at death for a defendant found guilty solely upon circumstantial
evidence. The present law also prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty when the person convicted is 17 years old or younger at the
time of conviction. This prohibition is included although the age
has been changed from 17 at the time of conviction to 17 at the time
of harm inflicted. The former time seems irrelevant.
(4) Abbreviated Proceeding. Upon the entry of a plea of
guilty, subject to the provisions of the present statute, the court
must impanel a jury to decide whether the killing was murder of the
first and second degree and, if first degree, whether or not the
death penalty should be chosen as the penalty.
Under the proposed section, a guilty plea also may be entered,
and, if so, a jury must be impaneled to determine the penalty
death, life imprisonment, or a term of ten to 25 years.
It was the consensus of the committee and its advisors that a
district attorney knows, immediately prior to the trial, whether or
not he is prosecuting a capital murder case. This knowledge may be
based on the defendant's age, type of evidence, or on other facts.
Thus, the committee felt that if a district attorney were able to
inform the court that he does not seek the maximum penalty upon the
entry of a plea of guilty, a jury could decide the penalty somewhat
quicker, e.g.,by having to debate only two-thirds of the possible
penalties. In addition, it is conceivable a jury could be impaneled
quicker, the district attorney not having to examine prospective
jurors on their attitudes toward capital punishment. Most important,
however, is the belief that if the defense is aware of the district
attorney's lack of a desire to seek the death penalty, it is expected
many "not guilty" pleas that are entered only because of the death
penalty will be withdrawn and "guilty" pleas entered instead. The net
effect of amended pleas would be to reduce the court's time, only the
second part of the trial (sentencing) being necessary.
(5) Aggravation and Mitigation. This proposed section, not
comparable to anything contained in the present law. lists aggravating
and mitigating circumstances that might be present at the time of the
murder. During the second part of the two-part trial, either the
defense or the prosecution may present any evidence, including but not
limited to those items presented in this section, provided the court
believes the evidence relevant to the imposition of the penalties,
regardless of the admissability of the evidence under the exclusionary
rules of evidence. The court must give the defendant an opportunity
to rebut any hearsay evidence.
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At least one aggravating circumstance must be present at the
time of the murder in order for the jury to consider the death penalty.
However, the presence of at least one mitigating circumstance may
negate any number of aggravating circumstances.
40-1-2.

Voluntary manslaughter.

(1)

Any person who, with

intent to kill or do great bodily harm, kills another without lawful
justification commits voluntary manslaughter if, while engaged in the
conduct which causes the deaths
(a)

He is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from provocation by the person killed, or by another whom
the offender endeavors to kill but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the person killed, which
provocation is sufficient to excite an intense passion in
a reasonable person; however, if there should appear to
have been an interval between the provocation given and
the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason to be
heard, the killing shall be punished as murder; or

(b)

He is acting in the exercise of his privilege of selfdefense or defense of others or defense of dwelling or
his privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of
a felony, in the belief that the circumstances are such
that, if they in fact existed, would justify the killing,
but his belief is unreasonable.

(2)

Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a

class ___ felony.
Comment
This section replaces several sections in the present code
which define the offense of voluntary homicide, an offense not considered quite as serious as murder in that the killing must occur
almost immediately after the intention to kill was formed. It is a
lesser grade of homicide than murder.
Present Colorado law (40-2-4, CRS 1963) defines voluntary
manslaughter as the killing of another without lawful justification, and:
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(1) without malice, express or implied,
(2) which results from a sudden heat of passion caused by

provocation that is apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible.
This provocation, in turn, can be caused either by:
(1) a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the
actor, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a
reasonable person, or
(2) an attempt by the victim to commit a serious personal
injury on the actor.
The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of
irresistible passion; if an interval of time occurs between the provoking act and the killing, sufficient for the actor to collect his
wits and reflect upon the seriousness of causing another's death, the
homicide constitu1:es murder and not voluntary manslaughter.
This section essentially restates the present law, although
provocation caused by the victim's criminal attempt has been expanded.
Both the present and the proposed sections require the killing
to result from provocation which, in turn, must be caused either by
the infliction or attempt to inflict serious injury upon the actor.
Completed Act
Cause of provocation. Present Colorado law states that the
act or conduct causing provocation must be a serious and highly provoking injury upon the actor. The proposed statute requires only
"provocation," and it may be caused either by the victim or, in the
case of a death of an innocent bystander, the intended victim. By
not requiring an actual and serious injury, the proposed section
avoids arbitrarily limiting the nature of the circumstances which
provoke the act. Used in this context, the term "provocation" includes any act which mentally or emotionally disturbs the actor.
Degree of provocation. Both present and proposed law require
that the provocation must be sufficient to excite passion in a reasonable person. The present law requires the passion to be "irresistible"
while that proposed here requires "intense 11 passion. Either word may
indicate "extreme emotional disturbance."
Result of provocation. Both present and proposed laws require
that the killing occur as a result of the extreme emotional disturbance. This proposed section
requires the killing to result from the
actor acting under a 11 sudden and intense passion, 11 while the present
statute requires a "sudden violent impulse of irresistible passion."
The passion must be sudden in order for the homicide to constitute voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The intent to kill
must be formulated quickly after the provocation, and the homicide
committed immediately thereafter. Present law states that if the
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length of time between the provocation and the killing is sufficient
"for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard," the homicide is
an act of revenge and constitutes murder. According to case law, the
time interval must be of sufficient length so that one thought could
follow another. (22 Colo. 53). This "cooling off" provision has
been included in this section in essentially the same language.
Attempted Act
Present law states that if the victim, while attempting to
commit a serious and personal injury upon the actor is killed, the
homicide constitutes voluntary manslaughter if, subject to the defense
contained in 40-2-15, CRS 1963, the homicide was not absolutely necessary. (Section 40-2-15 reads in part, "If a person kills another in
self-defense it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing
that in order to save his own life or to prevent his receiving great
bodily harm the killing of the other was absolutely necessary."} To
be an absolutely necessary homicide, the actor must have tried to
prevent, either by retreating or by some other method, any further
combat with the victim prior to his death. Colorado courts have ruled
that apparent necessity, if well grounded and of such a character as
·to appeal to a reasonable person, is sufficient to require action and
justify the application of the doctrine of self defense to the same
extent as actual or real necessity. (47 Colo. 352). When a person
has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that danger of
death or great-bodily harm is imminent, he may kill in order to defend himself, although it may turn out that the belief was false, and
he was mistaken as to the extent of the real or actual danger.
This section is essentially a restatement of the present
statutory defense, as refined by court interpretation. If~ person
kills to prevent his own death or serious bodily harm, the homicide
constitutes voluntary manslaughter only if he believes "unreasonablI"
that the "circumstances are such that, if they in fact existed, wou d
justify the killing ••• " Homicides caused by unreasonable beliefs
must be approached as crimes of recklessness or negligence but cannot
be considered as serious as intentional or purposeful homicides.
This section also includes homicides caused by the unreasonable belief of the actor that he has no alternative to the defense of
another or his home and to the prevention or termination of the commission of any felony offense, which are present justifications.
40-1-3.

Involuntary manslaughter.

Any person who kills

another without intent to do so and without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his conduct, whether lawful or unlawful, which causes the death creates an unreasonable risk of death
or great bodily harm to some person, and he engages in that conduct
recklessly but not under circumstances revealing his extreme· indif-
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ference to the value of human life.

Whoever commits involuntary

manslaughter is guilty of a class _ _ felony.
Comment
This section is similar to the present law with the exception
of the definition of the conduct of the actor; both present and proposed sections require the homicide to be committed without lawful·
justification and without the intent to com~it the homicide.
Present Colorado law requires the conduct to be either an
unlawful act or a lawful act without "due caution or circumspection."
(40-2-4, CRS 1963). The proposed section differs in that the conduct
which causes the death:
(1) must be engaged in recklessly but not under circumstances
revealing extreme indifference to the value of human life
(an element of murder),
(2) can be either lawful or unlawful, and
(3) must create an unreasonable risk of death or great bodily
harm to another.
As explained elsewhere, a homicide is considered murder under
the proposed murder section if the homicide is the intention of the
actor or, without intending to kill, the actor engages in reckless
conduct which reveals or is presumed to reveal his extreme indifference
to the value of human life. The proposed murder section excludes all
other types of felony-homicides (other than those which, when committed,
reveal extreme indifference) which constitute second degree murder
under present law. These homicides now constitute voluntary mans~
laughter.
It follows that a homicide committed without the intention to
kill and without extreme recklessness should be treated as a crime
other than murder. Coverage proposed here includes conduct that is
presently an element of voluntary manslaughter:
(1) legal and reckless conduct that causes a homicide; and
(2) misdemeanor-homicides;
and conduct that is presently an element of second degree murder:
(1) felony-homicides, other than those homicides which reveal
or presume to reveal extreme indifference.
There is, however, no presumption of recklessness in this
section if the conduct which causes death is illegals the question
of whether the actor's conduct demonstrates a "conscious disregard"
for the safety of another will have to be decided by the trier of
facts in the light of the particular circumstances of the homicide.
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40-1-4.

Neglig•nt bomi51de.

Any person who kills another

without intent to do so and without lawful justification commits
negligent ho~icide if his conduct, whether lawful or unlawful, which
causes the death creates an unreasonable risk of death or great
bodily harm to some person, and he engages in that conduct negligently.
Whoever commits negligent homicide is guilty of a class ____ misdemeanor.
Comment
This section deals with homicides caused by negligent conduct.
Under present Colorado law, a homicid~ caused by negligence and occurring under certain conditions is criminal; no broad, general negligent homicide statute is contained in the present criminal code. Th•••
specific crimes ·include:
"Any person while under the influence of intoxicating liquor •••
who causes the death of another by operating or driving an
automobile ••• in a ••• negligent ••• manner ••• shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of not
less than one year nor more than fourteen years." (40-2-10,
CRS 1963);
.
·
and
"If any lives shall be lost by reason of the willful negligence ••• to observe the provisions of this article if!onstruction Requirements of Public Buildings?, the person through
whose default such loss of life was occasioned shall be •••
punished by a fine not less than one thousana nor more than
five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the penitentiary
not less than six months nor more than ten years, or by both
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
(17-1-6, CRS 1963).
The scope of this section is therefore dependent upon the
meaning of the term "negligent conduct.'' The term, as defined in
proposed section ____ and in the context of this section, means
that the actor causes the death of another by engaging in conduct
which constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care
which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. The actor
need not know his conduct creates a substantial risk that a homicide
will follow. A gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard
of care, which demonstrates that a substantial and unreasonable risk of
death was consciously created. is "reckless conduct," and is an
element of involuntary manslaughter.
The scope of this section has been enlarged to include all
negligent homicides. It appears there is no need or desirability for
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individual, particularized provisions or offenses addressed to fatally
negligent conduct in specific areas of activity.
Presumably, this proposed section, carrying only a misdemeanor
penalty, would be used for prosecution of the majority of vehicle
homicides, although crimes of "recklessness" could be used for more
heinous acts. Presently, most prosecutions for vehicle homicides are
carried out under the involuntary manslaughter statute, which provides a simil~r penalty to that proposed here.
40-1-5.

Concealing death of child.

Any woman who conceals

the corpse of any issue of her body with intent to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive commits the crime of
concealing the death of a child and is guilty of a class _ __
misdemeanor.

Nothing herein shall be so construed as to prevent such

mother from being prosecuted for the murder or manslaughter of such
child.
Comment
This section defin~s an offense which is committed by any
woman who conceals the body of a child to which she has given birth
with the intent to prevent a determination of whether it was born
dead or alive. This section is substantially a restatement of the
present law, and reflects the following changes: 1) immaterial facts,
such as whether the child was male or female, have been omitted; 2)
the definition has been broadened to include legitimate as well as
illegitimate children; and 3) the required intent has been narrowed
to require only the intent to prevent a determination of whether the
child was born dead or alive. Present law contains a broader intent;
i.e., the intent that the issue of her body does not come to light.
Both the present and proposed sections specifically state that
a prosecution under this section does not bar a subsequent prosecution
for murder, if such is the case.
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ARTICLE 2.
40-2-1.

ASSAULTS AND BATTERIES

Simple assault.

Any person who attempts to commit

a battery or intentionally places another in reasonable apprehension
of receiving a battery commits simple assault and is guilty of a
class

--- misdemeanor.

Comment
two ways:

Under this proposed section, an assault may be committed in

(1) An assault is defined as an attempt to commit a battery.
Consequently, there must be an overt acti a substantial step in the
offender's course of conduct, which is panned to culminate in the
commission of a battery. An intentional act of force or violence must
have begun to be executed but not completed. An intentional and completed act of force or violence against another, of course, constitutes
a battery.
(2) An assault is defined also as the intentional placing of
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. This is
essentially a restatement of the present definition of assault, i.e.,
an unlawful attempt coupled with a.present ability to commit a violent
injury on the person of another (40-2-33, CRS 1963). The committee
noted that several newly-revised criminal codes, including the Wisconsin
criminal code, define an assault only as an attempt to commit a battery.
Indeed, the Wisconsin code makes no mention of assault, relying solely
upon its attempt provisions as a remedy. However, the committee agreed
that the basis of the present assault offense is the creation of a
well-founded fear of immediate peril in the mind of the victim. Also,
the committee was aware of the difficulty in practice of drawing a
precise line which separates violence that is menaced from violence
that is begun to be executed. Consequently, it decided that the unequivocal appearance of an attempt with force or violence to do such an
act as will convey to the mind of the victim a "reasonable apprehension"
of imminent danger of bodily harm should be retained as an essential
element of assault. The reasonableness of the victim's apprehension is
a question for the trier of the facts to decide.
40-2-2.

Aggravated assault.

Any person who commits simple

assault with a dangerous weapon commits aggravated assault and is
guilty of a class ___ felony.
Comment
Aggravated assault, as defined in this section, is the doing
of those acts within the scope of simple assault, coupled with the
presence and use of a dangerous weapon.
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Aggravated assault may be either an attempt to commit a
battery with a dangerous weapon, e.g., shooting at another with an
intent to injure, or the placing of another in reasonable apprehension
of receiving a battery with a dangerous weapon, e.g., the pointing at
another of an unloaded firearm or a firearm that, because of an absence
of a firing pin or some other necessary part, is incapable of being
discharged. The shooting at another, if coupled with the intent to
cause the other's death, should not be prosecuted under this section.
Such an act constitutes an attempt to murder and should be prosecuted
under the general criminal attempt provisions.
This section, by replacing the present assault with a deadly
weapon provision (40-2-34, CRS 1963), eliminates the requirement of
the specific intent to commit upon the person of another, with a deadly
weapon, instrument or other thing, a bodily injury where no considerable provocation appears or where the circumstances of the assault show
an abandoned and malignant heart. Under the present law, the placing
of another under a reasonable apprehension of receiving an injury with
the use of a deadly weapon that is incapable of being fired constitutes
only a simple assault, a misdemeanor offense.
This section also replaces the present assault with int~nt to
commit larceny, mayhem, murder, rape or robbery provision (40-2-34,
CRS 1963). This present section, because of its limited scope, does
not cover assaults to commit other equally serious offenses, such as
sodomy, also, l t appears unfair to subject a convicted offender to a
possible 14-year term of imprisonment for merely placing another in
reasonable apprehension of being a victim to one of these offenses.
For these reasons, the committee agreed that an assault to commit any
of these offenses should be prosecuted under either:
(1) the proposed simple assault section, ·if the offender
was not armed with a dangerous weapon and no overt act
was performed: or
(2) the proposed aggravated assault section, if the offender·
was armed with a dangerous weapon and no overt act was
performed; or
(3) the general criminal attempt section regardless of
whether or not the offender was armed with a dangerous
weapon, if an overt act was performed.
40-2-3.

Simple battery.

Any person who intentionally uses

force or violence upon another or intentionally administers a poison or
other noxious liquid or substance to another commits simple battery
and is guilty of a class

--- misdemeanor.

Comment
Under the present law, assault and battery, defined as a
single offense, is the unlawful beating of another \40-2-35, CRS 1963).
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Under this proposed· section, a battery is 1) the intentional use of
force or violence upon another, and 2) the intentional administration
of a poison or some other toxic item. This section covers all forcible
and violent contact, irrespective of the degree of force or violence.
Any forcible contact is sufficient and no physical harm or injury need
result. force upon another may be achieved by grabbing another's arm
as well as "beating" him. Administering a poison to another is considered here as being equally harmful as the use of force or violence.
If, however, the poison is administered with the intent to cause the
victim's death, the offender should be prosecuted under the general
criminal attempt statute for an attempt to commit murder. Thus, a
battery may be committed either directly or indirectly. A battery must
be the intention of the offender; no specific intent to injure is required. Injury or harm caused by the offender's recklessness or
negligence is outside the scope of this section. Consent of the victim
is no defense since consent of the victim is not element of the offense
of simple battery.
40-2-4.

Aggravated battery.

Any person who commits a simple

battery with a dangerous weapon commits aggravated battery and is
guilty of a class ___ felony.
Comment
Aggravated battery is simple battery committed with a dangerous
weapon. It is essentially a new offense in that it replaces no present
section other than mayhem. Aggravated battery is considered a more
serious offense than simple battery because of the higher probability
of the offender causing death, serious disfigurement, and_ permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a bodily member or
organ. Aggravated battery must be the intention of the offender; no
specific intent to injure, etc., is required. Injury or harm caused by
the offender's reckless or negligent use of a dangerous weapon is outside the scope of this section. Also, consent of the victim is not a
defense to prosecution.
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ARTICLE 3.
40-3-1.

KIDNAPING

False imprisonment.

Any person who intentionally

confines or detains another without the other's consent and without

proper legal authority commits false imprisonment and is guilty of a
class

--- misdemeanor.

Comment
This section is a restatement of the present offense defined
in 40-2-42, CRS 1963. The present offense is defined as the unlawful
violation of the personal liberty of another, and consists in confinement or detention without sufficient authority.
40-3-2.

Simple kidnaping.

Any person who intentionally does

any of the following acts commits simple kidnaping and is guilty of a
class ____ felony:
(1)

Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to
another without his consent and without lawful justification; or

(2)

Takes, entices or decoys away, for an unlawful purpose,
any child not his own and under the age of 18 years,
without the consent of its parent or guardian.

Comment
Simple kidnaping is aggravated false imprisonment. It requires a confinement or restraint without consent and without proper
legal authority plus some aggravating factor, other than an intent
to extort a ransom.
In subsection (l)(a), force is used to overcome the victim's
refusal to consent to the carrying from one place to another. This
subsection covers a normal case of kidnaping where the victim is
overpowered and is lifted or forced at gun point into an awaiting car.
A special situation where force is not required is covered in subsection (l)(b). The offender need not have a special motive to kidnap,
with the exception of extortina ransom. Kidnaping for ransom is considered the most heinouA offense which violates personal liberty, and
is dealt with accordingiy in proposed section 40-3-3. It is essential
under this subsection that the victim is moved from one place to
another, although this definition is broad enough to cover a situation
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in which the victim is carried or forced to move from one room to
another, a distance of only a few feet. It is not essential that the
victim is an adult or a juvenile and is harmed or unharmed. These
facts are some of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which
obviously should be considered by the court following the defendant••
conviction and prior to his sentencing.
In subsection (l)(b), force is not required, but the victim
· must be a juvenile. Children under the age of 18 can be taken away
without the use of force because they are too young to understand what
is happening: an offer of candy to a child can be just as persuasive
as a poirit of a gun is to an adult. The actor must have an intent to
commit an unlawful act, harmfulness which corresponds to the danger of
force required in subsection (l)(a). Usually,· this will be an intent
to commit a sex offense. However, the language is sufficiently broad
enough to include any unlawful act. The child enticed away must not
be the offender's child. This exclusion covers cases where a parent
takes his child who is in the legal custody of the other parent -conduct which, although undesirable, is not kidnaping under this proposed section and is covered by proposed section 40-3-4.
The victim's age, the actor's method and degree of enticement,
and the seriousness of the intended unlawful act are aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, as the case may be, and should be weighed
by the court upon the defendant's conviction but prior to his sentenc•
ing.
40-3-3.

Aggravated kidnaping.

(1)

Any person who does any

of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim, or
some other pe~son, to give up anything of value in order to secure a
release of the person under the offender's actual or apparent control
commits aggravated kidnaping:
(a)

forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to
another; or

(b)

Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to
another; or

(c)

Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person.

(2)

Whoever commits aggravated kidnaping is guilty of a

class ____ felony if any person kidnaped shall have suffered
bodily harm; provided, that no person convicted of aggravated kidnaping shall suffer the death penalty if at the time of the offense he
was under the age of 18 years, if he was convicted on circumstantial
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evidence alone, or if each person kidnaped was liberated alive prior
to his conviction.
(3)

Whoever commits aggravated kidnaping is guilty of a

class_ felony if, prior to his conviction, each person kidnaped
was liberated unharmed.
Comment
This section defines the offense of simple kidnaping and false
imprisonment with the intent to extort a ransom. It increases the
penalty for kidnaping when it is done for ransom. If a person does
any of the acts in subsections (l)(a), (l)(b) or (l)(c) with the intent to demand a ransom in return for the release of his victim, he is
guilty under this section. Although ransom will usually be money, the
broader term "anything of value 11 is used to cover things like jewels
or other valuables.
To maximize his incentive to return the victim unharmed, a
number of penalties may be imposed on a convicted kidnaper, depending
on two aggravating factors: the harm inflicted upon the victim,
and whether or not the victim was released prior to his ccmviction.
The maximum penalty is death if the victim is not released and harmed,
. life imprisonment if the victim is released harmed, and____ years
if the victim is released unharmed.
Two additional facts may also bar the death penalty from
being imposed: the kidnaper was convicted solely on circumstantial
evidence or the kidnaper was under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the offense. These two defenses are contained in the
present law. Except for the change that the actor must be under 18
at the time of the offense rather than at the time of his conviction.
(the latter time being irrelevant), these two defenses are essentially
restatements of the defenses contained in the present law, and are
identical to the defenses contained in the proposed murder statute;
40-3-4.

Violation of custody.

(l)(a)

Any person, including

a natural or foster parent, who, knowing that he has no privilege to.
do so or heedless in that regard, takes or entices any child under
the age of eighteen years from the custody of its parent, guardian,
or other lawful custodian shall be guilty of a class
(b)

--- felony.

Any parent or other person who violates an order of any

district or juvenile court of this state, granting the custody of a
child under the age of eighteen years to any person, agency, or institution, with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian of the custody
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of a child under the age of eighteen years, shall be guilty of a
class _ _ _ felony.
(2)

It shall be an affirmative defense either that the of-

f ender reasonably believ·ed that his conduct was necessary to preserve

the child from danger to its welfare, or that the child, being at the
time not less than fourteen years old, was taken away at its own
instigation without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal
offense with or against the child.

Knowledge or disregard of the fact

that a child is below the age of fourteen years shall be presumed.
Comment
This section is new law, designed to meet a situation which
-not infrequently arises and for which there is at present no proper
remedy.
Under present Colorado law, no felony offense is committed if
a divorced parent, who was not granted the custody of his child or
children, takes his child from its lawful custodian. If the parent
having the unlawful custody of his child remains in Colorado, the
court could convict the parent under a kidnaping provision which provides a misdemeanor penalty. If he leaves the state, however, the
court is powerless: a commission of a misdemeanor is not a sufficient
ground for extradition.
Generally, there are only two remedies
available to a parent granted the custody of a child when the other
parent unlawfully removes them from Colorado: 1) "re-kidnap" the
child and return to Colorado, or 2) ask a court of pro~er jursidiction
in which the children are now residing to hold a custody hearing.
Violation of lawful custody of children requires special
legislation, notwithstanding its similarity in some respects to kidnaping. The interest to be protected is not freedom from physical
danger or terrorization by abduction, since this is covered elsewhere,
but rather the maintenance of parental custody against all unlawful
interruptions, except if the child is 14 years of age or older and is
a willing, undeceived participant in the attack on this interest of
its parent. The problem is further distinguishable from kidnaping by
the fact that the offender here will often be a parent or another
person favorably disposed toward the child.
Subsection (l)(a) covers situations in which a person, including a parent, intentionally entices or takes a child away from
the parent or other person to whose custody it has been awarded, i.e.,
he must know that the custody of the child has been awarded to that
parent or other person. If the enticement is for an immoral or other
criminal purpose, of course, prosecution will be carried out under
another appropriat~ section of this code. Subsection (l)(b) covers a
situation in which a parent or other person intentionally deprives the
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lawful custodian of the custody of the child. Such a situation would
occur where a parent, not the lawful custodian, is awarded visitation
rights and fails to return the child to its lawful custodian.
Both subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) provide a felony penalty.
However, it is not the committee's intent for penitentiary sentences
to be imposed each time a violation of this section occurs; it is the
intent that an adequate ground (commission of a felony) be established
for extradition.
The age of 18 is selected as the limit of parental interest
in custody, to be protected by criminal law, since this is the age at
which a child begins to move into the relative independence of selfsupport or higher education.
Subsection (2) provides two broad defenses to prosecution
which will tend to bar a conviction in most prosecutions, and which
reflect the committee's desire of keeping convictions to a minimum.
No crime is committed if the child, 14 years of age or older, is
principally responsible for its determination to leave home. It is
unfair to punish a parent who merely fell in with the child's plan.
Subsection (2) provides also the defense that the actor enticed or
fails to return the child in the belief that to do so would endanger
the child's welfare. Both defenses are questions of fact.
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PART B.

OFFENSE DIRECTED AGAINST PROPERTY
ARTICLE 4.

40-4-1.

Aggravated arson.

ARS<l-J
Any person who intentionally sets

fire to, burns, causes to be burned, or aids the burning of, or by
the use of any explosive, damages or destroys, causes to be damaged
or destroyed or aids in the damage or destruction of, any building or
occupied structure of another and without his consent, commits aggravated arson and is guilty of a class _ __ felony.
Comment
This section replaces a major portion of the present offense
of first degree arson, and has substantially altered the elements of
·the present offense (see also proposed section 40-4-4).
The example of recently enacted revised codes of other states
has been followed in that the concept of arson has been enlarged to
include exploding as well as burning. The criminologic considerations
are quite similar: likelihood of extensive property destruction
accompanied by danger to life. Also, explosions frequently lead to
fires, just as fires sometimes cause explosions.
·
The proposed section requires the property to be that of
another (the present crime requires that the property must be that of
"himself or of another"). Other proposed sections deal with situation,
in which a person, exploding or burning his own property, causes injury to other property (see sections 40-4-4, reckless burning and exploding, and 40-4-2, simple arson).
To burn down a building owned and occupied by the actor may or
may not be recklessness in relation to other people's safety or valued
property, depending on the isolation of the premises and. the degree of
care taken, but the actor's poor choice of means to get rid of his own
property does not mark him as the same kind of dangerous character as
one who burns his own buildings to defraud an insuror, or another's
building to wreck vengeance.
The definition of the type of structure that is burned or
exploded has been narrowed. This section, the most serious arson
offense, covers only arson in which valued property is destroyed or
imperiled and the life of any person is placed in jeopardy. Burning
or exploding other property (property other than a building or occu~
pied structure) may endanger life to some extent, as .firefighters and
spectators are drawn to the scene. This danger, however, is not
considered as serious as that to which the owner or occupants of the
building are exposed. In principle, the burning of a dilapidated and
deserted house unsuited for occupancy should be no more than simple
criminal damage to property (proposed section 40-6-2 or reckless
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burning and exploding (proposed section 40-4-4). But the probabiliti
that a building is used by human beings in ways that make it dangerous
to burn or explode is so high that it seems pointless to require the
prosecution to charge and prove occupancy in every case. Occupied
structures-include ~hips, ~leeping cars, mobile homes and offices
but not ordinary passenger cars, trucks or freight cars (see proposed
section 40-4-~).
40-4-2.

Simple arson.

Any person who intentionally sets fire

to, burns, causes to be burned, or aids the burning of, or by the use
of any explosive, damages or destroys, causes to be damaged or destroyed, or aids in the damage or destruction of, any property of
another and without his consent, other than any building or occupied
structure, commits simple arson and:
(1)

Is guilty of a class

felony, if the damage exceeds

the value of one hundred dollars;
(2)

Is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if the damage does
not exceed one hundred dollars in value; or

(3)

Is guilty of a class_ felony, if the damage does not
exceed one hundred dollars in value and the person has
been previously convicted of simple arson, aggravated
arson, reckless burning or exploding or arson to defraud.

Comment
This section also reflects the concept of arson broadened to
include exploding. It replaces the present second and third degree
arson laws. It requires the property to be that of another. The
ownership provision in the present law requires that the property may
be that of •himself or of another" (second degree arson) or "of another
person" (third degree arson). Again, other proposed arson sections
pertain to those situations in which a person causes injury to other
property while exploding or burning his own property in a reckless
fashion.
This section broadens the type of property to include both
real and personal property, other than a building or occupied structure.
Thus, any type of property covered by the wording in the proposed aggravated arson section is precluded from this section. An intentional
act of arson which is not a violation of the proposed aggravated arson
section is a violation of this proposed section.
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The value of the property required under the present third

degree arson statute distinguishes whether the act of burning is an

offense of arson or malicious mischief; third degree arson requires
the damage to exceed $25 in value, while lesser valued damage is an
act of malicious mischief. This section has increased the value of
property fro~ $25 to ,100 to reflect contemporarr values. This section
also covers all types or arson, regardless of va ue, out, as mentioned
below, the severity of the penalty for violating this section depends
on the value of the damage. The value of the property is a factor to
be considered only by the court in sentencing the convicted offender.
Value does not determine whether or not simple arson has been committed.
Two penalties are provided in this section. Simple arson is
a felony offense if the damage exceeds $100 dollars in value or the
actor has been convicted previously of simple arson, aggravated arson,
reckless burning or exploding or arson to defraud, regardless of
damage value. Simple arson is a misdemeanor offense if the value of
the damage does not exceed $100.
40-4-3.

Arson to defraud.

Any person who, by ~~ans ot fire

· or explosives, intentionally damages any property with intent to defraud, commits arson to defraud and is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This section is substantially a restatement of the present
statute. Again, the concept of arson has been expanded to include
exploding as well as burning of property.
40-4-4.

Reckless burning and exploding.

Any person who

intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his
own property or that of another, and thereby recklessly does any of
the following acts commits reckless burning and exploding and is guilty
of a class

--- felony:

(1)

Places another in danger of death or bodily injury; or

(2)

Places any building or occupied structure of another in
danger of damage or destruction.

Comment
Reckless burning and exploding contains minor elements of
first degree arson that have been expanded. Where aggravated arson
requires intent, reckless burning and exploding requires recklessness.
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This section deals with three situations presently dealt with
by first degree arson:
(1) the burning of one's own property under circumstances
where there is a high risk that the fire will spread to property of
another. This situation is usually treated as severely as setting
fire to another's property. The present first degree arson section
defines that offense as the "malicious" burning of a dwelling and related structures whether the property of himself or of another;
(2) the burning of lesser forms of property in close proximity
to the specially valued categories, also treated as first degree arson
or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is
parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto ••• "); and
(

11

•••

(3) other recklessness in relation to sp•cial categories of
highly regarded property, such as setting fire to a pile of trash near
a home, where no burning of the home occurs.
40-4-5.

Definition~

As used in this article, the term

"occupied structure" includes a tent, boat, trailer, sleeping car, or
any other vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or
for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is act~ally
present.

If a building or structure is divided into separately oc-

cupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied
structure of another.
Comment
This designation of the property protected by the proposed arson
sections is narrower than that contained in the present laws. By
restricting the aggravated arson offense to buildings and occupied
structures, the offense is confined to the fire and explosions which
are the most dangerous. Occupancy is to be distinguished from
"p~sence" of a person because the presence or ibsence of a person in
a structure which is normally occupied may be purely a matter of
·
chance so far as the arsonist is concerned. On the other hand, the
arsonist should be able to judge whether the structure is a dwelling,
store, factory, warehouse, o~ other place for the conduct of human
affairs. It is unnecessary to prescribe that "buildings" be occupied,
since buildings are generally employed by humans in ways that amount
to occupancy. In the case of structures other than buildings, such
as a mine shaft, prosecution would have to prove occupancy as part of
its case. The requirement of occupancy is significant chiefly in relation to vehicles. It serves to exclude from aggravated arson the
burning of freight cars, motor vehicles other than house trailers or
mobile offices, ordinary small water craft and the like.
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The provision as to separate or occupied portions of buildings and structures takes care of the situation of apartment houses,
office buildings, etc., where occupancy is by unit. It is a unit
rather than a structure which must be safeguarded, even against the
occupants of other units in the same structure.
ARTICLE 5.

40-5-1.

Burglary.

BURGLARY

Any person who without authority enters

or remains in any building or enclosed portio~ of any vehicle or
craft, whether movable or immovable, or who being lawfully within any
building or enclosed portion of any vehicle or craft, whether movable
I'

or immovable, enters into any room, apartment, or enclosed portion of
the same building, vehicle, or craft, with the intent to commit any
felony or theft therein commits burglary and is guilty of a class
___ felony.
Comment
This section essentially restates the present law, 40-3-5,
Under the present law, a
per·son who breaks and enters must have the intention to commit any
felony or misdemeanor in order to be convicted of burglary. This
section proposes to limit the required intent to any felony and misdemeanor-theft.

CRS 1963, but it proposes one major change.

40-5-2.

Aggravated burglary.

Any person who commits burglary

and:
(1)

Is armed with a dangerous weapon and intends to inflict
bodily injury if discovered; or

(2)

After entering arms himself with ,,a dangerous weapon and
intends to inflict bodily injury if discovered; or

(3)

Uses, or possesses with intent to use, any explosive
substance, commits aggravated burglary and is guilty of a
class

--- felony.
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Comment
This section is substantially new law in that it defines an
offense that parallels the classification of robbery offenses. Any
burglar who is armed with a dangerous weapon, either before or $Ubsequent to his unlawful entry, is guilty of an offense under this section.
Under present law, this aggravating feature of burglary is
prosecuted under the assault with a deadly weapon section. This section also includes a restatement of the present use of dynamite in
burglary statute 40-3-6, CRS 1963.
40-5-3.

Possession of burglary tools.

Any person who pos-

sesses any key, instrument, device, or any explosive substance suitable
for use in breaking into any building, vehicle, craft, or any depository designed for the safekeeping of anything of value, or any part
thereof, with intent to commit burglary, commits possession of burglary
tools and is guilty of a class __ felony.
Comment
changes.

This section replaces 40-3-7, CRS 1963, and proposes no major
40-5-4.

Coin-box burglary.

Any person who, with intent to

commit theft, enters or breaks into any coin-operated vending machine
or other coin-operated contrivance, apparatus, or equipment used for
the purpose of providing lawful amusement, sales of goods, services,·
or other valuable things, or telecommunications, when punishment
therefor is not otherwise provided, upon a first conviction, is guilty
of a class

misdemeanor.

Upon a second or subsequent conviction,

any such person is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This section is designed to cover vending machine burglaries.
Under present law, this conduct may be prosecuted under either the
present burglary section or the section on damage or destruction of
property belonging to another.
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ARTICLE 6.
40-6-1.
person.

DAMAGE AND TRESPASS TO PROPERTY

Criminal damage to property involving danger to the

Any person who intentionally damages any property, real or

personal, by any means other than fire or explosion, and thereby
recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury
commits criminal damage to property involving danger to the person,
and is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section defines an offense of property destruction that, regardless of the value of the property destroyed, creates
a dangerous situation for another. This section defines an offense
that cannot be committed with fire or explosives. Essentially it
· covers all conduct outside the scope of arson.
40-6-2.

Simple criminal damage to property.

(1)

Any person

who intentionally damages any property, real or personal, of another,
without the consent of 'the owner, by any means other than fire or explosion, commits simple criminal damage to property.•
(2)

Any person who commits simple criminal damage to property,

where the damage done does not exceed one hundred dollars, upon a
first conviction, is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Upon a second

or subsequent conviction, any such person is guilty of a class
felony.
(3)

Any person who commits simple criminal damage to property,

where the damage done exceeds one hundred dollars, is guilty of a
class_ felony.
(4)

Any person who commits the crime of simple criminal

damage to property, where the damage is done to any public utility or
common carrier and the damage done directly interferes with or interrupts any common carrier, pipe line, gas, electrical, telephone,
telegraph or water service, or makes inoperable any facility or
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equipment directly used in furnishing any such service, no matter

what the amount of damage done, is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section restates the major elements of the offense defined in 40-18-1, CRS 1963, i.e •• unlawful damage or destruction of personal or real property of another.
40-6-3.

Damage to property with intent to defraud.

(1)

Any

person who damages or destroys any property, real or personal, by any
means other than fire or explosion, with intent to defraud commits
damage to property with intent to defraud.
(2)

Any person who commits damage to property with intent to

defraud, where the damage or destruction exceeds one hundred dollars,
is guilty of a class
(3)

felony.

Any person who commits damage to property with intent to

defraud, where the damage or destruction does not exceed one hundred
dollars, upon first conviction, is guilty of a class_ dismeanor.
Upon a second or subsequent conviction, any such person is guilty of
a class

felony.

Comment
This proposed section is the counterpart of the proposed arson
to defraud section 40-4-3.
40-6-4.

Criminal trespass.

Any person who enters or remains

upon the lands of another, knowing that the consent to enter or remain
is denied or withdrawn'by the owner, the person having lawful possession thereof, or any agent of such owner or possessor, commits criminal
trespass and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor; provided, that this
section shall not apply to any reasonable entry seeking safety, shelter,
or information.
Comment
This section proposes to consolidate offenses involving crimi- 30 -

nal trespass.
include:

Present trespass statutes that this section replaces

40.-3-8, CRS 1963 -- Trespass on Premises of Another.
40-18-12, CRS 1963 -- Trespass to Injure Dam or Embankment.
40-18-13, CRS 1963 -- Trespass Upon Garden or Orchard.

ARTICLE 7.
40-3-10.

Forgezy.

(1)

FORGERY

Any person who, with intent to de-

fraud, knowingly:
(a)

Makes or alters the signature or any part of any document
apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner
that it purports to have been made by another, at another
time, with different provisions, or by authority of one
who did not give such authority: or

(b)

Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been
thus made or altered, commits forgery and is guilty of a
class

(2)

felony.

An intent to defraud means an intention to cause another

to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any •right, obligation,
or power with reference to any person or property.
(3)

A document apparently capable of defrauding another in-

cludes, but is not limited to, a writing by which any right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or property may be
created, transferred, altered, or terminated.
Comment
The key to this section is that the offender must, with the
use of a document, knowingly cause another either to assume, create,
transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power. This
section replaces the present and general forgery statute, 40-6-1, CRS
1963, and other statutes defining forgery offenses, including:
13-6-42,
13-7-35,
40-6-12,
59-21-7,

CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS

1963
1963
1963
1963

Altering or Using Altered Certificates.
Forging Ability to Respond in Damages.
Forging or Defacing Official Seals.
Forgery of Ballot
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ARTICLE 8.
40-8-1.

Theft.

THEFT

Any person who knowingly does any of the

following commits theft:
{l){a)

Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over anything

of value of another; or
{b)

Obtains by deception control over anything of value of
another; or

(c)

Obtains by threat control over anything of value of
another; or

(d)

Obtains control over any stolen thing of value knowing
the thing of value to have been stolen by another: and

(2){a)

Intends to deprive another permanently of the use or

benefit of the thing of value; or
{b)

Knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of
value in such manner as to deprive another permanently
of such use or benefit; or

(c)

Uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value knowing
such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will
deprive another permanently of such use or benefit.

(3)

Any person who commits theft where the value of the

thing involved does not exceed one hundred dollars, and any person
who commits theft twice or more within a period of six months and from
the same person, where the aggregate value of the things involved does
not exceed one hundred dollars, is guilty of a class
(4)

misdemeanor.

Any person who commits theft where the value of the thing

involved exceeds one hundred dollars, and any person who commits theft
twice or more within a period of six months and from the same person,
where the aggregate value of the things involved exceeds one hundred
dollars, is guilty of a class

felony.
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(5)

Any person who commits theft from the person of another,

regardless of the value of the thing involved, is guilty of a class
felony.
Comment
This section combines the major crimes of larceny, embezzlement, confidence game, obtaining goods or services by false pretenses,
and buying and receiving stolen goods. The distinctions between these
crimes are technical and have historical significance only.
changes.

In combining these crimes, this section makes three major

(1) It abolishes the distinction between these crimes, such
as whether or not the actor had possession of the property before he
misappropriated it, which is the distinction between larceny and
embezzlement; whether he obtained title to it or just possession of
. the property, which is the distinction between larceny by bailee and
obtaining goods and services under false pretenses; and whether the
false representation was a visible token, symbol or device, which is
the distinction between obtaining goods or services under false pretenses and confidence game.
(2) The criminal intent required for each of the present
crimes varies. For example, the present crime of larceny requires
the intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property. If the
actor did not intend to keep the property permanently but intended to
return it, he is not guilty of larceny. (A special situation, "joyriding," is treated separately in the present and proposed law (see
proposed section 40-8-2). Joyriding requires an intent to depriye
the owner temporarily of his property.) In embezzlement, the intent
to return the property is not a defense to prosecution, even though
that intent existed at the time of the conversion. All that is required in embezzlement is a fraudulent or criminal conversion. It is
well established Colorado law that only a person with custody of
property can commit larceny of it. In addition, the larceny by bailee
provision covers larceny by persons in possession of the property.
The result is that, although each has the same intent, one person is
guilty and another is not guilty, depending on the section under which
he is prosecuted.
(3) A number of the present sections were necessitated by the
fact that the subject matter of larceny, i.e., the property which
could be stolen, had been limited at common law to personal goods of
another, so that deeds to land, things which were affixed to l~nd,
and things which grew on the land were outside the scope of larceny.
This has caused many specific enactments adding to the things which
might be stolen. A partial list of special Colorado enactments includes:
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40-5-3

Stealing of a Dog

40-5-4

Stealing of Ore or Minerals from a Mine

40-5-5

Stealing of Ore from a Reduction Mill

40-5-6

Stealing Fixtures from a House

40-5-7

Stealing from Realty

40-5-8

Stealing Livestock

40-5-9

Stealing a Motor Vehicle

40-5-13

Larceny by Bailee

40-5-14

Stealing Bedding, Furniture, etc., from a Lodging

40-5-29

Shoplifting

Embezzlement is not a common law offense. It is common law
larceny extended by statute. Colorado statutes contain several
embezzlement statutes, including:
40-5-15

What Constitutes Embezzlement

40-5-16

Embezzlement of Public Property

40-5-17

Embezzlement by Public Officers

40-5-18

Embezzlement by Carriers and Warehousemen

40-5-19

Embezzlement of Landlord's Share of Crops

In all, this proposed section replaces some 50 separate sections which define and provide penalties for some type of "stealing"
or "misappropriation. 11
This proposed section can not be violated unless the actor's
conduct is described in one paragraph of both subsections (1) and (2).
Subsection (1) lists four methods which may be used to accomplish th~
misappropriation, and subsection (2) describes a state of mind which
is either evident or presumed.
Presumption of· the actor's intent is reflected in the manner
in which he uses the stolen thing of value. Subsection (1) describes
the required criminal act, and subsection (2) describes the required
criminal state of mind.
In subsection (1), property is defined as "anything of value"
to be sure that its scope is as broad in stealing as it is elsewhere
in the law, and the specific provisions are no longer needed.
"Anything of value" is sufficiently broad in its coverage to
include real and personal property, and tangible and intangible
property.
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Subsection (l)(a) covers a situation where, present Colorado
larceny and embezzlement statutes are now applicable. This section
deals with the problem of appropriation of property without the consent of the owner or other authorization. The offense may be committed by a person snatching the property out of the owner's hands, such
as a purse snatcher, or by a person entrusted with the property as
agent, bailee or otherwise. It is immaterial what relationship to
the owner or to the property the actor had.
Subsection (l)(b) covers conduct which is now covered by
confidence game and false pretenses statutes. If the deception is
effective to cause the victim to part with anything of value, it is,
in general, no defense that a reasonable person would not have been
misled. The actor must intend to create an impression for the furpose.
of inducing the owner to part with it. Deception can be accomp ished
by the actor in reinforcing the victim's false belief, preventing the
victim from acquiring information which could influence his decision,
failing to disclose all pertinent information to the victim or by
using symbols, tokens or any other visible instrument to deceive the
victim.
Subsection (l)(c) deals with situations where coercion rather
than deception is the method employed to make the victim transfer his
property. This method is covered by the present blackmail or extortion statute.
·
The threat may be either express or implied. It is sufficient,
for example, that the actor asks for money in exchange for his promise
not to inflict physical harm, or in exchange for "protection" from
harms where the actor intends to convey the impression that he will in
some fashion instigate the harm from which he proposes to "protect"
the·victim.
The threatened harm may be lawful or unlawful. The actor may
be privileged or even duty-bound to inflict the harm which he
threatens; yet if he employs the threat of harm to coerce a transfer
of property for his own benefit he clearly is guilty~ For example,
a policeman who is under a duty to make an arrest threatens an arrest
unless his victim pays him money.
Threats need not be made especially to the actor. Threats can
be threats to anyone. If the threat is in fact the effective means
of compelling another to give up anything of value, the character of
the relationship between the victim and the actor whom he chooses to
protect is immaterial. Whether a threat to injure a third person,
unrelated to the victim, was intended to intimidate or was effective for
that purpose can be decided .by the trier of the facts.
In addition to the threat of bodily
a threat to physical confinement, to commit
accuse any person of a criminal offense, to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, and to harm a
repute.

harm, this section includes
any criminal offense, to
expose any person to
person's credit or business

Subsection (l)(d) incorporates the present crime of buying and
receiving stolen goods. This subsection broadens the present crime by
eliminating the nece:~sity that the property comes into the receiver's
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hands from an act of burglary, larceny or robbery. Also, the present
statute excludes from its coverage situations where the property
transferred is valued at less th~n $50. T~is propos:d subs 7ction
includes anything of value. By incorporating the crime, this
subsection makes it impossible to convict of two offenses based on the
same transaction, which can happen under present law, where a person
is held ~uilty as a principal to the original act of theft because he
helped plan the offense, and also of a separate offense of receiving
because he took his share of the proceeds.
Subsection (2) requires the actor, after a thing of valYe has
been misappropriated, to act either knowingly or intentionally in
such a manner so as to deprive the owner of such thing of value. The
actor must have either the intention to deprive permanently the owner
of such thing of value or knowingly act in such a manner that he exhibits a knowledge that his conduct will cause, in all likelihood, the
owner to lose permanently such thing of value. The criminal state of
mind in subsection (2)(aJ is permanent deprivation, while subsections
(b) and (c) describe conduct which is engaged in knowingly and which
presumes the intent of permanent deprivation.
Subsections (3) and (4) provide penalties for the offense of
theft. The grading of penalties is essentially the same as now provided in the larceny statute. The distinction between misdemeanor and
felony punishment is determined by the value of the items taken and
the frequency of the offenses. The value.distinction has been r~ised
from $50 to $100, however, to reflect co?temporary values.
Subsection (3) makes theft a high misdemeanor if the value of
the thing misappropriated is $100 or less in value or the actor has
committed theft two or more times within six months from the same
victim and the value of all things taken does not exceed $100_Subsection (4) makes theft a low grade felony if the value of
the thing taken exceeds $100 in value or the actor has committed theft
two or more times within six months and the value of all things misappropriated exceeds $100 dollars in value.
Subsection (5) covers cases where the thing misappropriated,
regardless of vaiue, is taken from the person of another. It is a
restatement of the present law. Essentially, it is an act of "stealing," without circumstances of force or violence as would constitute
robbery, where the thing stolen is on the person on whom the theft is
made. Nevertheless, taking something of value from a person involves
some degree of danger to the victim which is not present during other
theft offenses, and accordingly is punished more severely than other
types of theft offenses. Pocket-picking is an example of conduct
covered here.
40-8-2.

Joyriding.

(1)

Any person who knowingly takes pos-

session of, or drives, or propels, or takes away, any motor vehicle
or craft, the property of another, without authority or consent of the
owner thereof or his duly authorized agent, with the intent to
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temporarily deprive the owner of the possession, use, or benefit of
the same, or who knowingly aids, abets, or assists another in so
doing, commits joyriding.
(2)

Any person who commits joyriding for the first time is

guilty of a class
(3)

misdemeanor.

Any person who commits joyriding a second or S\.lbsequent

time is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This section restates the present joyriding statute -- 13-132, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 9.
40-9-1.

Simple robbery.

ROBBERY
Any person who takes anything of

value from the person or presence of another, with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property or interest therein, by
the use of force or by threatening the use of force commits simple
robbery and is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section proposes no major changes, and is•
restatement of 40-5-1(1), CRS 1963. One minor change is recommended,
that of stating the offender must have the intent to deprive permanently the owner of his property. This is e.ssentially that required
under
the fl present statute: "Robbery is the felonious and violent
.
t a k 1.ng
•••
40-9-2.

Aggravated robbery.

Any person who commits simple

robbery and during the act of robbery:
(1)

Is armed with a dangerous weapon and intends to inflict
bodily injury if resisted;

(2)

Inflicts bodily injury with a dangerous weapon; or

(3)

Has present an accomplice who •is armed with a dangerous
weapon and who intends to inflict bodily injury if
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resisted, commits aggravated robbery, and is guilty of
a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section replaces the armed or aggravated robbery
provisions contained in the present law, 40-5-1(2), CRS 1963, and
proposes no major changes.
40-9-3.

Sentencing.

Any person convicted of robbery or

aggravated robbery who is under the age of twenty-one years at the
time of the offense, may be sentenced to confinement in the state reformatory, or the state penitentiary, in the discretion of the court;
and, if sentenced to the state penitentiary, such person shall be
deemed guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This section restates the special penalty clause of the present
statute, 40-5-1(3), CRS 1963. However, it proposes that where the
offender is under -·21 year of age at the time of the offense, rather
than at the time of his conviction, he may be sentenced to the state
reformatory. No felony penalty is provided for a reformatory sentence.
All sentences to the state reformatory under the present law are for
an indeterminate number of years.
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PART C.

OFFENSES AFFECTING PUBLIC DECENCY

SUB-PART I.

SEXUAL OFFENSES

ARTICLE 10.
40-10-1 •

.fi!.2!.

(1)

RAPE

Any male who has sexual intercourse with

a female not his wife· commits rape if:
(a)

He compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily harm, extreme pain or kidnaping, to be inflicted on anyones or

(b)

He has substantially impaired her power to appraise or
control her conduct by administering or employing without
her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
purpose of preventing resistance; or

(c)

The female is unconscious; or

(d)

The female is less than 12 years old.

(2)

R~pe is a class

,·,

felony unless in the course thereof

the· off6nder inflicts serious bodily harm upon anyone, or the victim
was not a voluntary social companion of the offender upon the occasion of the crime and had not previous! y permitted him sexua_l liberties.,
in which cases the offense is a class

--- felony.

Comment
Under this section, a ma.n must have sexual intercourse with a
woman he 'knows is not his wife under circumstances where it is clear
that she has not consented to intercourse and where her resistance is
overcome by the use or threat of force. or she is unable to give
effective consent because she lacks mental capacity or responsibility.
Restricting liability to males under this section does not preclude
the conviction of a female who acts as an accomplice, however. Forcible
sexual conduct, other than intercourse is covered under proposed
article 11.
The situations covered by subsection (l)(a) are the classic
rape cases. This subsection substantially restates subsection (3) and
a major portion of subsection (4) of the present law. The victim's
resistance must be overcome either by force or by a threat of death,
serious bodily harm, extreme pain or kidnaping to be inflicted upon
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anyone. The phrase "to be inflicted upon anyone" extends the range of
threats of harm to a member of the victim's family, her friends, or
anyone. Whether the threat is sufficient to undermine her will to
resist and whether the threat is in fact a "bargain," however, must
be determined by the trier of the facts.
Subsection (l)(b) covers situations now covered by subsections (6) and (7) and a portion of subsection (4) of the present
statute. Cases in which the victim is unwittingly drugged or intoxicated should be treated as being equal to forcible rape because, in
both cases, the victim's will to resist is undermined.
Subsection (l)(c) covers situations where the female is unconscious. Her unconsciousness may or may not be brought about by
the offender, but she is powerless to consent or resist.
Subsection (l)(d) covers the statutory rape situation now
covered by section (1) of the present law, which requires the female
to be under 18 and the male over 18 years of age. Consent of the
female is immaterial under the present law. This proposed section
covers only intercourse with a child under the age of 12. The age of
the offender and whether or not the child gave consent are immaterial
facts. Sexual activity involving adolescents and adolescents and
adults is covered in proposed article 13.
Subsection (2) provides two penalties for rape. A lesser.
penalty is to be imposed if the rapist does not harm the victim or
anyone, or if the victim has previously permitted the rapist sexual
liberties and was at the time of the offense a voluntary social
companion of the rapist. The most severe penalty should only be imposed in situations which are the most brutal or shocking, and evoke
a threat to public security, e.g., where the victim suffers physical
injury or where in effect she is attacked by a stranger. A lesser
penalty should be imposed in the latter case where the offender commits forcible rape upon a female with whom he has already been intimate. In this situation, there is clearly less outrage to the female
sense of virtue which is the basis for the offense of rape.
40-10-2.

Gross sexual imposition.

Any male who has sexual

intercourse with a female not his wife commits gross sexual imposition
and is guilty of a class ___
(1)

felony if:

He compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent
resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution; or

(2)

He knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect
which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of
her conduct; or

(3)

He knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being
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committed upon her or that she· s-ubmi ts because she
falsely supposes that he is her husband.
Comment
This section deals with sexual intercourse under circumstances
which are not considered as aggravating as those covered in the proposed rape section. Forcible sexual activity other than intercourse
is covered under proposed article 11.
·
Subsection (1) covers situations wher~ the male compels her
to submit to intercourse by threats, other than threats of death,
serious bodily harm, intense pain or kidnaping to be inflicted on
anyone. Lesser threats of harm to be inflicted only upon the victim
warrant a lesser penalty than that provided for in subsection (l)(a)
of the proposed rape section.
Subsection (2) of this proposed section deals with sexual
intercourse under circumstances in which the victim is unable to give
. effective consent because of her _mental incapacity. It must be proved
that the woman was so seriously mentally ill or deficient, that her
mental illness or deficiency rendered her incapable of understanding
the nature of the act, and that the offender knew of her incapacity
in order to obtain a conviction under this subsection. Proof that the
offender knew of her incapacity will usually be made by showing the
circumstances in which the act was accomplished. If the woman was an
inmate of an institution for the mentally ill or deficient, that in
most cases will be sufficient proof that the offender knew of her
incapacity.
Intercourse under these conditions does not warrant the
imposition of the heavy penalty for rape. This type of intercourse
does not lead to a general sense of insecurity in the community. as
does forcible rape, and the harm done is nqt as great, if outrage to
the feelings of the victim is considered the essential harmfulness of
non consensual sexual intercourse.
Subsection (3) covers situations where intercourse is accomplished by means other than by force, and where consent of the
victim is present. A female who submits to intercourse but is unaware
that a sexual act is being committed upon her is covered in this
subsection. This situation rarely occurs a~d usually results from a
doctor-patient relationship. Where a doctor has intercourse with the
victim who has been led to believe that she must submit to intercourse
as necessary treatment, the female is not forcibly ravished, although
she has been deceived. Subsection (3) also covers situations where
the offender impersonates the victim's husband, and where the offender
stages a mock marriage in reliance on which the victim engages in
sexual intercourse with him.
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ARTICLE 11.

DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

40-11-1. Deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition.
Any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse,
commits deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition and is
guilty of a class _ __ felony if:
(1)

He compels the other person to participate by force or
by threat of imminent death, serious bodily harm, extreme
pain or kidnaping, to be inflicted on anyone; or

(2)

He has substantially impaired the other person's power
to appraise or control his conduct, by administering or
employing without the knowledge of the other person
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of
preventing resistance; or

(3)

The other person is unconscious; or

(4)

The other person is less than 12 years old.

40-11-2.

Deviate sexual intercourse by other imposition.

Any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse,
commits deviate sexual intercourse by other imposition and is guilty
of a class
(1)

felony if:
He compels the other person to participate by any threat
that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary
resolution; or

(2)

He knows that the other person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct; or

(3)

He knows that the other person submits because he is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon him.
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Comment
Sections 40-11-1 and 40-11-2 replace Colorado's present
crime against nature statute. In general, these proposed sections
parallel the proposed rape and gross sexual imposition sections.
Present Colorado law is broader in its scope than is proposed here in
that it extends its coverage into a married couple's bedroom when
there is a departure from an accepted standard of sexual conduct.
By paralleling sections 40-10-1 and 40-10-2, these deviate sexual
intercourse sections proposed here exclude from their coverage all
deviate sexual practices not involving force, adult corruption of
minors, or conduct offensive to the public. - The scope of these sections is limited to unnatural sexual intercourse accomplished by force
or its equivalent. Conduct other than unnatural sexual intercourse is
covered by other proposed sections. The scope of these sections
covers unnatural sexual intercourse between two persons of the same
sex, between two persons of the opposite sex, and between a person
and an animal. Proposed section 40-13-1 covers situations where the
victim is 12 years of age and older but has not reached majority, and
the offender is at least four years older than the victim.
Penalties provided in these two proposed sections are less
than those provided in proposed sections 40-10-.l and 40-10-2. The
reduction is justifiable on the ground that, in most cases, the harm
done to a woman by forcible, normal intercourse is graver than that
involved in homosexual or deviate heterosexual assault. Also, the
possibility of pregnancy, the physical danger in case abortion is
required, and the impairment of her marital eligibility are factors
that need not be considered here.
40-11-3.

Definition.

"Deviate sexual intercourse" means

sexual intercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are
not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an
animal.
Comment
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined in proposed section
40-11-3 as mouth-genital and anus-genital intercourse between human
beings, and any form of intercou:se between a human being and a~
animal. Sexual intercourse, defined elsewhere.by statute, requ~res
penetration however slight. It does not require emission. This
definition includes only those acts of conduct which simulate normal
intercourse. Indecent assaults that do not take thi~ special form of
mock intercourse are covered in other proposed sections.

- 43 -

ARTICLE 12.
40-12-1.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Sexual assault.

Any person who subjects another

not his spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault and is
guilty of a class
(1)

misdemeanor, if:

He knows that the contact is offensive to the other
person; or

(2)

He knows that the other person suffers from a mental
disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of
appraising the nature of his or her conduct; or

(3)

He knows that the other person is unaware that a sexual
act is being committed; or

(4)

He has substantially impaired the other person's power
to appraise or control his or her conduct by admini$tering or employing without the other's knowledge drugs,
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing
resistance; or

(5)

The other person is less than 21 years old and the offender is his guardian or is otherwise responsible for
general supervision of. his welfare; or

(6)

The other person is in custody of law or detained in a
hospital or other institution and the offender has
supervisory or disciplinary authority over him.

Comment
This proposed section defines circumstances under which a
sexual assault has been committed. Under present Colorado law, a
person who commits a sexual assault upon another who is 16 years of
age or older is prosecuted under the present assault and battery
section.
The circumstances enumerated under this section are intended
to cover all situations wherein, if a sexual contact is made, an offense has been committed. Each circumstance requires the element of
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non consent. Under subsection (1), the offender must know that the
sexual contact is offensive to the victim •. Under subsection (3), the
offender must know that the sexual contact is known only to himself
or to others but not to the victim. Under the remaining circumstances,
a presumption is made that the victim is aware of th~ contact but is
incapable of resisting; either the victim has not consented or the
offender, in some manner other than by force, has overcome the victim's
ability to resist.
The definition of what constitutes a sexual contact is contained in proposed section 40-12-3.
A married party may not be convicted of sexually assaulting
his or her spouse, unless the contact involves another party, either
human or animal, and the spouse-victim has not given his or her consent.
Since this section requires non consent of the victim, consensual
homosexual as well as heterosexual non intercourse, and non deviate
intercourse relations do not fall within its scope. This exclusion
parallels other sections defining sexual offenses and reflects the
committee's decision not to punish consensual sexual relations between
adults, regardless of the gender of the parties involved and the type
of sexual activity, unless the activity is open and notorious.
Acts of sexual aggression, other than sexual intercourse and
deviate sexual intercourse, involving an adolescent or an adult and a
child or two adolescents whose ages are at least five years apart,
regardless of the gender of the parties, are covered under the proposed
sexual assault on children section.
40-12-2.

Sexual assault on children.

Any person who subjects

another not his spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on
children and is guilty of a class

felony, if:

(1)

The other person is less than twelve years old; or

(2)

The other person is less than sixteen years old and the
offender is at least four years older than the other
person.

Comment
The conduct which constitutes an offense under this proposed
section is treated under present law as 1) an assault (an unlawful
attempt coupled with the present ability to commit a violent injury on
the person of another (40-2-33, CRS 1963)) on a child under 16 years
of age and the taking of indecent and improper lib 7rties with the
child, or 2) the enticement, allurement or persuasion of any child
under the age of 16 into any room, or office, or to any other place for
the purpose of taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with
the child or 3) the taking of immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with'the person of a child under 16 at any place (40-2-32, CRS
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1963). Thus, under the present law, the victim must be under 16 while
the offender may be of any age, although it is conceivable that the
offender could be the same age as or younger than the victim. The
victim's consent or lack of consent is immaterial.
This recommended section proposes several substantial changes
in defining what constitutes an offense in this area of "indecent"
activity.
(1) As defined under proposed section 40-12-3, actual contact
of the victim, either directly or indirectly by the offender, must be
accomplished. "Enticement, allurement, and persuasion" are not elements of the offense as proposed in this section, and, if considered
substantially enough conduct to constitute an overt act which, unless
frustrated, would culminate in the commission of a sexual contact,
will be prosecuted under the general criminal attempt sections as an
attempt to commit sexual assault on children.
(2) No offense has been committed under the proposed section
unless the victim is under 16 and the offender is at least four years
older. (Subsection (2) which covers situations in which the victim is
11 years or younger and the offender is any age is discussed below.)
Thus, if the victim is 13 and the offender is 16, or if the victim is
15 and the offender is 18, no offense has been committed.

It is the committee's intention not to punish sexual activity,
other than sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse, which is
engaged in by consenting adolescents, irrespective of whether the
activity is homosexual or heterosexual in nature. The committee's
intent is based on the following:
(a) The basis of the present offense, retained as the basis
for the present offense, is i) the attack on the moral standards of
the community, and, perhaps more importantly, ii) the danger of the
possibility of distortion of the psychosexual growth of a child.
Neither of these bases are present in any significant degree by sexual
activity between consenting adolescents, perhaps prompted more by
normal curiosity rather than any other reason.
(b) · It is imperative that the offender not be, in actuality,
the victim. Some children and adolescents are more promiscuous than
others. Under the present law, an offender need be any age but the
victim must be under 16 to constitute an offense. A sexual contact
made by a 35 or 40-year-old paedophiliac upon a 15-year-old adolescent
should not be considered by the law as equal to the mutual, consensual
fondling practiced by a 16-year-old and his 15-year-old date. Conceivably, a situation may arise wherein the victim is 15 and the offender 13, and, in such a situation, it is difficult to decide exactly
who is the "victim" and who is the "victimizer." Indeed, it is even
possible that the offender, in actuality, is the real "victim."
Consequently, it was decided that an offense is committed only where
there is a significant age differential between the victim and the
offender, and this differential, coinciding with that ~ecommended in
the Model Penal Code, was set at four years. The committee does not
intend to protect the immature from the immature, where no physical
harm results.
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(3) If the victim is 11 years of age or younger and, with or
without consent, is sexually contacted by another, irrespective of the
other's age, an offense has been committed under subsection (2). It
is realistic to consider a child not yet.having reached complete
adolescence as the true victim of an assault.

40-12-3.

Definition.

As used in this article, sexual contact

is any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of
another for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of
either party.
Comment
The key to the proposed provisions on sexual assault and sexual
assault on children is this proposed definition of sexual contact.
This definition requires actual contact; indecent exposure,
abusive and obscene proposals, and other offensive gestures and lan·guage are treated elsewhere in this code. Sexual contact is the
touching of another's sexual organs or other intimate parts of the
human body. This definition, however, is sufficiently broad enough t~
include the touching of another's sexual parts through clothing as
well as removing undergarments. Also, it includes the subjecting of
another to sexual contact with an animal.
The touching must be for the purpose or intention of arousing
or gratifying sexual desire of either the victim or the offender.
Sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse are treated elsewhere, if accomplished under circumstances constituting an offense in
this code, although these acts do fall within the scope of touching
another for sexual gratification. Any touching of another without the
intent or purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual desire is not a
sexual contact and is outside the scope of this definition.
Present Colorado statutory law does not define the term "indecent liberties." However, case law has declared that "indecent" is
something that is unfit to be seen and is offensive to modesty and
delicacy. The common sense of the community is sufficient to apply
the statute to each particular case, and point unmistakably what
particular conduct is rendered criminal by it (44 Colo. 525).
ARTICLE 13.
40-13-1.

CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND SEDUCTION

Corruption of minors and seduction.

Any person who

does any of the following commits corruption of minors and seduction:
(1)

Any male who has sexual intercourse with a female not
his wife, or any person who engages in deviate sexual
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intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate

sexual intercourse, if:
(a)

The other person is less than sixteen years old
and the offender is at least four years older than
the other person; or

(b)

The other person is less than twenty-one years
old and the offender is his guardian or otherwise
responsible for general supervision of his welfare: or

(c)

The other person is in custody of law or detained
in a hospital or other institution and the offender
has supervisory or disciplinary authority over
him; or

(d)

The other person is a female who is induced to
participate by a promise of marriage which the
offender does not mean to perform.

(2)

Any female who has sexual intercourse or engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a male not her husband, if:
(a)

The male is less than eighteen years old; or

(b)

The male is of good repute, and the female is a
prostitute.

An offense under subsection (l)(a) is a class_ felony.
Otherwise an offense under this section is a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This section proposes to define conduct involving sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse which is accomplished under
circumstances not considered as aggravating as those contained in the
proposed sections on rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual
intercourse by force or imposition, and deviate sexual intercourse by
other imposition. This section, which defines circumstances under
which the less serious acts of intercourse are accomplished, is the
least serious sexual offense involving intercourse, other than
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prostitution (commercial intercourse) and adultery and fornication
(where intercourse is open and notorious and, in effect, constitutes
an offense of public indecency).
Intercourse under this section must be accomplished with
mutual consent, and it is the presence of consent which reduces the
penalty to that of a misdemeanor in the majority of the subsections.
Intercourse under this section may be either normal or deviate.
Since consent is an element, there appears no reason to make a distinction between the two types of intercourse in establishing this
section's penalty.
Subsection (l)(a), in effect, replaces Colorado's present
statutory rape provision, i.e., an act of sexual intercourse with an
unmarried female who is under, and the male who is over, the age of
18 years (40-2-25(l)(b), CRS 1963). It also replaces 40-2-25(l)(j),
i.e., where both the male and the female are under the age of 18, and
a portion of 40-9-7, CRS 1963, which defines the offense of seduction,
i.e., any male who, without promise of marriage, seduces and has
illicit connection with an unmarried female of previous chaste character under the age of 16 years. Respectively, the maximum terms of
imprisonment for the commission of the foregoing acts of intercourse,
irrespective of the presence of the female's consent, are imprisonment
for life, five years, and ten years. The minimum terms of imprisonment are considerably less and depend, in addition to the leniency of
the court, on the age and reputation of the offender: commitment for
an indeterminate term to the reformatory, commitment for an indeterminate term to the Lookout Mountain School for Boys or the Mount View
School for Girls, and commitment to the penitentiary for one day.
Since the basis of the offense of statutory rape or statutory
seduction is the victimization of the immature, it appears extremely
harsh to subject a 19-year-old male who has consensual sexual intercourse, normal or deviate, with his 17-year-old sweetheart to a
possible imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Likewise, it
appears equally harsh to subject a 16-year-old male who has consensual
sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old "steady" to a possible $1,000
fine and five-year term of imprisonment (third degree rape), or to a
possible ten-year term of imprisonment if, prior to the act of intercourse, she was of chaste repute. The committee believes that not
only are these possible maximum penalties unrealistic and that, in
actuality, they are seldom imposed, but the conduct described should
not be considered criminal. As stated elsewhere, it is not the committee's belief that criminal law should protect the immature from the
immature. The best way to avoid this unreasonable protection and, at
the same time, protect the immature from being exploited by the mature
is to provide an age differential between the victim and the victimizer.
Identical to the number of years set under the proposed sexual assault
on children section, the committee has set the age differential under
this section at four years.
Under this proposed subsection, a low grade felony has been
committed, if the female is 15 years old and the male 19. If the
female is 16 years of age and the male is of any age, no offense has
been committed. However, if the consensual intercourse was accomplished
openly and notoriously (fornication) or falls within the circumstances
included ·within the scope of other subsections of this section, a
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misdemeanor offense has been committed.
Special bars to conviction under the present seduction statute,
i.e., marriage of the offender and his victim is contracted prior to
conviction, testimony of the seduced female is unsupported by other
evidence, and the information is filed later than two years after the
act of intercourse, are discussed under other sections in sub-part I,
Sexual Offenses.
Under subsection (l}(b} the victim must be 20 years of age or
younger and the offender, regardless of his or her age, must be the
victim's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision
of welfare of the victim. A father who has sexual intercourse with
his daughter who is under 21 years is also subject to prosecution
under the proposed aggravated incest section and another who has sexual
intercourse with her son who is under 21 years is also subject to
prosecution under the proposed incest section. Cohabitation, wherein
either normal or deviate intercourse is presumed, may also be prosecuted under the respective incest sections or this section. Furthermore, any guardian, if he or she is an ancestor, a brother or sister,
or an uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the whole blood, is liable for
prosecution under this or the proposed incest sections. Other nonrelated guardians must be prosecuted under this section.
Consensual intercourse under this subsection is not considered
as serious as the circumstance defined under subsection (l)(a) in that
the victim's age will range from 16 to 20 years. If the victim's age
ranges from 12 to 15 years and the guardian's is at least four years
older than the victim, prosecution may be pursued under this subsection
or subsection (l)(a).
Subsection (l)(c) is similar to (l)(b) in that the offender has
authority over the victim. In this subsection, the age of the victim
is immaterial.
Subsection (l)(d) defines a specific type of circumstance
under which an act of intercourse is an offense that is similar to
that contained in the present code, i.e., the seduction and illicit
connection, under promise of marriage, with an unmarried female of
previous chaste character, irrespective of the age of either party
concerned (40-9-7, CRS 1963).
Under both the present and proposed sections, prosecution must
prove that it was the male's promise of marriage which induced the
female to yield. For this reason, the committee agreed that a:promise
of marriage intentionally made in bad faith, and not, as the present
law requires, a promise of marriage whether made,in good or bad faith,
should be required. The latter type of promise seems to open the door
to the possibility of blackmail.
This proposed subsection makes no mention of the previous
reputation held by the victim. Requiring a victim to be of chaste
character prior to the act of intercourse that is induced by the
promise of marriage, which is the excuse for prosecution, seems to
indicate that an "experienced" woman cannot be deceived by a false
promise of marriage. Moreover, it seems to indicate that no harm is
accomplished if the female held an unchaste reputation previous to
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the act. The committee agreed that sexual intercourse resulting from
deception should be the basis for the offense, rather than intercourse
with a female of good repute. It should be the method in which intercourse was induced rather than the result which occurred; the "how"
rather than the "what." Also, this proposed section does not require
the female to be unmarried. She may in fact be married, legally
separated or divorced. And, if she is married and the intercourse
induced by the offender's false promise, the offender may be prosecuted under this section or under the proposed adultery section.
Because of the difficulty that may be encountered by a defendant in1proving that his promise was made in good faith, and because a district attorney may not know for certain whether he is
prosecuting a legitimate seducer or a "victim" of a disappointed and
angry ex-fiance, the penalty of this offense has been reduced to the
misdemeanor level. It is common knowledge than many seductions end
in marriage, and the majority of seductions, whether ending in marriage
or otherwise, do not come to the attention of law enforcement authorities.
Marriage of the victim and the seducer, subsequent to the
. information or indictment but prior to conviction, bars a conviction
under the present law. Although a marriage during this time seems to
indicate a promise made in good faith, it also seemingly gives a
felony incentive to the seducer to marry his victim. Moreover, it
provides an angry father an opportunity to retaliate against the_
seducer for the unfavorable publicity given his family and daughter
by denying to his daughter his permission to marry, albeit she and her
seducer wish to marry. For these reasons, marriage as a bar to conviction is omitted in this proposed subsection.
Subsection (2) is a restatement of the present offense defined in 40-2-25(k), CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 14. PROVISIONS GENERALLY AP~LICABLE
TO ARTICLES 10 THROUGH 13
40-14-1.

Mistake as to age.

Whenever in articles 10 through

13 the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below the
age of twelve, it is no defense that the actor did not know the
child's age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than twelve.
When criminality depends on the child's being below a critical age
other than twelve, it is a defense for the actor to prove that he
reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.
40-14- 2.

Spouse Ielationships.

Whenever in articles 10

through 13 the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse,
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the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and
wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.

The

exclusion shall be inoperative as respects spouses living apart under
a decree of judicial separation.

Where the definition of an offense

excludes conduct with a spouse or conduct by a woman, this shall not
preclude conviction of a spouse or woman as accomplice in a sexual
act which he or she causes another person, not within the exclusion,
to perform.
40-14-3.

Sexually promiscuous complainants.

It is a defense

to prosecution under article 13 and sections 40-12-1(5), 40-12-1(6),
and 40-12-2(2) for the alleged offender to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the alleged victim had, ~rior to the time of the
offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with
others.
40-14-4.

Prompt c:omplaint.

No prosecution may be instituted

or maintained under this article unless the alleged offense was
brought to the notice of public authority within three months of its
occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than sixteen years
old or otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within three months
after a parent, guardian or other competent person specially interested
in the victim learns of the offense.
40-14-5.

Testimony of ~omplainants.

No person shall be con-

victed of any felony under articles 10 through l3 upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the alleged victim.

Corroboration may be circumstantial.

In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under articles 10 through
13, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim
or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth
with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.
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Comment
Generally, all sections contained in articles 10, 11, 12, and
13 of this proposed code are based on those sections recommended in
the Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft.l Article 14 is also
based on the Model Penal Code's provisions.
Mistake as to age. Concerning this defense, the Model Penal
Code's reporters commented that:
It is generally provided or held under present
law that even a reasonable mistake as to the age of
the girl does not exculpate or mitigate the offense.
Ploscowe has severely criticized this ·1egislative
and judicial attitude in cases where the girl is over
10 years old, on two gro~nds: (1) over the age of 10,
the sexual act begins to lose its abnormality and
physical danger to the victim; (2) bona-fide mistakes
in age can be made more easily by men who are not
essentially dangerous where the girl is physically
more developed. He recommends that a reasonable belief that the girl was above the age of consent be
permitted as a defense to· the charge of "statutory
rape."
Lfhis sectio,n? ••• follows existing law in denying the defense of mistake as to age, when the
victim is in fact under 10, for the reason that any
error that is at all likely to be made would still
have the young girl victim far below the age for sexual pursuit by normal males •
.b\lso, under this sectio,n? ••• the actor
escapes even third degree liability if he reasonably
believed the girl to be over 16. Pursuit of females
who appear to be over 16 betokens no abnormality but
only a defiance of religious and social conventions
which appear to be fairly widely disregarded.2
The committee adopted this provision recommended in the Model
Penal Code but, where the criminality of conduct depended on the child
being below the age of 10, the committee agreed that this minimum age
should be raised to 12.
Spouse Relationships. In explaining the justification for
this section, the Model Penal Code's reporters stated that:
Coercion of a wife to submit to conjugal embrace
is not rape under existing law. The husband may,
however, be convicted as an accomplice in the rape of

l.

Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Proposed
Official Draft, May, 1962.

2.

Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Tentative
Draft No. 4, April 1955, p. 253.
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his wife, where he compels or 'helps compel her to
submit to another man. In England a husband probably
may be convicted as a principal on a count of common
assault upon his wife for having intercourse with her
against her will. A 1949 English decision held that
a judicial separation order containing a non-cohabitation provision revoked the marital consent of the
wife, making a husband liable for rape. The mere
filing of a divorce petition, which is in the process
of being heard, will not open the door to a rape conviction in England. A related problem arises where
the parties are living together as husband and wife
although not legally married. These problems are resolved,in the text by defining "wife" as including a
woman living with the accused as his wife, regardless
of the legal validity of their marital status, but
not including a woman living apart under a decree of
judicial separation. Under the proposed statute a
rape prosecution is not possible where the spouses
have been living apart without benefit of a judicial
order. We take this position because of the substantial possibility of consent in the resumption of
sexual relations in this situation, coupled with the
special danger of fabricated accusations.
Under the general provisions of this Code there
could be no liability for rape unless the accused
knew that the victim was not his wife or was reckless
in this regard. Some such requirement seems important
particularly in cases where rape liability can be
imposed for consensual relations, e.g., with girls
below the age of 16. A man who married a young girl,
without knowing that she was already married to
another, might find himself charged with statutory
rape for sleeping with his supposed wife. The question is not often explicitly dealt with in present.
law; but the new Wisconsin Code, for example, specifies that the man must know that the woman is not his
wife.
Lfhis sectio,n7 ••• takes care of situations where
the accessorial liability of a husband for rape of
his wife is not otherwise clear, i.e., where the
actual perpetrator is an unwilling participant. Under
the reasoning that threat of violence or other compulsion which negatives female acquiescence in intercourse ought to be punishable, it would make little
difference whether the actual penetration was accomplished by the actor or by another functioning as
the actor's tool. Where the actor is the husband and
his own penetration would not be punishable, the degradation of the marriage relationship brought about
by forcing his wife to have intercourse with another
man is sufficient to remove his immunity and to suggest that outrage to the female sense of virtuP which
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is a basis for the offense of rape.3
The committee agreed with this reasoning and, accordingly, adopted
this section.
Sexually Promiscuous Complainants. This proposed section
broadens the defense now available under the present Colorado seduction statute, 40-9-7. CRS 1963, and applys it to all sections of
articles 10 through 13. Under t~e present Colorado seduction statute,
no conviction can be had unless the victim was of "previous chaste
character." Chastity is also material under other "corruption" statutes,
including 40-9-8 and 40-9-9, CRS 1963. Again, the committee agreed with
the reasoning of the Model Penal Code's reporters:
At common law, prior unchastity of the female
was not a defense to either forceful or "statutory"
rape; a minority of American jurisdictions make the
female's virtue an issue in prosecutions for consensual intercourse with female children. Virtue, in
this connection, is likely to be defined as absence
of previous sexual intercourse. In Pennsylvania, the
defendant is guilty only of fornication if the girl
under 16 was "not of good repute."
Inquiries of this character may be justified
in cases involving older adolescent girls where the
essence of the offense is the defendant's corruption
of innocent but capable females. If, however, we
proceed on the hypothesis that girls under 16 lack
capacity for judgment in this area, it is something
of a farce to inquire into their virtue. Previous
sexual experience in this situation might well betoken previous victimization, which should not be a
defense to a subsequent victimizer. However, one can
envision cases of precocious 14 year old girls and
even prostitutes of this age who might themselves be
the victimizers •••• It is believed that in the rare
instance of prostitution or promiscuity in girls
under 10, the aberration evidenced by the male in
his desire for gratification with the child, is a
sufficient menace to the community to warrant the
penalty irrespective of the abnormal sex habits of
the girl.4
Present seduction legislation commonly requires
that the woman be of "previously chaste character"
or "innocent and virtuous"; e.g., Minnesota, North
Carolina. These terms are generally construed to
mean the real moral qualities of a woman; she must
be of good conduct and pure thought. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that she must be a virgin

3.
4.

Ibid., pp. 244-246.

"fbid., p. 254.
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in the physical sense, for a woman once fallen and
now reformed may be "chaste" within the meaning of
the statutes. A minority of the sample jurisdictions
adopt the test of the woman's "reputation" for
morality rather than her physical virginity or actual
chaste character; e.g., Indiana, New Jersey
The rationale of these requirements would appear to be either that an "experienced" woman cannot
be easily imposed upon, i.e., that her story is
unworthy of belief, or that no important "harm" is
done to such a victim. The correlation between
credibility and chastity is uncertain; it may even
be that emotional factors attending an initial experience involve a special tendency to distortion.
In any event, cross-examination and the requirement
of corroboration would appear sufficient safeguards
on this account. "Harm" of the sort which is our
present concern, can be done to those who have had
previous sexual experience; the girl once seduced
may be the readier victim of him who now proposes
marriage. Also, deterrent and reformative considerations would seem to call for the application of
penal measures to the male who practices these deceptions, regardless of his victim's character or
reputation. In lieu of the virtue requirement there
is proposed a defense against complaints by prostitutes and the like.
Although two-thirds of the sample states require that the woman be single, we recommend that
this curcumstance not be made determinative. Indeed,
if the actor was aware of her marital state, this
might well be regarded as a matter of aggravation.
In some cases, it is true, the fact that the woman
was married may indicate that she could not have relied on a promise of marriage which must be contingent
on her divorce (as it might be contingent on his,
were he married). But considering the frequency and
ease of divorce in this country, there seems to be no
justification for an absolute immunity for seduction
of married women on promise of marriage.5
Prompt Complaint. The present Colorado seduction statute
comes close to the scope of that which is proposed under this section.
Section 40-9-7, CRS 1963, provides that "No conviction shall be had
under this section ••• unless the indictment shall be found, or the
information laid, within two years after the commission of the offense." The committee, by adopting the Model Penal Code's recommended
section, implicitly agreed with its purpose:
At common law, "a strong, but not a conclusive
presumption against a woman" was raised by her

-Ibid.,

pp. 259-260.
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failing to complain of rape within a reasonable time
after the fact. In the absence of statutory provision, failure to make prompt complaint is not a bar
to prosecution for rape. However, evidence of prompt
complaint is admissible to repel a suggestion that the
complaint was insincere. Some jurisdictions have
provided special statutes of limitation for rape
cases, so that complaint would have to be made within that limited time. The specific requirement under
••• fthis sectio!!.7 ••• that the offense be brought to
the attention of the public authorities within six
months is an innovation in Anglo-American law. A
prosecutor would, however, hesitate to institute prosecution on a stale complaint. The possibility that
pregnancy might change a willing participant in the
sex act into a vindictive complainant, as well as the
sound reasoning that one who has, in fact, been subjected to an act of violence will not delay in bringing the offense to the attention of the authorities,
are sufficient grounds for setting some time limit
upon the right to complain. Likewise, the dangers of
blackmail or psychopathy of the complainant make
objective standards imperative. A specific possi~
bility of extension of time is made in the case of
young children and incompetents for the obvious reason
that if such individuals, under our rationale, do not
possess the judgment and capacity necessary to become
"willing" participants in an act of sexual intercourse, their deficiency may also blind them to the
need for complaint. Fear of parental anger or confusion as to the significance of the act might well
encourage silence in this situation. Hence the •••
ff.hreiJ ••• month period for complaint does not begin
to run, for such individuals, until after a competent
person specially interested in the victim learns of
the offense.6
Testimony of Comelainants. Again, the only related statutory
provision to that which is proposed here is found in the present
Colorado seduction statute, 40-9-7. CRS 1963, i.e •• "No conviction
shall be had under this section on the testimony of the female
seduced, unsupported by other evidence ••• " The reporters of the
Model Penal Code justified this recommended section on the following
grounds:
Seduction statutes usually, and rape statutes
occasionally, require ••• that the prosecutrix' story
be corroborated, conviction being barred if her
testimony is "unsupported by other evidence." Wigmore disapproves of corroboration requirements on
the ground that they are unnecessary because (1)
jurors are naturally suspicious of such complaints,

6.

Ibid., pp. 264-265.
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and (2) the purpose of the rule is already attained
by the court's power to set aside a verdict for insufficient evidence. This, he says, is being done
in jurisdictions having no statutory rule upon the
same evidence which would not be sufficient in
jurisdictions having the statutory rule of corroboration. The most important issue raised by the differences among present laws is whether corroboration
in seduction cases shall be required only of the
promise of marriage (e.g., Missouri, Pennsylvania),
or of all the material elements of the offense (e.g.,
Indiana). For example, New York's statute says the
testimony of the woman must be supported by other
evidence, but decisions have held this to require
corroboration of the promise of marriage and the
intercourse only; there is no need for corroboration
that the girl is single or that she is chaste. Sometimes under the statutes which require corroboration
without further specification, the language of the
opinions suggests that what is desired is not so
much independent evidence of particular elements of
the offense, but rather a basis for believing that
the "testimony given by the woman • • • is worthy of
credit and belief." A common formulation with regard
to corroboration of the promise of marriage is that
the circumstances must be such as usually accompany
the relationship of engaged couples.
The text requires corroboration, but does not
attempt to particularize as to its nature. A general
caution to the authorities against convicting on the
bare testimony of the prosecutrix may be desirable
in view of the probable special psychological
volvement, conscious or unconscious, of judges and
jurors in sex offenses charged against others. The
only rational alternative would be to require corroboration as to every element of the crime, since
there is no reason to believe that complainant is
more likely to lie or deceive herself on one point
rather than another. A requirement as broad as that
would impose an impracticable burden on the prosecutor, especially considering that the offense under
subsection ••• B0-13-l(l)(dl7 ••• requires proof that
the defendant did not intend to perform his promise,
and is otherwise narrowly circumscribed and lightly
punished.7

7.

Ibid., pp. 263-264.
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SUB-PART II.

FAMILIAL OFFENSES

ARTICLE 15.
40-15-1.

Abortion.

(1)

ABORTIOO
Any person who uses any instrument,

medicine, drug, or other substance whatever, with the intent to procure a miscarriage of any woman, commits abortion and is guilty of a
class_ felony.

It shall not be necessary in order to commit

abortion that such woman be pregnant or, if pregnant, that a miscarriage be in fact accomplished.
(2)

If any woman by reason of such abortion shall die, the

person administering or causing to be administered such medicine,
drug, or other substance whatever, or using or causing to be used any
instrument as aforesaid, shall be guilty of murder and punished accordingly.
(3)

It shall be an affirmative defense to abortion that the

abortion was performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine
and· surgery in all its branches and in a licensed hospital or other
licensed medical facility because it was necessary for the preservation of the woman's life or the prevention of serious and permanent
bodily injury to her.
Comment
This section is a restatement of the present abortion offense
defined in 40-2-23, CRS 1963, with the exception of one proposed
change, that of including within the coverage of this proposed section
"pretended" abortions.
The present practice of district attorneys is to prosecute an
alleged abortionist under the present abortion and false pretenses
or confidence game sections which. in effect. forces the alleged
abortionist to plead guilty under one of the two sections. However,
there does remain the possibility that in less populous judicial
districts, where the offense of abortion is seldom prosecuted, a district attorney may prosecute only under the abortion statute and be
surprised after the trial has begun when the defendant claims he knew,
in fact, that the female was not pregnant. To avoid this remote possibility, "pretended" abortions are brought within the scope of the
section.
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40-15-2.

Distributing abortifacients.

Any person who sells

or distributes any drug, medicine, instrument, or other substance
whatever which he knows to be an abortifacient and which is in fact
an abortifacient to or for any person other than licensed physicians
commits distributing abortifacients and is guilty of a class __ misdemeanor.
40-15-3.

Advertising abortion.

Any person who advertises,

prints, publishes, distributes, or circulates any communication through
print, radio, or television media advocating, advising, or suggesting
any act which would be a violation of this article commits advertising
abortion and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
These two proposed sections restate the present and identical
offenses now defined under 66-3-65 to 67, 'CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 16.
40-16-1.

Bigamy.

BIGAMY

Any person having a husband or wife who

subsequently marries another or cohabits in this state after such
marriage commits bigamy and is guilty of a class_ felony, unless
at the time of the subsequent marriage:
(1)

-

The accused reasonably believed the prior spouse to be
dead; or

(2)

The prior spouse had been continually absent for a period
of five years during which time the accused did not know
the prior spouse to be alive; or

(3)

The accused reasonably believed that he was legally
eligible to remarry.
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Comment
This section propose.s no major changes in the definition of
the offense of bigamy now contained in 40-9-1, CRS 1963. The defenses
available to a charge of bigamy also are restatements of the present
law, with one minor proposed change contained in subsection (3).
This defense, which replaces the defense that the former marriage
ended in divorce or otherwise was declared void, is intended to reach
circumstances wherein the alleged bigamist reasonably believed that
he was legally eligible to remarry. Such wording is intended to
avoid confusing situations arising under foreign divorces, compounded
by the question of their validity, which have caused many different
court opinions.
40-16-2.

Marrying a bigamist.

Any previously unmarried

person who knowingly marries another under circumstances known to
him which would render the other person guilty of bigamy under the
laws of this state, or who cohabits in this state after such marriage,
commits marrying a bigamist and is guilty of a class_ felony (misdemeanor).
Comment
This section replaces the present offense of marrying a spouse
of another, 40-9-2, CRS 1963, and proposes no major changes.
40-16-3.

Cohabitation after discovery of bigamous marriage.

Either party to a bigamous marriage who continues to cohabit with the
other party to a bigamous marriage after he or she has discovered
that said marriage is bigamous commits cohabitation after discovery of
bigamous marriage and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This section proposes new law. The committee agreed that in
any proposed bigamy sections, there should be a provision making the
spouse of a bigamist also guilty of an offense when he or she discovers that the marriage, entered into in good faith, is bigamous
·.
Often. a wife who discovers after her marriage that her husband has
another wife will literally blackmail him, asking for unfair property
settlements, etc., in turn for her silence. Both parties in such a
situation should be guilty of an offense.
i'
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ARTICLE 17.
40-17-1.

Incest.

INCEST

Any person who knowingly marries or co-

habits with or has sexual intercourse with an ancestor or descendant,
a brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or an uncle, aunt,
nephew, or niece of the whole blood, commits incest and is guilty of
a class_ felony.
40-17-2.

Aggravated incest.

Any father who cohabits or has

sexual intercourse with his daughter commits aggravated incest and is
guilty of a class_ felony.
40-17-3.

Definition.

As used in sections 40-9-8 and 40-9-9,

the word "cohabit" means to live together under the representation or
appearance of being married.

The relationships referred to herein

include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, and the
relationship of parent and child by adoption.
Comment
These sections propose no major changes and replace the
present definitions contained in 40-9-4 to 6, CRS 1963.
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SUB-PART Ill. COMMUNITY OFFENSES
ARTICLE 18.
40-18-1.

OBSCENITY

Obscenity offenses.

Any person who, with knowledge

of the nature or content thereof, does any of the following commits
obscenity:
(1)

Sells, delivers, or provides, or offers or agrees to
sell, deliver, or provide any obscene writing, picture,
record, or other representation or embodiment of the
obscene; or

(2)

Presents or directs an obscene play, dance, or other
performance or participates directly in that portion
thereof which makes it obscene; or

(3)

Publishes, exhibits, or otherwise makes available anything obscene; or

(4)

Performs an obscene act or otherwise presents an
obscene exhibition of his body for gain; or

(5)

Creates, buys, procures, or possesses obscene matter
or material with intent to disseminate it in violation
of this article, or of the penal laws or regulations of
any other jurisdiction; or

(6)

Advertises or otherwise promotes the sale of material
represented or held out by him to be obscene.

Any person who commits obscenity for the first offense is
guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, and for a second or subsequent
offense is guilty of a class_ felony.

40-18-2.

Obscenity defined.

A thing is obscene if, consid-

er,~ as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that
is,a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if
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it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description
or representation of such matters.

A thing is obscene even though

the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs.
40-18-3.

Interpretation of evidence.

Obscenity shall be

judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it shall be
judged with reference to children or other specially susceptible
audience if it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be specially designed for or
directed to such an audience.

In any prosecution for an offense under

this article evidence shall be admissible to show:
(1)

The character of the audience for which the material
was designed or to which it was directed;

(2)

What the predominant appeal of the material would be
for ordinary adults or a special audience, and what
effect, if any, it would probably have on the behavior
of such people;

(3)

The artistic, literary, scientific, educational, or
other merits of the material, or absence thereof;

(4)

The degree, if any, of public acceptance of the material
in this state;

(5)

Appeal to prurient interest, or obscene thereof, in
advertising or other promotion of the material;

(6)

Purpose of the author, creator, publisher, or disseminator.

40-18-4.

Prima facie evidence.

The creation, purchase,

procurement, or possession of a mold, engraved plate, or other embodiment of obscenity specially adapted for reproducing multiple copies,
or the possession of more than three copies of obscene material shall
be prima facie evidence of an intent to disseminate.
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40-18-5.

Exceptions.

It shall be an affirmative defense to

obscenity that the dissemination:
(1)

Was not for gain and was made to personal associates
other than children under eighteen years of age:

(2)

Was to institutions or individuals having scientific
or other special justification for possession of such
material.

Comment
The key to any offense involving obscenity, e.g., possession
and dissemination, is the definition of obscenity. In a 1957 decision (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476), the United States Supreme
Court defined obscene material as material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest, that is, material having a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts. This definition is included
under this proposed article. The proposed sections presented here are
based on the similar provisions of the new criminal code of Illinois
that was enacted in 1961. Coverage of obscenity offenses provided
here is essentially that which is provided under present Colorado law.
ARTICLE 19.
40-19-1.

Prostitution.

PROSTITUTION
Any person who performs, offers, or

agrees to perform any of the following with any person not his spouse
for money commits prostitution and is guilty of a class

misde-

meanor:
(1)

Any act of sexual intercourse; or

(2)

Any act of deviate sexual intercourse.

Comment
.
This proposed section defines an act of prostitution which the
present law, by relying on a common law definition, does not. An act
of prostitution. as defined here, is committed by a person when he or
she performs, offers to perform or agrees to perform an act of intercourse, whether normal or deviate, with another who is not his or her
spouse and in consideration for which is the payment of money.
Under this section, a male as well as a female can be convicted.
Although one may expect the majority of the offenders under this section or under the present section to be females, prostitution is not
exclusively a crime of women.
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An act of prostitution, however, cannot be committed if the
two parties are married to each other, or, if the two parties are not
married to each other, where there is the payment of anything of value,
other than money, in consideration for which there is an act of intercourse. Since this article is directed toward commercialized prostitution, it is intended to exclude a female who rewards her date with
intercourse in consideration for a night on the town, and other similar
non-marital rewards, whether the agreements are explicit or implicit.
Similarly, an act of intercourse in consideration of the payment of
money involving a married couple is excluded from the coverage of this
section.
40-19-2.

Soliciting for a prostitute.

Any person who per-

forms any of the following commits soliciting for a prostitute and is
guilty of a class

misdemeanor:

(1)

Solicits another for the purpose of prostitution; or

(2)

Arranges or offers to arrange a meeting of persons for
the purpose of prostitution; or

(3)

Directs another to a place knowing such direction is for
the purpose of prostitution.

Comment
This section broadens the coverage of the two present.provisions which it replaces. This section replaces 40-9~14, CRS 1963,
i.e., any prostitute, courtesan or lewd woman who, by word, gesture
or action, shall endeavor to ply her vocation upon the streets, or
from the door or window of any house, or in any public place in any
city or town in this state, or who for such purpose shall make a bold
and meretricious display of herself, and 40-9-11, CRS 1963, i.e., any
ma!._ .,ver the age of 18 years who acts or engages himself as a pimp,
or solicits for any prostitute.
The basis of this offense is the promotion of prostitution.
An offense under this section is a misdemeanor and can be committed
by a customer, prostitute or a third party, e.g.,a bellboy, an elevator operator, or a bartender. An offense can be committed irrespective of whether the offender is male or female, whether the
solicitation is open or discreet, and whether the solicitation was
made within a town or city or within an unincorporated area.
40-19-3,

Pandering.

(1)

Any person who does any of the

following for money commits pa·ndering:
(a)

Compels a female to become a prostitute; or
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(b)

Arranges or offers to arrange a situation in which a
female may practice prostitution.

(2)

Any person convicted of pandering under paragraph (a) of

subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a class_ felony.

Any

person convicted of pandering under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of
this section is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section replaces the present offense defined
under 40-9-10, CRS 1963, i.e., the encouraging, persuading, influencing, inducing, or procuring a female of chaste character to have
illicit sexual intercourse with any male by any person over the age of
18 years. A person convicted under this present section may be
punished by a one to five-year term of imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Under proposed subsection (l)(a), an offense of which constitutes the only felony penalty provided in this article, a person can be
convicted of panderi~g.only if he or she compelled the female to become
a prostitute. If the female is offered a situation in which she can
practice prostitution or if such an arrangement is actually made,
whether she accepts or refuses, a misdemeanor offense under subsection
(l)(b) has been committed. However, the mere encouragement, inducement or persuasion of a female to become a prostitute without actual
compulsion or, in the absence of compulsion, the offer to or actual
arrangement of a situation in which she can practice prostitution, is
not an offense under this section.
If the panderer's conduct conforms to that described by either
subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b) but he has not acted for the. purpose of
financial gain, no offense has been committed under this section.
40-19-4.

Keeping a place of prostitution.

Any person who

has or exercises control over the use of any place which offers
seclusion or shelter for the practice of prostitution and who performs
any one or more of the following commits keeping a place of prostitution and is guilty of a class
(1)

misdemeanor:

Knowingly grants or permits the use of such place for

the purpose of prostitution; or
(2)

Grants or permits the use of such place under circumstances from which he could reasonably know that the
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place is used or is to be used for purposes of prostitution; or
(3)

Permits the continued use of a place after becoming aware
of facts or circumstances from which he should reasonably
know that the place is being used for purposes of prostitution.

Comment
This proposed sect·ion replaces several provisions now contained
in the law: 1) the keeper or proprietor of any house of ill fame or
bad repute or any assignation house into which an unmarried female is
enticed shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor as principal (40-9-9,
CRS 1~63); 2) any male person over the age of 18 years who engages or
assists in operating or managing any room, house, or building for the
urpose of carrying on prostitution shall be deemed guilty of a felony
40-9-11, CRS 1963); and 3) any person who maintains or keeps a lewd
house or place for the practice of fornication, or keeps a common,
ill-governed and disorderly house, to the encouragement of idleness,
gaming, drinking, fornication or other misbehavior is guilty of a misdemeanor (40-9-15, CRS 1963).
·

f

This section proposes to combine these present offenses under
one section and to penalize any person, irrespective of the person's
age or sex, who has or exercises control over any place which he knows
or should reasonably know offers seclusion or shelter for the practice
of prostitution.
.
40-19-5.

Patronizing a prostitute.

with a

Any person who performs

·--•-

any of the following

person not his spouse commits patronizing

a prostitute and is guilty of a class
(l)

misdemeanor:

Engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a prostitute; or

(2)

Engages in an act of deviate sexual conduct with a
prostitute; or

(3)

Enters or remains in a place of prostitution with intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual conduct.
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Comment
This section proposes a new offense, that of promoting prostitution through the patronization of prostitutes. Under the present
law, a man who engages a prostitute commits no offense unless the
engagement is an open flout of the community standards of morality.
Since prostitution could hardly flourish without customers, it is
recommended here that the patronization of prostitutes be treated no
different than other conduct deemed criminal under this article, which
involves the promotion of prostitution, e.g.,pandering, soliciting for
a prostitute, and keeping a place of prostitution.
This section penalizes customers and intended customers of
prostitutes, whether the intercourse is normal or deviate. Delivery
men, telephone repair men, and others who enter a place of prostitution
for legitimate business purposes are excluded from the coverage of
this section.
40-19-6.

Pimping.

Any person who receives money or other

property from a prostitute, not for a lawful consideration, knowing it
· was earned in whole or in part from the practice of prostitution,
commits pimping and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section replaces one of the present offenses
defined under 40-9-11, CRS 1963, i.e., any person 18 years of age or
older who knowingly lives on or is supported or maintained in whole or
in part by the money or other valuable consideration realized, procured or earned by any female through her own prostitution or the
prostitution of other females is guilty of a felony.
This section, reflecting the changes proposed in other sections
of this article, including the ability of a male to commit prostitution,
proposes to penalize pimping in more realistic terms. The wording of
the present law can be construed in such a manner as to subject to a
felony penalty.a grocer or other storekeeper who knowingly sells to a
prostitute. and to the prostitute's 19 or 20-year-old son and daughter
wno knowingly receives financial support from his prostitute-parent
to meet tuition and other college expenses. The Model Penal Code's
reporters criticized felony punishment for this offense for another
reason:
It is obvious that such £pimping offense? laws were
evolved to help prosecutors convict men believed to be
engaged in promoting prostitution. often of their wives. If
there were sufficient evidence, the man might be convicted
of soliciting for the woman. But where evidence of soliciting
or other actual complicity in prostitution is lacking, conviction can be had on proof merely that she supports him "in
whole or in part."
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Such legislation is insupportable in principle and goes

well beyond any pragmatic justification which might be urged

for it. In no other instance is criminal liability based on
the bare fact that one is supported by another person who
gains his livelihood illegally. True, a high statistical
probability favors the inference t~at a man without other
means of support must be collaborating in the prostitution of
the woman who supports him. But this hardly warrants more
than the presumption[cif promoting prostitutio!!.7 provided by
subsection {4).8
.
40-19-7.

Testimony of witness to prostitution.

In any in-

vestigation or prosecution of any violation of the provisions of this
article, or any attempt thereof, no person shall be excused from giving testimony or producing documentary or other evidence material to
such investigation or prosecution on the ground that the testimony or
evidence required of him is or may be incriminating; provided, that
any person who so testifies or produces evidence concerning such offenses shall be immune to prosecution or conviction for any such
violation about which he may testify or produce evidence.
Comment
This section is a restatement of the existing witness immunity
section, 40-9-12, CRS 1963, and proposes no major changes.

8.

Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 9, The American Law Institute,
Philadelphia, 1959, p. 180.
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ARTICLE 20.
40-20-1.

Adultery.

PUBLIC INDECENCY

Any person who cohabits or has sexual

intercourse with another not his spouse commits adultery and is
guilty of a class

--- misdemeanor,

if the behavior is open and

notorious, and:
(1)

The person is married and the other person involved in
such intercourse is not his spouse; or

(2)

The person is not married and knows that the other
person involved in such intercourse is married.

Comment
The present Colorado adultery crime leans on the common
law definition of adultery for a description of the unlawful conduct.
At common law, adultery consisted of an act of sexual intercourse by
a man, whether single or married, with a married woman not his wife,
performed in such an open and notorious manner as to be a public
nuisance.
This section proposes to define adultery also by statute law.
It is the same conduct which constitutes fornication and performed by
a person who is married and knows the other person, whether married
or single, is not his spouse, or by a single person who knows that
the other person is married. If the person believes that the other
person is single, wh~n in fact the other person is married, the conduct constitutes fornication.
40-20-2.

Fornication.

Any person who cohabits or has sexual

intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication and is
guilty of a class _ __ misdemeanor, if the behavior is open and
notorious.
Comment
Present Colorado law does not define the crime of fornication.
It relies on the common law definition, i.e., an act of private sexual
intercourse by a man, either married or single, with a consenting,
unmarried woman, as modified by the phrase "Any man or woman ••• "
This section proposes to define fornication by statute law.
It is cohabitation or a single act of sexual intercourse by an unmarried person, either male or female, with an unmarried person of the
opposite sex, in a non-private manner. Where one party is married, the
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conduct if criminal, constitutes adultery. Cohabitation, of course,
implies'one or more acts of s!xual activity and does not requi~e.a
special definition. Prosecution do 7s not have.to prove~ ~pec1fic
act of sexual intercourse occurred if the parties were living together
under circumstances that makes it obvious that a continuing sexual
relationship existed between them. Furthermore, prosecution does not
have to prove an act of sexual intercourse occurred -- any type of
sexual activity, normal or deviate, is covered.
Following the present statute's exclusion of bedroom conduct,
the act of sexual intercourse or cohabitation must occur under circumstances which reveal the conduct to the public. Only when sexual
activity between consenting adults is so "open and notorious" that it
offends the public's morals is it criminal.
40-20-3.

Loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations.

Any person who loiters in or near any public place for the purpose of
soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate sexual relations
commits loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations and is guilty
of a class

--- misdemeanor.

Comment
Section 40-20-3 covers deviate behavior which requires treatment somewhat similar to "open and notorious" heterosexual relationships. However, the problem is different in that a strong inference
of sexual relations follows from "cohabitation" of a man and woman,
and if it is known that they are not married the cohabitation constitutes an open flouting of widely held standards of morality. This is
not the case when two people of the same sex live together, however
strong the suspicion may be of a sexual relation between th~m. Ac- •
cordingly, section 40-20-3, similar to subsection (2) of the present
Colorado law, 40-2-31, CRS 1963, reaches the problem by prohibiting
solicitation of strangers in public places.
By reducing the penalty for solicitation of sodomy and by
requiring the solicitation to be accomplished only in public places,
the danger of abuse of the law by blackmailers is reduced.
·
40-20-4.

Public indecency.

Any person of the age of 17 years

and upwards who performs any of the following in a place where the
conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others commits
public indecency and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor:

(1) An act of sexual intercourse; or
(2)

An act of deviate sexual intercourse; or
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(3)

A lewd exposure of the body done with intent to arouse
or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person; or

(4)

A lewd fondling or caress of the body of another person
of the same sex.

Comment
This section defines the undefined crime of open lewdness now
contained in 40-9-15, CRS 1963, i.e., "If any person shall be guilty
of open lewdness, or other notorious act of public indecency, tending
to debauch the public morals, ••• ffie shal.J7 be fined not exceeding one
hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six
months." At common law, which the present statute relies upon for a
definition, "open lewdness" means open and public indecency, and in
order to amount to an indictable offense it must always amount to a
common nuisance, committed in a public place, and seen by two or more
persons lawfully at that place.
This section requires that one of four acts of conduct must
be committed in a public place by a person 17 years of age or older.
A public place is defined as any place where the prohibited conduct
may reasonably be expected to be seen by others. This definition
includes public parks during the daylight and early evening hours as
well as any office waiting rooms during normal business hours. It is
a question for the trier of the facts to decide if the place is a
public place, depending on the circumstances under which the conduct
was performed. The age of 17 years was selected under this particular
section as the division of responsibility of offenders. A child, 17
years of age or younger, may or may not be expected by society to exercise discretion in choosing his arena for promiscuity, depending on
his age, but a person over the age of 17, generally considered an
adult in this code, is expected to exercise some judgment.
Four acts are considered indecent under this section, if done
publicly by adults.
Subsections (1) and (2) define two acts of public indecency.
The prohibited conduct may be conduct which, if done in a proper
place, is lawful but which is prohibited when done in the presence of
others, i.e., an act of sexual intercourse between a man and his wife,
or the conduct may be unlawful and prosecuted under this section or
under the section which defines the prohibited conduct, i.e., an act
of sexual intercourse between an unmarried man and woman.
Subsection (3) requires lewd exposure coupled with an intent
to arouse or to satisfy the carnal appetite of a viewer. Most often
prosecution under this subsection will involve the genital exposure
of an exhibitionist. This subsection does not apply to members of
nudist camps, persons appearing nude in public showers, nor persons
attired in brief beach wear, since there is no lewd exposure coupled
with the specific intent of sexual arousal-or gratification.,
Subsection (4) is similar to the other three subsections in
that a gross flouting of community standards in respect to sexuality
is exhibited.
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PART D.

OFFENSE AFFECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
ARTICLE 21.

40-21-1.

Libel.

LIBEL

(1) ,Libel is the malicious defamation ex-

pressed either by printing, or by signs, or pictures or the like,
tending:
(a)

To blacken the memory of one who is dead: or

(b)

To impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation,
or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.

(2)

Any person who commits libel is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.
40-21-2.

Justification.

In all prosecutions for libel,. the

truth thereof may be given in evidence in justification, except libels
tending to blacken the memory of the dead or expose the natural defects of the living.
Comment
These two proposed sections constitute a restatement of the
present offense of libel defined under 40-8-12, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 22.
40-22-1.

CLAIRVOYANCY

Practicing clairvoyancy.

Any person who practices

or advertises a practice of clairvoyancy, palmistry, mesmerism, fortune
telling, astrology, seership, or like crafty science, readings, sit•
tings or exhibitions of a like character, for which a fee or charge is
made or accepted, commits practicing clairvoyancy and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor.
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Comment
This section combines and restates the definitions and penalty
contained in 40-24-1, 40-24-2, and 40-24-3, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 23.
40-23-1.

BRIBERY IN SPORT CONTESTS

Bribery of sports.participants and officials.

Any

person who does any of the following acts commits bribery of sports
participants and officials and is guilty of a·class _
(1)

felony:

Gives, offers or promises to any participant in any contest of skill, speed, strength or endurance any gift or
gratuity whatever with intent thereby to influence such
participant to refrain from exerting his full degree of
skill, speed, strength, or endurance, in such contest; or

(2)

Requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or promises to
make a gift or promise to do an act beneficial to himself, under an agreement or with an understanding that
he shall refrain from exerting his full degree of skill,
speed, strength or endurance in such contest; or

(3)

Gives, offers, or promises to any person who is or will
be an umpire, referee, judge or other official at any
such contest with the intention or understanding that
such person will corruptly or dishonestly umpire, referee,
judge or officiate at any such contest so as to affect or
influence the result thereof; or

(4)

Requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or promises to
make a gift or promise to do an act beneficial to himself,
when he is or expects to be an umpire, referee, judge or
other official at any such contest, under an agreement
or understanding that he shall corruptly or dishonestly
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umpire, referee, judge or officiate at any such contest.
(2)

As used in this section, "participant" includes any

person who is selected or who expects to be selected to take part in

any such contest.
Comment
This section is a restatement of the offenses presently defined in 40-12-2, 40-12-3, 40-12-4, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 24.
40-24-1.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

Cruelty to animals.

(l)

Any person who does any

of the following acts commits cruelty to animals and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor:
(a)

Intentionally tortures any animal, or without justification kills any domestic animal of another without the
owner's consent; or

(b)

Abandons or fails, without reasonable excuse, to provide
necessary food, care or shelter for any animal in his
custody; or

(c)

Intentionally poisons any domestic animal of another
without the owner's consent or places poison in any place
with intent that it be taken by a domestic animal of
another; or

(d)

Intentionally transports or confines any animal in a
cruel manner; or

(e)

Intentionally participates in the earnings of any place
for baiting or fighting animals or intentionally maintains or allows any place to be used for such purpose.

(2)

As used in this section, "torture" does not include bona
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fide experiments carried on for scientific research or normal and
accepted veterinary practices.
Comment
This section, by combining the essential criminal conduct
defined in many statutes, is a restatement of present law. Present
Colorado statutes to be replaced by this proposed section include:
40-20-1, CRS 1963 -- Overdriving and Starving Animals.
40-20-2, CRS 1963 -- Improper Care of Impounded Animals.
40-20-4, CRS 1963 -- Keeping Fowls or.Animals to Fight.
40-20-16, CRS 1963
Sheepherder Abandoning Sheep Without
Notice.
40-20-18, CRS 1963 -- Unlawful to Dock a Horse's Tail.
40-20-22, CRS 1963 -- Killing Animals in a Contest.
40-24-2.

Influencing dog and horse races.

(1)

Any person

who influences, conspires with or has any understanding or connivance
with any owner, jockey, groom or other person associated with or
interested in any stable, kennel, horse or dog, or any race in which
any horse or dog participates or is expected to participate, to prearrange or predetermine the results of any such race, or any person
who-stimulates or depresses a dog or horse for the purpose of affecting the results of a race commits influencing dog and horse races and
is guilty of a class_ felony.
{2)

Nothing in this section shall prohibit the normal treat-

ment of such animals by veterinarians when the purpose of such treatment is not primarily designed to stimulate or depress such animals
in order to affect the results of a race.
Comment
This section is a restatement of the present law, 40-20-27,
CRS 1963.
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>MTIO..E 25.

40-25-1.

DISORDERLY CONDUCT

Disturbance of the peace by telephone.

(1)

Any

person who does any of the following commits disturbance of the peace
by telephone and is guilty of a class
(a)

misdemeanor:

Disturbs or tends to disturb the peace, quiet, or right
of privacy of any person or family to whom the call is
directed by repeated and continued anonymous or identified telephone messages intended to harass or disturb;
or

(b)

By a single call or repeated calls uses obscene, profane,
indecent, or-offensive language or suggests any lewd or
lascivious act over or through a telephone; or

(c)

Attempts to extort money or other thing of value from
any person or family by means or use of the telephone;
or

(d)

Threatens any physical violence or harm to any person or
family; or

(e)

Repeatedly or continuously causes the telephone of any
person or family to ring with intent to disturb or harass
such person or family.

(2)

The normal use of a telephone for the purpose of request-

ing payment of debts or obligations or for other legitimate business
purposes does not constitute a violation of this section.
Comment
This section restates the present offenses defined in 40-4-23,
CRS 1963.
40-25-2.

Disturbance of the peace.

Any person who shall

maliciously or willfully disturb the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
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or family, by loud or unusual noises, or by tumultuous or offensive
carriage, threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight,
or fighting, commits disturbance of the peace and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-8-1, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session
Laws.
40-25-3.

Unlawful assembling.

Any person who assembles with

another for the purpose of disturbing the peace, or committing any
unlawful act, and does not disperse on being desired or commanded so
to do by a judge, sheriff, coroner or other public officer, commits
unlawful assembling and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-8-3, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session
Laws.
40-25-4.

Riot.

Any person who meets with another to do an

unlawful act with force or violence against the person or property of
another, with or without~ common cause of quarrel, or even does a
lawful act in a violent or tumultuous manner commits riot and is
guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-8-6, CRS 1963.
40-25-5.

Disturbing worship.

Any person who by menace, pro-

fane swearing, vulgar language, or any disorderly or immoral conduct,
interrupts and disturbs any congregation or collection of citizens
assembled together for the purpose of worshiping Almighty God commits
disturbing worship and is guilty of a class
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misdemeanor.

Comment

This proposed offense is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-8-15, CRS 1963.
40-25-6.

Vagrancy.

(1)

Any person who loiters or prowls in

a place at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals
under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or
property in the vicinity commits vagrancy and is guilty of a class_
misdemeanor.
(2)

Among the circumstances which may be considered in deter-

mining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the person
takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify

himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object.
Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under
this section afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm
which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to i~entify him'

self and explain his presence and conduct.

No person shall be con-

victed of an offense under this section if the peace officer did not
comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that the
explanation given by the person was true and, if believed by the peace
officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm.
Comment
This section proposes a substantial deviation from the present
vagrancy statute, 40-8-19, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964
Session Laws, and is based on the Model Penal Code's recommended
statute. The complete analysis of this Model Penal Code section, as
stated by the Code's reporters, is as follows:
The proposals here made to penalize what might
be called "suspicious loitering," are all that would
be left in the law of that ancient protean offense
designated "vagrancy," if indeed even this much
should be retained in a code of substantive penal
law. The reasons for doubt on that score are that
a statute which makes it a penal offense for a person
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to fail to identify himself and give an exculpatory
account of his presence is in effect an extension of
the law of arrest, and trenches on the privilege
against self-incrimination. It authorizes arrest of
persons who have not given reasonable ground for believing that they are engaged in or have committed
offenses. Alternatively, it can be regarded as a
legislative determination that in ''suspicd.ous" circumstances, failure to respond to police inquiries
supplies reasonable ground. In either view, extension of the law of arrest might be regarded as a
matter for a code of procedure rather than an end to
be achieved indirectly by creating a ~ubstantive
offense of failure to respond to the police.
The constitutionality of such legislation may
depend on the fact that the history of Anglo-American
law provides an ancient pedigree for offenses of this
character, under the heading of "vagrancy". In
feudal times the vagrancy statutes served to protect
the rights of the lord in his fugitive serfs. They
also were an instrument for controlling wandering
bands of robbers, as the feudal system began to break
up, leaving a surplus of rootless workmen. Paradoxically, the vagrancy laws also lent themselves to
control of scarce labor. When the Black Death depopulated England of one-third to one-half of its
inhabitants, and the Statute of Labourers was passed
to compel able-bodied men to serve anyone who required their services at the customary rate of wages,
it was made an offense for a workman or servant to
depart from service before the time agreed upon. It
was also an offense to give alms to a "valiant" beggar. Wandering or vagrancy was punishable summarily.
About this time a distinction came to be made between
sturdy and impotent beggars. The former were treated
as vagrants, the latter being non-criminal so long as
they remained in their own locality. Thus the vagrancy
laws assumed still another role: criminal sanctions
against abuse of the poor laws. These laws placed the
burden of the impotent beggar on his home parish.
Impotent beggars were required to remain in the cities
or towns where they were living, later being given an
option of going to their places of birth. Such beggars came to be licensed. Sturdy beggars were
punished and given a pass to return to their place of
habitation or birth. Provisions were made for the
employment of sturdy beggars in their own locality
in workhouse-like institutions.
Thus, the early vagrancy laws were criminal
sanctions of the Statute of Labourers, designed to
control the labor market. Later they became the
criminal sanction of the poor laws. As time went on,
they came to be looked upon also as devices to control a mass of potential criminals.
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Today some form of vagrancy is a statutory offense in every state except West Virginia, where it
is a common law offense. It will be observed that
many of these activities are punishable under specific provisions of this Code and the existing codes
of the several states. Others cannot, consistently
with constitutional standards, be proscribed in the
terms commonly found in the vagrancy statutes.
The most noteworthy aspect of the legislation
is its effect to create a ttstatustt of criminality
based on past behavior. Illustrative is People v.
Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907). Defendant
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. His
defense was that he was resisting an illegal arrest.
The testimony of the arresting officers was quite
frank. They received a report that the defendant
and another had assaulted a man. They had not seen
the offense and concluded they could not arrest them
for battery without a warrant. One officer testified: "I was notified that this man and Mack had
beat up a man • • • and I says: 'Well, the only thing
we can do -- we didn't see it -- we will go and vag
them.'" There was evidence that he knew defendant
as a vagrant, but had been instructed to leave him
alone if he behaved himself. The court affirmed the
conviction stating:
Whether this is an entirely commendable
attitude toward appellant's class of misdemeanants we need not stop to consider, but we
think the admitted fact that appellant would not
have been arrested if he had confined himself
to vagrancy did not render his arrest for that
offense illegal. Vagrancy differs from most
other offenses in the fact that it is chronic
rather than acute; that it continues after it is
complete, and thereby subjects the offender to
arrest at any time before he reforms. (152 Cal.
at 47)
If the disorderly conduct statutes are troublesome
because they require so little in the way of misbehavior, the vagrancy statutes offer the astounding
spectacle of criminality with no misbehavior at all!
Loitering statutes, whether or not they include provisions for police interrogation and compulsion on the loiterer to explain his presence,
appear to be designed to enable the police to arrest
persons suspected of having committed or being about
to commit offenses. Thus, in State v. Grenz, defendant was convicted of vagrancy (wandering the
streets at late or unusual hours without visible.or
lawful business) upon evidence that he was moving
towards a chicken coop carrying a gunny sack. The
Court said:
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It is true that there was insufficient
evidence adduced to support a charge of attempted larceny or attempted burglary for the
reason that there was no overt act tending to
accomplish the commission of either of these
offenses • • • • But such was not the charge in
this case. The laws relating to criminal attempts do not properly apply to the vagrancy
statutes • • • • The gist of the offense in the
instant case is that the circumstances under
which the appellant was apprehended were consistent with the hypothesis that he was about
to commit a crime, and were inconsistent with
any reasonable hypothesis that he· had any lawful or visible business at the time and place
of his apprehension. This is the very evil
which the statute was designed to remedy, and
it is difficult to conceive of a clearer case
calling for its application. (26 Wash. 2d at
770-771)
Four justices dissented, including two who expressed
the view that the legislature is without power to
make this type of activity an offense. Apart from
the issue of constitutionality, the courts are inclined to construe the loitering statutes to exclude
lassitude or indolence, i.e., non-suspicious loitering.
Typical suspicious loitering situations would be
the following: a known professional pickpocket is
seen loitering in a crowded railroad station; a
rough-looking character, not recognized by the policeman as a local resident, is seen lurking in a doorway
looking up and down the street as if to see whether
anyone is watching; a nervous housewife summons police
to her neighborhood because an unknown man has been
standing for some time in a dark alley. These situations would not be covered by the law of attempt,
even under the expanded definition of that offense in
Article 5 of this Code, since no act has yet been done
which is a "substantial step" toward commission of an
offense or "strongly corroborative of the actor's
criminal purpose." The "offender" does not even possess burglary tools or other "instrument of crime,"
upon which to base a conviction under Section 5.06.
What response does the community wish to make to
these situations? At least five courses are open:
(1) Loitering or wandering "without lawful
business" or "at unusual hours," may be made an
offense, as in many vagrancy laws, e.g., Cal.
Pen. Code§ 647, thus laying the basis for arrest
and conviction without proof of any criminal act
or purpose.
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(2) The suspicious situation may be treated
as laying the basis for police inquiries to
which the actor must respond, as in draft Section
250.12.

(3) The suspicious situation may be treated
as a proper occasion for brief detention to facilitate police interrogation, not involving charge
of crime.
(4) The situation might be one in which the
police could be authorized to order the suspect
to "move on," i.e., to depart from the place
where his presence causes alarm.

(5) Or, finally, the police might expect
merely to make inquiry of suspicious persons,
most of whom would of course answer questions
voluntarily. Where the answer does not dissipate suspicion, the officer would make such observations as would facilitate identification of
the suspect in case an offense is committed in
the neighborhood.
All these alternatives have difficulties. The
first authorizes conviction of persons without proof
of anti-social behavior or inclination. The second
does not exclude that possibility, since failure to
identify or to give credible account of one's behavior
leads to criminal liability, without necessity on the
part of the prosecution to prove any criminal purpose.
Another trouble with alternative 2 is that a plausible
lie about one's purposes or identity will exclude
liability under this section, while an implausible
truth does not. The third alternative involves a quite
controversial and possibly unconstitutional change in
the law of arrest, rather than a definition of a substantive offense within the scope of the Model Penal
Code. The fourth alternative, the police order to
"move on," hardly solves the problem of the individual
who is bent on crime, and confers a disturbingly unbounded discretion upon the police. The last alternative, although most consistent with our ideas of the
proper role of the police and with general principles
of penal law against convicting person without proof
of anti-social behavior, involves total abandonment of
the traditional vagrancy concept, a departure which
will encounter serious resistance.
In draft Section 250.12 our aim had been to provide the least objectionable form of alternative 2 for
those jurisdictions not prepared to break entirely
from the vagrancy concept. In contrast to some proposals of the same general character, Section 250.12
requires that the loitering be such as to justify suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, the offense is
only a violation, i.e., not subject to imprisonment.
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Municipalities may properly regulate the use of
sidewalks to safeguard against annoying and importunate mendicants and merchants; but such legislation
does not belong in the penal code. Other codes, dealing with traffic, or heal th and welfare·, or regulating
callings, would be the place for specific and detailed
provisions necessary to make proper distinctions between the aggressive beggar· and the immobile, silent
beggar; between begging as a business and soliciting
for the Red Cross, Disabled Veterans, or the Salvation
Army; between begging and the "selling" of pencils or
trinkets which the purchaser is not expected to take;
between the person suffering a momentary embarrassment
from having lost his wallet and the bum dunning
passersby for coins with which to buy liquor, under
the fraudulent pretense of needing carfare.9
40-25-7.

Reckless hunting.

(1)

Any p~rson, while in the

act of pursuing, taking or killing game or birds, who does a~y of the
following commits reckless hunting and is guilty of a class

mis-

demeanor:
(a)

Carries a firearm while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs; or

(b)

Acts in a careless or reckless manner or wanton disregard of huma~ life or property.

(2)

The hunting license of any person convicted under this

section shall be revoked upon conviction and the offender shall not
be eligible to purchase or use a Colorado hunting license for a
period of three years next following conviction.
Comment
This proposed offense is a restatement of the present offenses defined in 40-11-5, 40-11-6, and 40-11-7, CRS 1963.
40-25-8.

Disturbing the remains of a dead person.

Any person

who knowingly disturbs or removes the remains, or any part thereof, of

9.

Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Tentative
Draft No. 13, April 1961, pp. 60-65.
~
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any person permanently interred in any church, churchyard or cemetery,
other than pursuant to an order of court, commits disturbing the remains of a dead person and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the pr~sent offense
defined in 40-12-5, CRS 1963.
40-25-9.

Defacing Tombs.

Any person who intentionally does

any of the following commits defacing tombs and is guilty of a class
misdemeanor:
(1)

Defaces, breaks, destroys or removes any tomb, monument
or gravestone erected to any deceased person or any
memento or any memorial or any ornamental plant, tree or
shrub appertaining to the place of burial of any human
being; or

(2)

Marks, defaces, injures, destroys or removes any fence,
post, rail or wall of any cemetery or graveyard or
erected within any cemetery or graveyard.

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a new offense.
40-25-10.
(1)

Conducting or participating in endurance contests.

Any person who conducts or participates in· any physical or mental

endurance contest for a period longer than 24 hours or conducts or
participates in any such endurance contest within any period of 168
hours commits conducting or participating in endurance contests and
is guilty of a class
(2)

misdemeanor.

This section does not apply to any athletic contest of

schools, colleges or universities.
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Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-12-9 through 40-12-17, CRS 1963.
40-25-11.

Sunday barbering.

Any person who carries on the

business of barbering on Sunday in any city of the first or s&cond
class, whether incorporated by general law or special charter, commits
Sunday barbering and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses
defined in 40-12-20 and 40-12-21, CRS 1963.
40-25-12.

Polluting streams.

Any person who does any of the

following commits polluting streams and is guilty of a class

mis-

demeanor:
(1)

Throws or discharges into any stream or running water,
or into any ditch or flume, any obnoxious substance, such
as refuse matter from a slaughter house or privy, or
slops from eating houses, or any other fleshy or vegetable matter which is subject to decay in water; or

(2)

Empties or causes to be emptied, or allows the emptying
or flowing of oil, petroleum or other oleaginous substance into any of the waters of this state, or deposits
or causes the same to be deposited at such distance that
the same may be carried into such waters by natural
causes.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses
defined in 40-12-22 and 40-12-23, CRS 1963.
40-25-13.

Causing danger to blind persons.

Any person, other

than a wholly or partially blind person. who knowingly does any of
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the following commits causing danger to blind persons and is guilty

of a class

misdemeanor:

(a)

Carries or uses on any street, highway or other public
place, a cane or walking stick which is white in color,
or white tipped with red; or

(b)

Fails to take precaution against accidents or injury to
a person carrying or using on any street, highway, or
other public place a cane or walking stick which is white
in color, or white tipped with red.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses
defined in 40-12-24, 40-12-25, and 40-12-26, CRS 1963.
40-25-14.

Selling tobacco to children.

Any person who, with-

out the written permission of the child's parent or guardian, gives
or sells any item containing tobacco to a child under the age of sixteen years commits selling tobacco to children and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-13-2 and 40-13-5, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 26.
40-26-1.

GAMBLING

Defi~itions relating to gambling.

As used in this

article, the following words have the meaning given below:
(1)

"Bet" means a bargain in which the parties agree that,
dependent upon chance even though accompanied by some
skill, one stands to win or lose anything of value
specified in the agreement.

(a)

But a bet does not include:

Bona fide business transactions which are valid under
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the law of contracts, including, without limitation:
C~ntracts for the purchase or sale, at a future date, of
securities or other commodities; and agreements to compensate for loss caused by the happening of the chance,
including without limitation, contracts for indemnity or
guaranty and life or health and accident insurance;
(b)

Offers of purses, prizes, or premiums to the actual contestants in any bona fide contest for the determination
of skill, speed, strength, or endurance or to the bona
fide owners of animals or vehicles entered in such contests; or

(c)

Betting or games of chance otherwise permiited by law.

(2)

"Gambling device" means a contrivance which for a consideration affords the player an opportunity to obtain
anything of value, the award of which is determined by
chance, even though accompanied by some skill and whether
or not the prize is automatically paid by the device.

A

gambling device does not include:

(a)

A coin-in-the-slot operated mechanical device played for
amusement which rewards the player with the right to
replay such mechanical device, which device is so constructed or devised as to make such result of the
operation thereof depend in part upon the skill of the
player and which returns to the player thereof no coins,
tokens, or merchandise;

(b)

Vending machines by which full and adequate return is
made for the money invested and in which there is no
element of chance or hazard.
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(3)

"Gambling place" means any structure or place, any
vehicle (whether self-propelled or not), or any room
within any of them, one of whose principal uses is any
of the following:

Making and settling bets; receiving,

holding, recording, or forwarding bets or offers to
bet; or playing gambling devices.
40-26-2.

Gambling.

Gambling consists of:

(1)

Making a bet; or

(2)

Ent·ering or remaining in a gambling place with intent to
make a bet or to play a gambling device;

Whoever commits gambling is guilty of a class
40-26-3.

Commercial gambling.

misdemeanor.

Commercial gambling consists

of either:

(1)

Participating in the earnings of or operating a gambling
'

place;
(2)

Receiving, recording, or forwarding bets or offers to
bet;

(3)

Possessing or controlling facilities with the intent to
receive, record, or forward bets or offers to bet;

(4)

For gain, becoming a custodian of anything of value,
either bet or offered to be bet;

(~)

Setting up for use, for the purpose of gambling, or
collecting the proceeds of, any gambling device.

Whoever commits commercial gambling is guilty of a class
felony.
40-26-4.-

Permitting premises to be used for gambling.

Per-

mitting premises to be used for gambling consists of:
(1)

Knowingly permitting any property owned or occupied by
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any person or under his control to be used as a gambling
place; or
(2)

Knowingly permitting a gambling device to be set up for
use by another for the purpose of gambling in a place
under his control.

Whoever commits permitting premises to be used for gambling
is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor.
40-26-5.

Dealing in gambling devices.

(1)

Dealing in

gambling devices consists of manufacturing, transferring commercially,
or possessing, with intent to transfer commercially, any of the following:
(a)

Anything which he knows evidences, purports to evidence,
or is designed to evidence participating in gambling; or

(b)

Any device which he knows is designed exclusively for
gambling purposes or anything which he knows is designed
exclusively as a subassembly or essential part of such
device.

This includes without limitation, gambling

devices, numbers jars, punchboards, and roulette wheels.
(2)

Proof of possession of any device designed exclusively
for gambling purposes which is not in a gambling .place
and is not set up for use is prima facie ~vidence of
possession with intent to transfer.

(3)

Whoever commits dealing in gambling devices i·s guilty
of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This article restates the essential gambling provisions contained in 40-10-7 through 40-10-11, CRS 1963, 40-10-12, CRS 1963, as
amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session Laws, and the 17 sections that
comprise Artitle 16 of Chapter 40, CRS 1963.
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ARTICLE 27.
40-27-1.

WEAPONS

Unlawful use of weapons.

Any person who knowingly

does any of the following acts commits unlawful use of weapons:

(1)

Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any
bludgeon,· black-jack, sling-shot, sand-club, sand-bag,
shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches in length,
metal knuckles or any knife, commonly referred to as a
switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or
other device in the handle of the knife; or

(2)

Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous
knife, razor, stiletto or any other dangerous or de~dly
weapon or instrument of like character; or

(3)

Carries on or about his person or in any vehicle, a
tear gas gun projector or bomb or any object containing
noxious liquid gas or substance; or

(4)

Carries concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about
his person except when on his land or in his own abode
or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver or
other firearm; or

(5)

Sets a spring gun; or

(6)

Possesses any device or attachment of any kind designed,
used or intended for use in silencing the report of any
firearm; or

(7)

Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any
weapon from which more than 8 shots or bullets may be
discharged by a single function of the firing device.
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Any person who commits unlawful use of weapons is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor if the offense is a violation of subsections

(1) through (6) of this section.

Any person who commits unlawful use

of weapons is guilty of a class __ felony if the offense is a violation of subsection (7) of this section.
Any person who has been convicted of any felony under the laws
of this or any other state and, within ten years of release from
penitentiary or within ten years of conviction if a penitentiary
sentence has not been imposed, violates any subsection of this section
is guilty of a class_ felony.
40-27-2.

Exemptions.

(1) Subsections (3) and (4) of section

· 40-27-1 shall not apply to or affect any of the following:
(a)

Peace officers or any person summoned by any such officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the
peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such
officer.

(b)

Warden, superintendents and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the
detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense.

(c)

Members of the armed services or reserve forces of the
United States or the national guard or the reserve
officers training corps, while in the performance of
their official ·duty.

(d)

Watchmen while actually engaged in the performance of
the duties of their employment.

(e)

Manufacture, transportation, or sale of weapons to
persons authorized under paragraphs (a) through (d) of
this subsection to possess such.
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(2)

Subsection (4) of section 40-27-1 shall not apply to or

affect any of the following:
(a)

Members of any club or organization organized for the
purpose of practicing shooting at targets upon established target ranges, whether public or private, while
such members are using their firearms on such target
ranges.

{b)

Licensed hunters or fishermen while engaged in hunting
or fi-shing.

:(c))

Transportation of weapons broken down in a non-function:in9 '.State or not immediately accessible.

(d)

Any person in possession of a valid license issued to
him pursuant to sections 40-27-7 through 40-27-11.

(3)

Subsection (7) of section 40-27-1 shall not apply to or

affect a~y,oJ the following:
(a) ~eace officers.
(b.)

Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, peni·tentiaries, jails and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense.

(c)

Members of the armed services or reserve forces of the
United States or the national guard while in the performance of their official duty.

( d)

Manuf actu·re, transportation or sale of machine guns to
persons authorized under paiagraphs (a) through (c) of
this subsection to possess such, provided said machine
guns are broken down in a .non-func,t;i.oning state or not
immediately accessible.

(4)

An information or indictment .based ,~pon a violation of

sections 40-27-1 through 40-27-6 need not ,negativ.e any exemptions
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tained in this article.

The defendant shall have the burden of prov-

ing such exemptions.
40-27-3.

Unlawful sale of firearms.

A person commits the

offense of unlawful sale of firearms and is guilty of a class
misdemeanor when he knowingly:
(1)

Sells or gives any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person to any person under eighteen
years of age; or

(2)

Sells or gives any firearm to any narcotic addict; or

(3)

Sells or gives any firearm to any person who has been
convicted of a felony under the laws of this .or any
other jurisdiction within ten years from release from
the penitentiary or within ten years of conviction if
penitentiary sentence has not been imposed.

40-27-4.

Register of sales by dealer.

(1)

Any seller of fire-

arms of a size which may be concealed upon the person, other than a manufacturer selling to a bona fide wholesaler or retailer or a wholesaler selling to a bona fide retailer, shall keep a register of all
firearms sold or given away.
(2)

Such register shall contain the date of the sale or

gift, the name, address, age, and occupation of the person to whom
the weapon is sold or given, the price of the weapon, the kind, description, and number of the weapon, and the purpose for which it is
purchased and obtained.
(3)

Such seller on demand of a peace officer shall produce

for inspection the register and allow such peace officer to inspect
such register and all stock on hand.
(4)

Any person convicted of violating any subsection of this

section is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.
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40-27-5.

Defacing identification marks of firearms.

(1)

Any person who shall change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of
the maker, model, manufacturer's number, or other mark of identification of any firearm is guilty of a class
(2)

misdemeanor.

Possession of any firearm upon which any such mark shall

_ have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated shall be prima
facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed, or
obliterated the same.
40-27-6.

Confiscation and disposition of weapons. Any

stolen weapon so confiscated, when no longer needed for evidentiary
purposes, shall
known.

pe

returned to the person entitled to possession if

All other confiscated weapons when no longer needed for evi-

dentiary purposes shall, in the discretion of the trial court, be
destroyed, preserved as county property, delivered to the armed forces
of the United States or the national guard or .sold and the proceeds of
such sale shall be paid to the county treasurer.
40-27-7.

License to carry concealed firearm.

Upon proof that

the applicant is of good moral cha·racter, a citizen of the United
States, has no prior history of mental illness, or narcotic drug
addiction, has not been convicted of a felony in this or any other
state or of an offense which if committed in this state would constitute a felony, during the preceding ten years, is 21 years of age or
older, and that a good reason or reasons exist for the issuance
thereof, the sheriff of any county may issue to such applicant a
license to carry a concealed firearm in that county, restricted to
any such reasons which are satisfactory to the sheriff.
40-27-8.

Application for license.

Each applicant shall pay

to the sheriff an application fee of three dollars upon the submission of his application for license.
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Such application for license

shall be filed in writing and include the applicant's:
occupation,

(1) name, (2)

(3) home address, (4) business address, (5) age, (6) sex,

(7) height, (8) weight, (9) color of eyes, (10) color of hair, (11)
color photograph, two inches by two inches, taken within one year
prior to such application, (12) signature, and (13) reasons for the
necessity or desirability to carry a concealed firearm.
40-27-9.

Comparison of fingerprints of applicant.

Upon

application, the sheriff shall cause to have duplicate fingerprints
made of the applicant and shall forward one copy to the national
bureau of identification in Washington, D. C., for comparison of
fingerprints with those on file in the bureau.

No license, except a

· temporary emergency license, shall be issued unless and until a report
is received by the sheriff that such comparison shows no conviction of
a felony during the preceding ten years.

In the event the applicant

previously has been fingerprinted in accordance with this section, and
his fingerprints are on file with the national bureau of identification, reference to such prints may be submitted in lieu thereof.
40-27-10.

License contents -- in possession.

(1)

Each

license shall be issued for a definite period of not more than one
year, and no renewal of such license shall be granted except upon the
filing of a new application.

Each license shall include the appli-

cant's (1) name, (2) occupation, (3) home address, (4) business
address, (5) age, (6) sex, (7) height, (8) weight, (9) color of eyes.
(10) color of hair. (11) color photograph, two inches by two inches.
taken within one year prior to the application, (12) signature. (13)
right thumb imprint or if that be not possible. the left thumb im-

print or some other finger.

Each license shall contain a description

of the weapon or weapons authorized to be carried. including the name
of the manufacturer, the serial number, and the caliber.
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(2)

Each licensee shall carry his license upon his person at

all tlmes when he may be carrying a concealed firearm upon his person
or in any vehicle operated or occupied by such licensee, and shall
display such license upon the request of any law enforcement officer.
40-27-11.

Temporary emergency license.

The sheriff of any

county may grant a temporary emergency license to carry a concealed
firearm in that county in cases of emergency pending the results of a
fingerprint comparison.

Such temporary emergency license shall expire

automatically 30 days after the date of issuance thereof.
Comment
This article restates the essential firearm provisions contained i~ 40-11-1. CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session
Laws; 40-11-2, and 40-11-8 through 40-11-10, CRS 1963; 53-3-1 through
53-3-3, CRS 1963, 53-3-4, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964
Session Laws; and the four sections comprising Article 4 of Chapter
53, CRS 1963.
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PART E.

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

i

ARTICLE 28.
40-28-1.

DISLOYALTY

Flag Desecration.

(1)

Any person who intentionally

does any of the following commits flag desecration and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor:
(a)

Places on or attaches to a flag any word, mark, design,
or advertisement not properly a part of the flag; or

(b)

Exposes to public view a flag upon which has been placed
or attached a word, mark, design, or advertisement not
properly a part of the flag; or

(c)

Manufactures or exposes to public view an article of
merchandise or a wrapper or receptacle for merchandise
upon which a flag is depicted; or

(d)

Publicly mutilates, defiles, or casts contempt upon a
flag.

(2)

As used in this section, flag means anything which is or

purports to be:
(a)

The Stars and Stripes; or

(b)

The Colorado state flag; or

(c)

Any other authorized flag, standard, color, or ensign of
the United States or of the state of Colorado; or

(d)

Any copy, picture or representation of any authorized
flag, standard, color or ensign of the United States or
of the state of Colorado.

(3)

The possession of any flag upon which is placed or at-

tached a word, mark, design, or advertisement not properly a part of
the flag and the possession of any article of merchandise oz a wrapper
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or receptacle for merchandise upon which a flag is depicted is prima
facie evidence of an intent to expose the same to public view.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-23-3, CRS 1963.
40-28-2.

Display of foreign flag.

(1)

Any person who in-

tentionally displays any flag, except the flags of the United States,
upon any state, county or municipal building commits display of
foreign flag and is guilty of a class
(2)

misdemeanor.

Whenever any foreigner becomes a guest of the United

States, the state of Colorado or of any city in this state, or upon
the occasion of the visit of any foreign minister, envoy or ambassador in his official representative capacity, the flag of the cou~try
of which he is a citizen may be displayed upon public buildings.
(3)

As used in this section, foreign flag includes flags of

other nations and flags of anarchistic societies.
Comment
This proposed section restates the present offense defined
in 40-23-1, CRS 1963.
40-28-3.

Improper use of national anthem.

Any person who

plays, sings or renders in any public place or assemblage, except an
entire or separate composition or number "The Star Spangled Banner,"
commits improper use of national anthems and is guilty of a class
misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-23-16 and 40-23-17, CRS 1963.
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40-28-4.

Insurrection.

Any person who engages in, or co-

operates or participates with any armed force of men, with the intent
by force of arms to obstruct, retard or resist the execution of any
law of this state or, with an armed force of men, invades any portion
of this state, commits insurrection and is guilty of a class
felony.

-

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40•7-18, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 29.
40-29-1.

Definitions.

BRIBERY

In article 29, unless

a

different

meaning plainly is required:
(1)

"Benefit" means gain or advantage, or anything regarded

by the beneficiary as gain or advantage, including benefit to any
other person or entity in whose welfare he is interested, but not an
advantage promised generally to a group or class of voters as a consequence of public measures which a candidate engages to support or
oppose;
(2)

"Government" includes any branch, subdivision or agency

of the government of the State or any locality within it:
(3)

"Harm" means loss, disadvantage or injury, or anything

so regarded by the person affected, including loss, disadvantage or
injury to any other person or entity in whose welfare he is interested;
(4)

"Official proceeding'' means a proceeding heard or which

may be heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative or
other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence
under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner,
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notary or other person taking testimony or deposition in connection
with any such proceeding:
(~)

"Party official" means a person who holds an elective or

appointive post in a political party in the United States by virtue of
which he directs or conducts, or participates in directing or conducting party affairs at any level of responsibility;
(6)

''Pecuniary benefit" is benefit in the form of money,

property, commercial interests or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain;
(7)

"Public servant" means any officer or employee of govern-

ment, including legislators and judges, and any person participating
as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental function: but the term does not include witnesses:
(8)

11

Administrative proceeding" means any proceeding the out-

come of which is required to be based on a record or documentation
prescribed by law, or in which law or regulation is particularized in
application to individuals.
40-29-2.

Bribery in official and political matters.

(1)

Any person who offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another any of the following commits bribery in official and political matters and is guilty of
a class

felony:
(a)

Any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's
decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise
of discretion as a public servant, part~ official or
voter; or

(b)

Any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision,
vote, recommendation or other exercise of official
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discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding;
(c)

or

Any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known
duty as public servant or party official.

(2)

It is no defense to prosecution under this section that

a person whom the offender sought to influence was not qualified to
act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office,
or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reas~n.
40-29-3.

Threats and other improper influence in official

and political matters.

(1)

Any person who does any of the following

commits threats and other improper influence in official and political matters:
(a)

Threatens unlawful harm to any person with purpose to
influence his decision, opinion, recommendatior,, vote or
other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party
official or voter: or

(b)

Threatens harm to any public servant with purpose to influence his decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or
other exercise of discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or

(c)

Threatens harm to any public servant or party official
with purpose to infiuence him to violate his duty: or

(d)

Privately addresses to any public servant who has or
will have an official discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding any representation, entreaty, argument
or other communication designed to influence the outcome
on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law.

(2)

It is no defense to prosecution under this section that

a person whom the offender sought to influence was not qualified to
- 103 -

act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office,
or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.
(3)

Any person who commits threats and other improper in-

fluence in official and political matters is guilty of a class
misdemeanor unless the offender threatened to commit a crime or made
a threat with purpose to influence a judicial or administrative proceeding, in which cases the offense is a class
40-29-4.

Official misconduct.

felony.

Any public officer or employee

who, in his official capacity, does any of the following commits official misconduct and is guilty of a class

felony (misdemeanor)

and forfeits his office or employment:
(1)

Intentionally or recklessly fails to perform any mandatory duty as required by law; or

(2)

Solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance or any
act a fee or reward which he knows is not authorized by
law.

40-29-5.

Compensation for past official behavior.

Any person

who does any of the following commits compensation for past official
behavior and is guilty of a class
(1)

misdemeanor:

Solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary
benefit as compensation for having, as public servant,
given a decision, opinion, recommendation or vote favorable to another, or for having otherwise exercised a
discretion in his favor, or for having violated his
duty; or

(2)

Offers, confers or agrees to confer compensation acceptance of which is prohibited by subsection (1) of this
section.
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40-29-6.

Retaliation for past official action.

Any person

who harms another by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything
lawfully done by the latter in the capacity of public servant commits
retaliation for past official action and is guilty of a class
misdemeanor.
40-29-7.
Jurisdiction.

(1)

Gifts to public servants by persons subject to their
No public servant in any department or agency ex-

ercising regulatory functions, or conducting inspections or investigations, or carrying on civil or criminal litigation on behalf of the
government, or having custody of prisoners, shall solicit, accept or
agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from a person known to be sub. ject

to such regulation, inspection, investigation or custody, or

against whom such litigation is known to be pending or contemplated.
(2)

No public servant having any discretionary function to

perform in connection with contracts, purchases, payments, claims or
other pecuniary transactions of the government shall solicit, accept
or agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from any person known to be
interested in or likely to become interested in any such contract,
purchase, payment, claim or transaction.
(3)

No public servant having judicial or administrative

authority and no public servant employed by or in a court or other
tribunal having such authority, or participating in the enforcement of
its decisions, shall solicit, accept or agree to accept any pecuniary
benefit from a person known to be interested in or likely to become
interested in any matter before such public servant or a tribunal with
which he is associated.
(4)

No legislator or public servant employed by the legisla-

ture or by any committee or agency thereof shall solicit, accept or
agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from any person known to be
interested in a bill, transactioh or proceeding, pending or contemplated,
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before the legislature or any committee or agency thereof.
(5)

This section shall not apply to:

(a)

Fees prescribed by law to be received by a public
servant, or any other benefit for which the recipient
gives legitimate consideration or to which he is other-.
wise legally entitled; or

(b)

Gifts or other benefits conferred on account of kinship
or other personal, professional or business relationship
independent of the official status of the receiver; or

(c)

Trivial benefits incidental to personal, professional or
business contacts and involving no substantial risk of
undermining official impartiality.

(6)

No person shall knowingly confer, or offer or agree to

confer, any benefit prohibited by the foregoing subsections.
(7)

An offense under this section is a class

40-29-8.

misdemeanor.

Compensating public servant for assisting private

interests in relation to matters before him.

Any person who does any

of the following commits comQensating public servant for assisting
private interests in relation to matters before him and is guilty of
a class

misdemeanor:
(1)

Any public servant who solicits, accepts or agrees to
accept compensation for advice or other assistance in
preparing· or promoting a bill, contract, claim, or other
transaction or proposal as to which he knows that he has
or is likely to have an official discretion to exercise;
or

(2)

Any person who pays or offers or agrees to pay compensa-

tion to a public servant with knowledge that acceptance by the public
servant is unlawful.
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Connent
Proposed article 29 is based, on the provisions of the Model
Penal and the newly enacted Illinois codes. With the exception of
proposed sections 40-29-2 and 40-29-4, this article proposes new law.
A list of the present bribery statutes this article replaces would
include:
Bribery of Judges or Legislator
40-7-5, CRS 1963*
Bribery of Public Officer
40-7-6, CRS 1963*
Bribery of Water Conmissioner
40-7-8, CRS 1963
Embracery
40-7-38, CRS 1963
Judge or Officer Receiving Reward
40-7-43, CRS 1963*
40-7-45, CRS 1963* -- Officer Taking Reward for Omission of
Duty
* As amended by Chapter 39, 1964 session Laws
ARTICLE 30.
40-30-1.

Definitions.

ABUSE OF OFFICE
In this article, unless a different

meaning plainly is required, the definitions given in section 40-29-1
apply.
40-30-2.
formation.

Speculating or wagering on official action or in-

Any public servant -who, in contemplation of official action

by himself or by a governmental unit with which he is associated, or
in reliance on information to which he has access in his official
capacity and which has not been made public, does any of the following
commits speculating or wagering on official action or information and
is guilty of a class
(1)

misdemeanor:

Acquires pecuniary interest in any property, transaction
or enterprise which may be affected by such information
or official action; or

(2)

Speculates or wagers on the basis of such information or
official action; or

(3)

Aids another to do any of the foregoing.
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40-30-3.

Official oppression.

Any person who, while acting

or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of
such actual or purported capacity, does any of the following with
knowledge that his conduct is illegal commits official oppression
and is guilty of a class_ mi~demeanor:
(1)

Subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure,
mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other
infringement of personal or property rights; or

(2)

Denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of
any right, power or immunity; or

(3)

Has legal authority and jurisdiction of any person
legally restrained of his liberty and denies the person
restrained the opportunity to consult in private with any
practicing attorney at law, if:
(a)

There is no danger of imminent escape; and

(b)

The person in custody desires to consult with the
practicing attorney at law.

Comment
Proposed section 40-30-2 restates several offenses presently
defined in chapter 40, CRS 1963, including:
40-19-1, CRS 1963

State and County Officers Not to Deal
in Warrants

40-19-2, CRS 1963

County and Municipal Officers Not to
Deal in Warrants

40-19-5, CRS 1963

No Officer to Derive Benefit From
Contract

40-19-6, CRS 1963

Making Unlawful Contract

40-19-10, CRS 1963

Interest in Contract Prohibited

40-19-11, CRS 1963

Penalty for Violation of Section
40-9-10
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Proposed section 40-30-.-~, restates several offenses presently
defined in chapter 40, CRS 1963, including:
39-1-1, CRS 1963,, as amended by chapter 39. 1964 Session
Laws -- Rights of Prisoner to Consult Counsel
40-7-10. CRS 1963 -- Inhumanity of Jailer
40-7-11,. CRS 1963, -as amended by chapter 39, 1964 Session
Laws -- Coercion of Prisoners
40-7-12,

ems.

1963 -- Rules of Evidence Not Affected

40-7-17, CRS 1963, as amended by chapter 39, 1964 Session
Laws -- Resisting Officer
ARTICLE 31.
40-31-1.

ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES

Refusing to aid an officer.

Any person who upon

, command refuses or knowingly ·fails reasonably to aid a person known
by him to be a peace off leer to do any of the following, commits refusing to aid an officer and is guilty of a class

(1)

misdemeanor:

Apprehending a person whom the officer is authorized to
apprehend; or

(2)

Preventing the commission by another of any offense.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses
defined under 40-7-48, CRS 1963, as amended by chapter 39. 1964
Session Laws. Under the present law, a person may not commit this offense unless he is a male above 18 years of age. The proposed section
provides no similar limitation.
40-31-2.

Resisting an officer.

Any person who intentionally

obstructs, resists or opposes the authorized service of any lawful
process or order of any court by any public officer or other person
commits resisting an officer and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This section is a restatement of the present offense defined
under 40-7-17, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session Laws.
- 109 -

40-31-3.

(1)

Compounding.

Any person who accepts or agrees to

accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from
reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or suspected
commission of any offense or information relating to an offense commits compounding and is guilty of a class

(2)

misdemeanor.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this

section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the
offender believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for
harm caused by the offense.
Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense
defined in 40-7-34, CRS 1963.
40-31-4.

Aiding escape.

Any person commits aiding escape

when he intentionally:
(1)

Rescues any person who has been convicted of a class
felony, and is guilty of a class_ felony; or

(2)

Rescues any person who has been convicted of a class
felony, whether the person is in the custody of an officer
or in the penitentiary, and is guilty of a class_
felony; or

(3)

Rescues any person who is charged but not convicted of a
class_ felony, and is guilty of a class_ felony; or

(4)

Rescues any person who is charged but not convicted of a
class

misdemeanor, and is guilty of a class

mis-

demeanor.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offenses defined in 40-7-20 and 40-7-21, CRS 1963.
40-31-5.

Officer aiding escape.
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Any warden of the penitentiary

or any of his employees or any law enforcement officer who intentionally aids or permits any prisoner to escape commits officer aiding
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in .40-7-22, CRS 1963.
40-31-6.

Officer permitting convict to be at large.

Any

warden of the penitentiary or any of his employees or any law enforcement officer who negligently permits any convict committed or in custody,
under sentence of solitary imprisonment, to be at large·without the
cell or apartment assigned to such convict, or to be there visited,
conversed witn, comforted or relieved, contrary to the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary, or negligently permits such convict
or any other convict committed to the penitentiary under sentence of
confinement to hard labor, to be at large without the precincts of the
penitentiary, or contrary to the rules and regulations thereof, to be
out of close confinement, commits officer permitting convict to be at
large and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-23, CRS 1963.
40-31-7.

Inducing prisoners to absent selves.

Any person who

invites, entices, inveigles, solicits or induces any prisoner confined
in the penitentiary or restrained on or in any ranch, farm or camp
owned, operated or maintained by the state of Colorado or by authority
thereof or at any place whatsoever, to absent himself from his work,
or who delays or hinders such prisoner in his work, commits inducing
prisoners to absent selves and is guilty of a class
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misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement.of the present
offense defined in 40-7-24, CRS 1963.
·
40-31-8.

Conveying tools to prisoner.

Any person who conveys

to any convict in custody, or committed to the penitentiary, into the
penitentiary or other place where such convict may be confined, any
tool, weapon or other aid, with intent to enable such convict to
escape such custody or confinement, whether such escape be effected
or not, commits conveying tools to prisoner and is guilty of a class
misdemeanor.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-25, CRS 1963.
40-31-9.

Furnishing weapons to convicts.

Any person who

furnishes, or aids or assists in furnishing to any convict who is
confined in the penitentiary or state reformatory, or restrained on or
in any ranch, farm, or camp owned, operated, or maintained by the state
of Colorado, or by authority thereof, or at any place whatsoever, or
who furnishes to any person confined in any jail, or in the custody
of any sheriff, deputy sheriff, coroner, peace officer, or other person having lawful custody of such person, or conveys by any means
into a jail or other place of confinement, any firearms, or other
deadly weapons, or dynamite or other explosives, for the purpose of
aiding, assisting, or encouraging such convict or person to escape
from such confinement, custody, or such restraint, or to bring about
an ou~break or riot, commits furnishing weapons to convicts and is
guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
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offense defined in 40-7-26, CRS 1963.

40-31-10.

Assisting escape.

(1)

Any person who knowingly

aids, or assists any convict who is confined in the penitentiary or
state reformatory, or restrained on or in any ranch, farm or camp
owned, operated or maintained by the state of Colorado, or by authority
thereof, or at any other place whatsoever, to escape commits assisting
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony.
(2)

The knowingly leaving or causing to be left any clothing,

food, money, or other thing whatsoever which may be used by such
convict in attempting to escape where auch article or thing may be
obtained by such convict shall be held to be, within the meaning of
.this section, the assisting of such convict to escape.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-27, CRS 1963.
40-31-11.

Furnishing drugs or liquor to convicts.

(1)

Any

person who knowingly furnishes, or assists in furnishing to any
prisoner confined in the penitentiary or state reformatory or restrained on or in any ranch, farm, or camp owned, operated, or maintained by the state of Colorado, or by authority thereof, or at any
place whatsoever, any morphine, cocaine, codeine, or other such habitforming drug or any intoxicating liquor, commits furnishing drugs or
liquor to convicts and is guilty of a class
(2)

felony.

Knowingly leaving or causing to be left any such article

where it may be obtained by ·any such convict shall be held to be,
within the meaning of this section, the furnishing such
such convict.

-
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articles to

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-28, CRS 1963.
40-31-12.

Rescue on civil process.

Any person who rescues

another in legal custody on civil process commits rescue on civil
process and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offenses defined in 40-7-29, CRS 1963.
40-31-13.

Aiding in escape attempt.

Any person who aids or

assists a prisoner lawfully committed or detained in any jail for an
offense against this state, or who shall be lawfully confined by
virtue of any civil process, to make his escape from the jail, though
no escape be actually made, or any person who conveys or causes to be
delivered to any such prisoner any disguise, instrument or arms proper
to facilitate the escape of such prisoner, commits aiding in escape
attempt and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section c9nstitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-30, CRS\1963.
40-31-14.

Aiding escape from officer.

Any person who aids or

assists any prisoner to escape, or rescues any prisoner from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer, commits aiding escape from
officer and is guilty of a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined under 40-7-31, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964
Session Laws.
40-31-15.

Officer allowing escape.

Any law enforcement of-

ficer having lawful custody of any prisoner permits a prisoner to
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escape or go at large commits officer allowing escape and:

(l} Is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if the prisoner ha1
not been convicted of any offense; or
(2)

Is guilty of a class

felony, if the prisoner is

charged with a class

felony but has not been ·convicted;

or
(3)

Is guilty of a class

misdemeanor, if the prisoner

escapes because of the law enforcement officer's
negligence.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined under 40-7-32, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39,
1964 Session Laws.
40-31-16.

Assault during escape.

Any person who c?mmits an

assault with intent to commit bodily injury upon the person of another
with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury, commits assault during escape and is
guilty of:
(1)

(2)

A class

felony, if the person has been convicted of

a class

felony; or

A class

felony, if the person has been convicted of a

class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined under 40-7-49 and 40-7-50, CRS 1963.
40-31-17.

Holding hostages during escape.

Any person com-

mitted to the state penitentiary or the state reformatory at Buena
Vista who, while escaping or attempting to escape, holds as hostage
any person within the state penitentiary or the state reformatory at
Buena Vista, or, who by force or threat of force, holds any person or
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persons against his will in defiance of official orders within the

state penitentiary, or state reformatory at Buena Vista, or who, while
being held in jail after sentence but awaiting transportation to the
state penitentiary or the state reformatory at Buena Vista, or who,
while being transported to or from the state penitentiary or the state
reformatory at Buena Vista, escapes, commits holding hostages during
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined under 40-7-51, CRS 1963.
40-31-18.

Escapes.

Any person after being found guilty of a

felony by a court or jury or after pleading guilty to a felony who,
while being held in jail or while in the custody of any person lawfully
having charge of him, escapes therefrom, commits escape and is guilty
of a class_ felony.
Comment
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present
offense defined in 40-7-53, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 32.

40-32-1.

PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION IN
OFFICIAL MATTERS

Definition.

In this article, unless a different

meaning plainly is required:
(1)

The definitions given in 40-29-1 apply; and

( 2)

"Statement II means any representation, but includes a
representation of opinion, belief or other state of mind
only if the representation clearly relates to state of
mind apart from or in addition to any facts which are the
subject of the representation.
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40-32-2.

Perjury.

(1)

Any person who, in any official pro•

ceeding, makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation,
or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when
the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true commits perjury and is guilty of a class_ felony.
(2)

Falsification is material, regardless of the admissi-

bility of the statement under rules of evidence, if it could have
affected the course or outcome of the proceeding.

It is no defense

that the declarant mistakenly believed the falsification to be immaterial.

Whether a falsification is material in a given factual

situation is a question of law.
(3)

It is not a defense to prosecution under this Section that

the oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular
manner or that the declarant was not competent to make the statement.
A document purporting to be made upon oath or affirmation at any time
when the actor presents it as being so verified shall be deemed to
have been duly sworn or affirmed.
(4)

No person shall be guilty of an offense under this Sec-

tion if he retracted the falsification in the course of the proceeding
in which it was made before it became manifest that the falsification
was or would be exposed and before the falsification substantially
affected the proceeding.
(5)

Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under

oath or equivalent affirmation, both having been made within the period
of the statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting
forth the inconsistent statements in a single count alleging in the
alternative that one or the other was false and not believed by the
defendant.

In such case it shall not be necessary for the prosecution

to prove which statement was false but only that one or the other was
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false and not believed by the defendant to be true.
(6)

No person shall be convicted of an offense under this

Section where proof of falsity rests solely upon contradiction by
testimony of a single person other than the defendant.
40-32-3.

false swearing in official matters.

(1)

Any person

who makes a false &tatement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or
swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, when

he does not believe the statement to be true, commits false swearing
in official matters and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if:
(a)

The falsification occurs in an official proceeding; or

(b)

The falsification is intended to mislead a public servant
in performing his official function.

(2)

Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this

section.
40-32-4.

False swearing.

(1)

Any person who makes a false

statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms
the truth of such a statement previously made, when he does not believe the statement to be true, commits false swearing and is guilty
of a class_ misdemeanor, if the statement is one which is required
by law to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths.
(2)

Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this

section.
40-32-5.

Unsworn falsification to authorities.

(1)

Any

person who does any of the following with purpose to mislead a public
servant commits unsworn falsification to authorities and is guilty of

a class

misdemeanor:
(a)

Makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true; or
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(b)

Purposely creates a false impression in a written application for any pecuniary or other benefit, by omitting
information necessary to prevent statements therein from
being misleading; or

(c)

Submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows
to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in authenticity; or

(d)

Submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map,
boundary-mark, or other object which he knows to be
false.

(2)

Any person who makes a written false statement which he

. does riot believe to be true, on or pursuant to a form bearing notice,
authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein
are punishable is guilty of a class
(3)

misdemeanor.

Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this

section.
40-32-6.

False alarms to agencies of public safety.

Any

person who knowingly causes a false alarm of fire or other emergency
to be transmitted to or within any organization, official or volunteer,
· for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property,
commits false alarms to agencies of public safety and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor.
40-32-7.

False reports to law enforcement authorities.

(1)

Any person who does any of the following commits false reports to law
enforcement authorities:
(a)

Knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement

officer with purpose to implicate another; or
(b)

Reports to law enforcement authorities an offense or
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other incident within their concern knowing that it did
not occur; or
(c)

Pretends to furnish such authorities-with information
relating to an offense or incident when he knows he has
no information relating to such offense or incident.

(2)

A person who commits false reports to law enforcement

authorities by violating subsection (l)(a) of this section is guilty
of a class

misdemeanor.

is a class

misdemeanor.

40-32-8.

Otherwise, an offense under this section

Tampering with witnesses and informants.

(1)

Any

person who, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, attempts to induce or otherwise
cause a witness or informant to do any of the following commits tampering with witnesses and informants:
(a)

Testify or inform falsely; or

(b)

Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing;
or

(c)

Elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply
evidence; or

(d)

Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to
which he has been legally summoned.

(2)

A person who commits tampering with witnesses and in-

formants is guilty of a class
tion, threat

felony if he employs force, decep-

or offer of pecuniary benefit.

under this section is a class
40-32-9.

Otherwise, an offense

misdemeanor.

Retaliation against witness or informant.

Any person

who harms another by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done
in the capacity of witness or informant commits retaliation against
witness or informant and is guilty of a class
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misdemeanor.

40-32-10.

Witness or informant taking bribe.

Any person who

solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of
his doing any of the things specified in subsections (l)(a) to (l)(d)
of section 40-32-8 commits witness or informant taking bribe and is
guilty of a class_ felony.
40-32-11.

Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.

Any person, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, does any of the following commits
tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and is guilty of a
class

misdemeanor:
(1)

Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or
availability in such proceeding or investigation; or

(2)

Makes, presents or uses any record, document ,or thing
knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a
public servant who is or may be engaged in such proceeding or investigation.

40-32-12.

Tampering with public records or information.

(1)

Any person who does any of the following commits tampering with public
records or information:
{a)

Knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of,
any record, document or thing belonging to, or received
or kept by, the government for information or record, or
required by law to be kept by others for information of
the government; or

(b)

Makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing
knowing it to be false, and with purpose that it be taken
as a genuine part of information or records referred to
in paragraph (a); or
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(c)

Purposely and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or
otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such
record, document or thing.

(2)

An offense under this section is a class

misdemeanor

unless the offender's purpose is to defraud or injure anyone, in which
case the offense is a class __ felony.
40-32-13.

ficials.

False personation of judicial or governmental of-

Any person who falsely represents himself to be an attorney

authorized to practice law or a public officer or a public employee,
commits false personation of judicial or governmental officials and
guilty of a class
40-32-14.

1,

misdemeanor.
Performance of unauthorized acts.

Any person who

performs any of the following knowing that his performance is not
authorized by law commits performance of unauthorized acts and is
guilty of a class_ felony (misdemeanor):

(1)

Conducts a marriage ceremony; or

(2)

Acknowledges the execution of any document which by law
may be recorded; or

(3)

Becomes a surety for any party in any civil or criminal
proceeding, before any court or public officer authorized
to accept such surety; or

(4)

Does any other act in the course of any act or proceeding
whereby if it were done by the person falsely personated,
such person might in any event become liable to an action
or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to pay a sum
of money, or to incur a charge, forfeiture or penalty.
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Comment
Proposed article 32 is based on the provision of the Model
Penal Code and the newly revised criminal code of Illinois. A partial
list of present perjury statutes this article replaces would include:
Perjury - Subornation
40-7-1, CRS 1963
40-7-2, CRS 1963
False Verified Statements
40-7-3, CRS 1963
Procuring Conviction of Murder by Perjury
40-7-4, CRS 1963
Indictment - Allegations
40-7-7, CRS 1963
Inducing Witness to Secrete Himself
40-7-9, CRS 1963
Officer Purloining Records
40-7-13, CRS 1963 -- Detaining Office Records
False Instrument~ - Procuring
40-7-14, CRS 1963
Simulating Judicial Process
40-7-15, CRS 1963
Penalty for Simulating Judicial Process
40-7-16, CRS 1963
Exercising Office Unlawfully
40-7-37, CRS 1963
False Impersonation Defined
40-17-1, CRS 1963
40-17-3, CRS 1963 -- False Impersonation - Penalty
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PART F.
ARTICLE 33.
40-33-1.

INCHOATE OFFENSES
CRIMINAL ATTEMPT

Criminal attempt.

(1) (a)

A person is guilty of

attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the state of mind otherwise
required for the commission of the crime, he:
(b)

Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the
crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes
them to be; or

(c)

When causing a particular result is an element of the
crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result,
without further conduct on his part; or

(d)

Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under. the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime.

(2) (a)

Such person's conduct shall not be held to constitute

a substantial step under subsection (1) (d) of this sec~
tion unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
criminal purpose.

Without negativing the sufficiency of

other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative
of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law:
{b)

Lying in wait for, searching for, or following the contemplated victim of the crime;

(c)

Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission;
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{d)

Reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission
of the crime;

(e)

Unlawful entry of a vehicle, into a structure, into any
enclosure, or onto any real property in which or on
which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed;

(f)

Possession of items or materials to be employed in the
commission of the crime, which are specially designed for
such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of
the actor under the circumstances;

(g)

Possession, collection, or fabrication of items or materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at
or near the place contemplated for its commission, where
such possession, collection, or fabrication serves no
lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; or

(h)

Soliciting an accomplice or an innocent agent to engage
in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

40-33-2.

Conduct in aid of another.

Any person who engages

in conduct intended to aid another to commit any crime which would
establish his complicity under section ____ or ____ , if the
crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by
such other person.
40-33-3.

Defenses available -- not available.

(1)

When the

actor's previous conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to
commit a crime, as defined in this article, it is a defense that he
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its
commission, under circumstances manifesting the renunciation of his
criminal purpose.

The establishment of such defense shall not affect
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the liability for the attempt of an accomplice who did not join in
such abandonment or prevention
(2) (a)

It shall not be a defense to a conviction of the

crime of attempt to commit a crime that:
(b)

Because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it
would have been factually or legally impossible for the
accused to commit the offense attempted; or

(c)

Under the circumstances, the accused could not have
actually accomplished his purpose; or

(d)

The crime attempted or intended was actually perpetrated
by the accused.

40-33-4.

Multiple convictions.

No person shall be convicted

of both the perpetration of a crime and the attempt to commit that
crime where the acts constituting such attempt were part of the same
conduct constituting the completed crime.
40-33-5.

Penalties.

A person convicted of an attempt to

commit a crime may be fined or imprisoned or both in the same manner
as for the offense attempted, but such fine or imprisonment shall not
exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term
of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the offense attempted; provided that:
(1)

If the offense attempted is a class I or class II felony,
the offense is a class_ felony;

(2)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony involving bodily injury of or an assault on any person,
other than a class I or class II felony, the offense is
a class_ felony;

(3)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony other
than those referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this
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section, the offense is a class_ felony: and
(4)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any class of
misdemeanors, the offense is a class

misdemeanor.

Comment
This proposed article is a restatement of the present provisions of article 25, CRS 1963.
ARTICLE 34.
40-34-1.

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

Definition of conspiracy.

A person is guilty of

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1)

Agrees with such other person or persons that they or
one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt to commit such crime; or

(2)

Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt to
commit such crime.

40-34-2.

Scope of conspiratorial relationship.

If a person

guilty of conspiracy, as defined by section (1) of this article, knows
that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired
with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty
of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he
knows their identity, to commit such crime.
40-34-3.

Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives.

If a

person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only
one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the
same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.
40-34-4.

Joinder and venue in conspiracy prosecutions.

(1)

Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, two or
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more persons charged with criminal conspiracy may be prosecuted
jointly if:

(a)

They are charged with conspiring with one another; or

(b)

The conspiracies alleged, whether they have the same or
different parties, are so related that they constitute
different aspects of a scheme of organized criminal conduct.

(2)

In any joint prosecution under subsection (1) of this

(a)

No defendant shall be charged with a conspiracy in any

section:

judicial district other than one in which he entered into
such conspiracy or in which an overt act pursuant to such
conspiracy was done by him or by a person with whom he
conspired; and
(b)

Neither the liability of any defendant nor the admissibility against him of evidence of acts or declarations
of another shall be enlarged by such joinder; and

(c)

The court shall order a severance or take a special verdict as to any defendant who so requests, if it deems
it necessary or appropriate to promote the fair determination of his guilt or innocence, and shall take any
other proper measures to protect the fairness of the
trial.

40-34-5.

Overt act.

No person may be convicted of conspiracy

to commit a crime, other than a class

or class_ felony, unless an

overt ·act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to
have been done by him or by a perspn with whom he conspired.
40-34-6.

Renunciation of criminal purpose.

It is an affirma-

tive defense that the offender, after conspiring to commit a crime,
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thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
40-34-7.

Duration of conspiracy.

For purposes of this

article:
, (1)

Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object
are committed or the agreement that they be committed is
abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he
conspired; and_

(2)

Such abandonment is presumed if neither the defendant
nor anyone with whom he conspired does any ov.ert act in
pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period
of limitation; and

(3}

If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy
is terminated as to him only if and when he advises those
with whom he conspired of his abandonment or he informs
the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the
conspiracy and of his participation therein.

40-34-8.
to conspiracy.

Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party
(l}

Except as provided in subsection (2} of this

section. it is immaterial to the liability of a person who conspires
with another to commit a crime that:
(a}

He or the person with whom he conspires does not occupy
a particular position or have a particular characteristic
which is an element of such crime. if he believes that
one of them does; or

(b}

The person with whom he conspires is irresponsible or has
an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the crime.
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(2)

It is a defense to a charge of conspiracy to commit a

crime that if the criminal object were achieved, the offender would
not be guilty of a crime under the law defining the offense or as an
accomplice.
40-34-9.

Penalties for criminal conspiracy; mitigation in

cases of lesser danger; multiple convictions barred.

(1)

Except as

otherwise provided in this section, conspiracy is a crime of the same
class as the most serious offense which is an object of the conspiracy.
A conspiracy to commit a class I felony is a class II felony.
(2)

If the particular conduct charged to constitute a crimi-

nal conspiracy is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in
the commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the offender
presents a public danger warranting the grading of such offense under
this section, the court may enter judgment and impose sentence for a
crime of a lesser class or, in extreme cases, may dismiss the prosecution.
( 3)

A person may not be convicted of both the con·spiracy to

commit a crime and:
(a)

The commission of the crime which is the object of the
conspiracy; or

(b)

The attempt to commit the crime which is the object of
the conspiracy.

Comment
This proposed article, based on the recommended provisions
contained in the Model Penal Code, constitutes a restatement of the
present general conspiracy, 40-7-35, CRS 1963.
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PART G.
46-3-3.

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES

When marriage is void.

(l}(a}

A marriage is void

only if o~e or more of the following conditions existed at the time
of the marriage:
(b)

Either party was under the age of sixteen, unless a
license to marry was issued by order of. a court of
record:

(c}

The marriage was not contracted in this state and was
incestuous as defined by the law of the place where such
marriage was contracted:

(d}(i)

The marriage was contracted in this state and was be-

tween parents and children, including grandparents and
grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and
sisters of the half blood as well as the whole blood,
between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, and between
first cousins.
(ii)

Subsection (d)(i) of this section shall extend to legitimate as well as illegitimate children and relations.

(iii)

As used in subsection (d)(i} of this section, marriages
between first cousins include those marriages where one
party has at least one parent who is a sibling of at
least one parent of the other party;

(e)

The marriage was bigamous or polygamous; or

(f)

The marriage was void by the law of the place where such
marriage was contracted.

Comment
This proposed section is a restatement of present sections
40-9-4 and 46-3-3, CRS 1963. The former section defines incestuous
marriages and the latter voids incestuous marriages. These two
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sections are combined and broadened under this proposed section to
include first cousin marriages. The committee agree that the science
of human genetics supports the popular belief that first cous~n marriages increases the incidence of mentally retarded or otherwise
defective children in the first generation if the blood line carries
an unfavorable recessive gene, although not substantially. Under
this proposed section, a first cousin marriage is void but neither
party is subject to punishment under this or the proposed criminal incest sections.
48-5-1.

Definitions.

( 11)

"Narcotic drugs" means any of the

following:
(a)

Alpha eucaine

(b)

Beta eucaine

(c)

"Cannabis" includes all parts of the plant Cannabis
Sativa L. (commonly known as marihuana), whether growing
or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any
part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant,
its seeds, or resin; but shall not include the mature
stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks,
oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized
seed of such plant which is incapable of germination.

(d)

"Opium" includes morphine, codeine, and heroin, and any
compound,-manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of opium, but does not include apomorphine
or any of its salts.

· (e)

"Coca leaves" includes cocaine, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
coca leaves, except derivatives of coca leaves which do
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not contain cocaine, ecgonine, or substance from which
cocaine or ecgonine may be synthesized or made.
(f)

"Isonipecaine" means the substance identified chemically
as l-methyl-4-phenyl-piperidene-4-carboxylic acid ethyl
ester, or any salt thereof by whatever trade name identified.

(g)

"Methadon" means the substance identified chemically as
4-4-Diphenyl-6-Dimethylamino-Heptanone-3, or any salt
thereof by whatever trade name identified.

(h)

"lsoamidone" means the substance identified chemically
as 4, 4-Diphenyl-5-Methyl-6-Dimethylamino-hexanone-3, or
any salt thereof by whatever trade name identified.

(i)

All parts of the plant of the genus Lophophora whether
growing or otherwise; the buttons thereof, the alkaloids
extracted from any such plant; and every compound salt,
derivative, mixture or preparation of such plant.

(j)

"Dromoran" means any substance identified chemically as
dl-3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan, 1-3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan (except d-3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan), dl3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan, or 1-3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan (except d-3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan), or any
salt thereof by whatever trade name designated.

(k)

"Nisentil" means any substance identified chemically as

2-1, 3-dimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxy-piperidene or any
salt thereof by whatever trade name designated.
(1)

"Ketobemidone'' means any substance identified chemically
as 4-(3-hydroxyphenyl)-l-methyl-4-piperidyl ethyl ketone
or any salt thereof by whatever trade name designated.

- 133 -

Comment
Proposed subsection 48-5-1 (11) replaces and restates in
modern language the present narcotic drug definitions set out in 48-5-1
(11), 48-5-1(12), 48-5-1(13) and 48-5-1(14)(a) through (c) and (e),
CRS 1963. In so doing, the proposed subsection eliminates the phrase
"any drug found by the state board of health, after reasonable notice
and opportunity for hearing, to have an addiction-forming or addictionsustaining liability similar to morphine or cocaine, from the date of
publication of,such finding by said board of health," which has been
declared to be an undue delegation of authority in the Boulder District
Court.
48-5-20.

Violations -- penalties.

(5)

Any person within the

state of Colorado who shall use narcotic drugs, or shall be under the
influence of narcotic drugs, as defined in this article, except when
such drugs are or have been administered by or under the direction of
a person licensed and duly authorized by law to prescribe and administer narcotic drugs for bona fide medical needs, is a disorderly

person and, shall, upon conviction, be confined in the county ja~l not
less than six months, nor more than one year.
Comment
This proposed subsection is a restatement of the present subsection, minus the phrase 11 shall be addicted to the use of narcotic
drugs. 11 A California statute, similar to Colorado's, was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1962.10
The court, in its majority opinion, ruled that the statute inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. It stated that:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in
history would attempt to make it a criminal offense
for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper or to
be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might
determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment,
involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.
But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease
would doubtless be universally thought to be an

10.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660.
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infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ••• We
cannot but consider the statute before us as of the
same category. In this court counsel for the State
recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness.
Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily. We hold
that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never
touched any narcotic drug within the State or been
guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, imprisonment for
ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment
which is either cruel or unusual. But the question
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the "crime" of having a common cold.11

11 •

.ill!;!., pp. 666-667.
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48-8-1.

Definitions.

(l)(a)

For the purpose of this

article:
(b)

The term "hypnotic drug" means any drug which contains
any quantity of:

Barbituric acid or any of the salts of

barbituric acid; or any derivative of barbituric acid;
provided, that such terms shall not include drugs containing, in addition to any such hypnotic drug, a sufficient quantity or proportion of another drug or drugs
to prevent the ingestion of a sufficient amount of the
hypnotic drug to cause a hypnotic.or somnifacient
effect; and shall not include any drug permitted under
federal law to be sold over the counter without prescription.
(c)

The term "stimulant drug" means any drug which contains
any quantity of amphetamine, benzphetamine, diethyloropion, mephentermine, methamphetamine, methylphenidate,
phenmetrazine, pipradrol, or any salt, mixture or optical
isomer thereof; provided, that such term shall not include any drug containing, in addition to any such
stimulant drug, a sufficient quantity or proportion of
another drug or drugs to prevent the ingestion of a
sufficient amount of stimulant drug to cause a stimulating effect on the central nervous system; and shall not
include any drug permitted under federal law to be sold
over the counter without prescription.

(d)

The term "delivery'' means sale. dispensing, giving away,

or supplying in any other manner.
(e)

The term "patient" means, as the case may be, either
the individual for whom a hypnotic drug or a stimulant
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drug is prescribed or to whom a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is administered; or the owner or the agent of
the owner of the animal for which a hypnotic drug or
stimulant drug is prescribed or to which a hypnotic
drug or stimulant drug is administered.
(f)

The term "person" includes individual, corporation,
partnership, and association.

(g)

The term "practitioner" means a person licensed by law
to prescribe and administer hypnotic drugs or stimulant
drugs.

(h)

The term "pharmacist" means a person duly registered
with the state board of pharmacy as a compounder, dispenser, and supplier of drugs upon prescription.

(i)

The term "prescription" means a written or oral order by
a practitioner to a pharmacist for a hypnotic drug or
stimulant drug for a particular patient, which specifies
the date of its issue, thf name and address of such
practitioner, the name and address of the patient and,
if such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is prescribed
for an animal, the species of such animal, the name and
quantity of the hypnotic drug or stimulant drug prescribed, the directions for use of such drug, and in the
case of a written order the signature of such practitioner.
An oral order by a practitioner for a hynotic drug or
stimulant drug must be promptly reduced to writing by the
pharmacist.

(j)

The term "manufacturer" means persons other than pharma-

cists who manufacture hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs,
and includes persons who prepare such drugs in dosage
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forms by mixing, compounding, encapsulating, entableting,
or other process.
(k)

The term "wholesaler" means persons engaged in the business of distributing hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs
to persons included in any of the classes named in
section 48-8-3.

(1)

The term "warehouseman" means persons who store hypnotic
drugs or stimulant drugs for others and who have no
control over the disposition of such hypnotic drugs or
stimulant drugs except for the purpose of such storage.

48-8-2.

Prohibited acts.

(1)

The following acts, the

failure to act as hereinafter set forth, or the causing of any such
act or failure are hereby declared unlawful, except as provided in
section 48-8-3.
(2)(a)

The delivery of any hypnotic drug or stimulant drug

unless:
(b)

Such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is delivered by a
pharmacist, upon a prescription, and there is affixed to
the immediate container in which such drug is delivered
a label bearing the name and address of the owner of the
establishment from which such drug was delivered; the
date on which the prescription for such drug was filled;
the number of such prescription as filled in the prescription files of the pharmacist who filled such
prescription; the name of the practitioner who prescribed such drug: the name and address of the patient,
and if such drug was prescribed for an animal, a statement
of the species of the animal; and the directions for use
of the drug as contained in the prescription: or
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(c)

Such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is delivered by a
practitioner in the course of his practice and the
immediate container in which such drug is delivered bears
a label on which appears the directions for use of such
drug, the name and address of such practioner, the name
and address of the patient, and if such drug is prescribed for an animal, a statement of the species of the
animal.

(3)

The refilling of any prescription for a hypnotic drug

or stimulant drug except as designated on the prescription, or by the
consent of the practitioner.
(4)

The delivery of a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug upon

prescription unless the pharmacist who filled such prescription files
and retains it as required in section 48-8-4.
(5)

The possession of a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug by

any person, unless such person obtained such drug on the prescription
of a practitioner or in accordance with section 48-8-2 (2)(c).
(6)

The refusal to make available and to accord full oppor-

tunity to check any record or file as required by section 48-8-5.
(7)

The failure to keep records as requir~d by subsection

(1) or (2) of section 48-8-4.
(8)

The using by any person to his own advantage, or the

revealing, other than to an officer or employee of the state department of public health, or to a court when relevant in judicial proceeding under this article, of any information required under the
authority of section 48-5-5, concerning any method or process which
as a trade secret is entitled to protection.
48-8-3.

Exemptions.

(l)(a)

The provisions of subsections

(2) and (5) of section 48-8-2 shall not be applicable to the delivery
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of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs to persons included in any

of

the classes hereinafter named, or to the agents or employees of such
persons, for use in the usual course of their business or practice or
in the performance of their official duties, as the case may be; or
to the possession of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs by such persons
or their agents or employees for such use:
(b)

Pharmacists;

(c)

Practitioners;

(d)

Persons who proc~re hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs
for handling by or under the supervision of pharmacists
or practitioners employed by them; or for the purpose of
lawful research, teaching, or testing, and not for resale;

(e)

Hospitals and othe~ institutions which procure hypnotic
drugs or stimulant drugs for lawful administration by
practitioners;

(f)

Officers or employees of appropriate enforcement agencies
of federal, state or local governments, pursuant to their
official duties;

(g)

Manufacturers and wholesalers; or

(h)

Carriers and warehousemen.

48-8-4.

Records.

(l)(a)

Persons

(other than carriers) to

whom the exemptions of· section 48-8-3 are applicable shall:
(b)

Make a complete record of all stocks of hypnotic drugs
and stimulant drugs on hand on the effective date of
this article, and

(c)

Maintain detailed, but not necessarily separate, records
and inventories relating to hypnotic drugs and stimulant
drugs manufactured, purchased, sold, distributed and
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handled; and retain all such records and inventories
required by this section for not less than two calendar
years after the date of the transaction shown by such
record and inventory.
(2)

Pharmacists shall in addition to complying with the

provisions of subsection (l)(c) of this section, retain each prescription for a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug received by them, for
not less than two calendar years immediately following the date of the
filling or the date of the last refilling of such prescription, whichever is the later date.
48-8-5.

Inspection of records.

Persons required to keep

files or records, relating to hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs by
section 48-8-4 shall, upon the written request of an officer or
employee duly designated by the state department of public health,
make such file~ or records available to such officer or employee, at
all reasonable hours, for inspection and copying; and accord to such
officer or employee full opportunity to check the correctness of
such files or records, including opportunity to make inventory of all
stocks of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs on hand; and it shall be
unlawful for any such person to fail to make such files or records
available or to accord such opportunity to check their correctness.
48-8-6.

Regulations.

The state department of public health

is hereby authorized to promulgate necessary regulations for the
administration and enforcement of this article.
48-8-7.

Penalties.

Any person who violates any of the pro-

visions of this article shall upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
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Comment
This proposed article is aimed at the increasing and illicit
use of stimulants and depressants. This proposed article is similar
to the narcotic drug article in that the drugs within the scope of its
provisions may be sold upon prescription only, and in properly labeled
containers. Furthermore, a record of each sale must be kept by the
seller for a minimum of two years.
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CROSS REFERENCE TABLE
This table is designed to show the disposition of the present
sections contained in chapter 40, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as
amended by the session laws of 1964.
Columns (1) and (2) show the present section number and, by
stating its title, indicates the subject matter of each present
section of chapter 40. Column (3) shows the proposed article and
section number in which the subject matter of the present section may
be found. If no proposed article and section number appears in
column (3), the subject matter has either been transferred to the
proposed code's general provisions or to another body of law, or has
been omitted because it no longer is useful or it duplicates a provision contained in another body of law, e.g., present chapter 40
sections which set out the jurisdiction of courts for a specific offense duplicate the jurisdiction provisions of the statutes which
establish the county and district courts. A present section number
followed by a single asterisk(*) indicates the section was amended
by the 1964 session laws, a double asterisk(**) indicates the section
was repealed by the 1964 session laws.
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(1)

(2)

(3)

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

ARTICLE 1

PERSONS CAPABLE
OF CRIME

1

What constitutes a crime

2

Intention, how manifested

3

Who deemed of sound mind

4

Infant not guilty

5

Lunatics, not to be convicted
Idiot not guilty

6
7
8

9

10
11

12
13

Counseling infant, luna. tic, to commit crime,
penalty
Husband responsible for
wife's crimes
Drunkenness no excuse,
persons causing, how
punished
Accident, offenses against
officers
Crime committed under
fear
Accessories, standing by,
not present, during the
fact
Accessory after the fact,
penalty

ARTICLE 2

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

1

Murder, defined, how
committed
Malice, how manifested
Implied malice, degrees of
murder, plea of second
degree murder permitted,
when, penalty
Manslaughter, degrees
Voluntary manslaughter
Manslaughter under passion
Involuntary manslaughter
Manslaughter, verdict,
penalty
Death in year and day

2
3

·4
5
6
7
8

9
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Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions

to General
to General
to General
to General
to General
to General
to General

Transferred to General
Provisions
Transferred to General
Provisions
Transferred to General
Provisions
Transferred to General
Provisions
Transferred to General
Provisions
Transferred to General
Provisions

1-·1
1-1

1-1

1-2, 1-3
1-2
1-2
1-3
1-2, 1-3
1-1

(1)

(2)

Present Penal
Law Section

(3)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

ARTICLE 2, contd.
10

17

Driving under influence,
death
Driving under influence,
injury
Injury in one county, death
in another, venue
Justifiable homicide,
necessary defense
Bare fear, reasonable
fear, killing officer
Self-defense, sufficient
cause
Resisting officer, killing a felon
Justifiable homicide

18

Excusable homicide

19

Killing justifiable or
excusable, acquittal
Killing proved, burden
on accused
Concealing death of
bastard, penalty
Petit treason, abolished
Poisoning, procuring
abortion
Mayhem
Rape
First degree rape deemed
forcible
Essential guilt, penetration
Punishment for rape
Application of sections
Emission
Crime against nature
Assault on child under
sixteen
What is an assault
Assault to commit felony,
deadly weapon
Assault and battery,
punishment
Jurisdiction of county
court
Hazing unlawful
Punishment for hazing
Punishment for hazing in
state institutions

11

12
13
14
15

16

20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35

36*
37
38
39
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1-3, 1-4

Omitted
Omitted
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
Transferred
Provisions
1-5

to General
to General
to General
to General
to General
to General
to General
to General

Omitted
15-1, 33-1
Omitted
10-1, 10-2, 13-1
Omitted
Omitted
10-1, 10-2, 13-1
Omitted
Omitted
11-1, 11-2, 13-1, 20-3
12-2

2-1, 2-2
2-1, 2-2
2-3, 2-4

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

(1)

(2)

( 3)

Proposed Penal Law

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

Section

ARTICLE 3, contd.
40*
41*
42
43
44

45
46
47
48'

ARTICLE 3
l
2

3
4
5

6
7
8

ARTICLE 4
1
2

3
4
5

6
7

8
9

10

Jurisdiction of county
court
Duties of faculty of state
institutions
False imprisonment, penalty
Name of prosecutor endorsed,
·malice, costs
Kidnaping defined
Penalty for kidnaping
Officer making arrest, age
of person kidnaped
Jurisdiction of courts
Assault and threat• against
person, restraining order

Omitted
Omitted
3-1
Omitted
3-2, 3- 3, 3-4
3-2, 3-3, 3-4
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

OFFENSES AGAINST HABITATIONS AND BUILDINGS
Arson, first degree
Arson, second degree
Arson, third degree
Burning to defraud insurer
Burglary, what constitutes,
penalty
Use of dynamite in burglary,
penalty
Burglar tools, possession,
penalty
Trespass on premises of
another

4-1, 4-2,
4-1, 4-2,
4-1, 4-2,
4-3
5-1, 5-2,

4-4
4.-4
4-4
5-4

5-2
5-3
6-4

OFFENSES AGAINST UTILITIES
Tapping water pipes, misdemeanor
Conduc~ing water around
meter
Interference with water
meter
Taking water without perinission
Prima facie evidence of guilt
Violation, penalty
Tapping gas conduits
Conducting gas around meter,
misdemeanor
Injury or destruction of
meter ·
Prima facie evidence
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8-1
8-1
6-2, 8-1
8-1
Omitted
6-2, 8-1

8-1
8-1

6-2
Omitted

(1)

Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 4
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

20
··- ' .... ·.

21
22

23

ARTICLE 5
l
2

3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

(2)

(3)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

OFFENSES AGAINST UTILITIES, contd.
Violation, penalty
Electricity, unlawful tapping
Avoiding meter
Tampering with meter
Prima facie evidence
Violation, penalty
Interference with telegraph
and telephone, penalty
Definitions
Refusal to yield "party
line"
False statement concerning
an emergency
telephone directories to
contain not'ice
.
Removal, injury or destruction of telephone and
telegraph facilities,
penalty
Disturbance of peace by
telephone

6-2, 8-1
8-1
8-1

6-2
Omitted
6-2, 8-1
6-2

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
5-4, 6-2

25-1

ROBBERY, LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT
Robbery, penalty
Larceny, penalty
Dog stealing, larceny
Ore stealing, larceny
Stealing ore from reduction
works, penalty
Stealing fixtures from house,
larceny
Stealing from realty,
larceny
Larceny of livestock, penalty
Larceny of motor vehicles
Entering motor vehicle with
intent to commit larceny
Buying and receiving stolen
goods
Property stolen restored,
action to recover
Larceny by bailee
Lodger taking goods, penalty
Embezzlement, what constitutes
Embezzlement of public
property
Embezzlement, officer failing
to pay orders, penalty
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9-1, 9-2. 9-3
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1,
8-1, 8-2
5-1, 33-1
8-1

Omitted
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1

(1)

(2)

(3)

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

ARTICLE 5
18
19
20
21
22**
23**
24**
25**
26**
21**
28
29

30

31
32

ARTICLE 6
1
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

10
11
12

ROBBERY, LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT, contd.
Embezzlement by carriers, warehousemen
Embezzling landlord's share of
crops
.
Larceny under fifty dollars
misdemeanor
Petit larceny, punishment
Jurisdiction of justice, jury
Docket, judgment
Execution
Body execution
Accused confessing
County commissioners to
furnish work
Shoplifting, elements of the
offense
Penalties for shoplifting,
subsequent offenses
Concealment of goods as prima
facie evidence of crime of
shoplifting
Questioning of person suspected
of shoplifting without civil
liability
Sections cumulative and supplemental

8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
8-1
8-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

FORGERY AND COUNTERFEITING
Forgery, penalty
Counterfeiting coin, passing,
penalty
Possessing with intent to
pass
Possession of counterfeit notes,
bonds or blanks, penalty
Counte_rfeit gold or silver,
penalty
Mingling base metal, penalty
Clipping or scaling coin,
penalty
Spurious bills, checks or notes,
penalty
Possessing tools for counterfeiting, penalty
Trial, need not prove incorporation
Testimony of experts
Forging· or defacing official
seals, penalty
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7-1

Omitted
Omitted
7-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
7-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

7-1

(1)
Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 7

1
2

3
4
5*
6*
7
8
9*
10
11*
12
13
14
15*
16*
17*
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

(2)

(3)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Perjury, subornation, penalty
False verified statement,
perjury
Procuring conviction of murder
by perjury, penalty
Indictment, allegations
Bribery of judge or legislator,
penalty
Bribery of public officer,
penalty
Inducing witness to secrete himself
Bribery of water commissioner
Officer purloining records,
penalty
Inhumanity of jailer, penalty
Coercion of prisoners, felony
Rules of evidence not affected
Detaining office records,
penalty
False instruments, procuring,
penalty
Simulating judicial process
Penalty for simulating judicial
process
Resisting officer, penalty
Insurrection, penalty
Obstructing messenger of state
Rescue after conviction,
penalty
Rescue before conviction,
penalty
Officer, aiding escape, penalty
Officer suffering convict to be
at large, penalty
Inducing prisoners to absent
selves
Conveying tools to prisoner,
penalty
Furnishing weapons to convicts
and other persons, penalty
Aiding escape, penalty
Furnishing drugs or liquor to
convicts, penalty
Rescue on civil process,
penalty
Aiding in escape attempt,
penalty
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32-2. 32-8
32-4
32-2, 32-8

Omitted
29-2
29-2
32-8
29-2
7-1, 8-1, 32-12
30-3
2-1, 2-2, 2-3,
2-4, 30-3

Omitted

29-4, 32-12

32-14
7-1, 32-13
7-1, 32-13
31-2
28-4

Omitted
31.:4

31-4
31-5
31-6
31-7
31-8
31-9
31-10
31-11
31-12
31-13

(1)

Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 7
31*
32*
33*
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43*
44*
45*
46*
47

48*
49
50
51
52
53

ARTICLE 8
l*
2

3*
4
5

(2)

(3)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, contd.
Aiding escape from officer,
penalty
Officer allowing escape,
penalty
Officer refusing to receive
or arrest prisoner, penalty
Compounding offense, penalty
Conspiracy in general, penalty
Conspiring to bring about
receivership
Exercising office unlawfully,
penalty
Embracery, penalty
Barratry, penalty
Maintenance, penalty, exception
Unlawful to solicit personal
injury claims
Misdemeanor, soliciting personal
injury claims
Judge or officer receiving
reward, penalty
Taking illegal fees, penalty
Officer taking reward for omission of duty
Malfeasance in office, removal
Public officer violating oath,
penalty
Refusing to aid in arrest,
penalty
Persons under life sentence,
assault during escape, death
penalty
Persons under less than life
sentence, assault during
escape, penalty
Holding hostage during escape,
penalty
State pay costs of prosecution
Escapes by felons

31-14
31-15
29-4
31-3
34-1
34-1
32-13, 32-14
29-2

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
29-2
29-2
29-2
29-2, 29-4, 30-3
29-4
31-1
31-16
31-16
31-17

.Omitted
31-18

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE
Disturbance, jurisdiction of
county court
Fighting by agreement, penalty
Unlawful assembling, penalty
Unlawful assemblage, penalty
Rout, penalty
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25-2

Omitted
25-3

Omitted
Omitted

(1)
Present Penal
Law Section

ARTICLE 8
6
1*
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16*
17
18-HI19*
20
ARTICLE
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
8

9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

(3)

(2)

9

Proposed Penal Law
Subject Matter

Section

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE, contd.
Riot, penalty
Officers shall prevent dueling
Publications of abuse for refusal to duel, penalty
Duel, abettors, penalty
Dueling, challange, penalty
Carrying challange, second,
penalty
Libel, penalty
Disturbing peace on Sunday,
penalty
Disturbance on Sunday,
penalty
Disturbing worship, penalty
County court, jurisdiction
Trial by jury, collecting fine
Appeals allowed
Vagrancy, arrest, fine
Vagrancy, trial by jury

2~-4
Omitted
Omitted
2-4
Omitted
Omitted

21-1, 21-2
Omitted
Omitted
25-5

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
25-6
25-6

OFFENSES RELATING TO MOAALS
Bigamy
16-1
Marrying spouse of another,
16-2
penalty
Adultery, fornication, punish20-1, 20-2
ment
(Transferred to Chapter
Incestuous marriages
46, Divorce, Separate
Maintenance, Annulment)
Penalty for incestuous
17-1
marriages
Father and daughter co17-2
habiting, penalty
Seduction, penalty, subsequent
13-1
marriage
Enticement, chaste women
Omitted
Omitted
Enticement, single persons
Procurers, penalty
Omitted
Prostitution, employee, pimp,
19-2, 19-4, 19-6
penalty
19-7
Witnesses
Omitted
Not to ~£feet other laws
19-1, 20-4
Prostitute making display,
penalty
19-4, 20-4
Open lewdness, keeping lewd
house, penalty
·
18-1, 18-2
Importing obscene books or
prints, penalty
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(70)

(1)

Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 9
17

18
19*
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27

ARTICLE 10

(3)

Subject Matter

OFFENSES RELATING TO MORALS, contd.
Exhibiting, selling or possessing
obscene books, penalty
Mailing obscene books, penalty
Search warrant for obscene books
Definitions
Action, by whom instituted
Temporary writ of injunction
Who named defendants
Actions have precedence
Violation of injunction, penalty
Advertising cures for sexual
diseases
Penalty, agent

13

ARTICLE 11

OFFENSES RELATING TO FIREARMS

l*

Carrying concealed weapons,
penalty
Carrying weapon with intent to
assault, penalty
Explosive contrivances
Violation, explosive contrivances, penalty
Hunting under influence of
liquor or drugs
Hunting in careless or reckless manner

3
4
5
6
7
8

9

10
11
12*

2
3
4
5

6

18-1, 18-2
18-1, 18-2
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

Omitted

GAMBLING AND CONFIDENCE GAMES
Confidence game, penalty
Indictment or information,
sufficiency
Construed liberally
Bunco steerer defined
Fakirs defined
Penalty if convicted of bunco
steering, etc.
Gambling rooms, penalties
Keeping gaming table, gambling
for livelihood, penalty
Wagering upon games, penalty
Inducing minors to gamble,
penalty
Penalty, information, fines,
informer
Seizure of property
Gaming contracts void

1
2

Proposed Penal Law
Section
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8-1
Omitted
Omitted
8-1
8-1
8-1
26-4
26-4
26-2
Omitted

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

27-1
27-1

Omitted
Omitted
25-7

25-7

(1)

(2)

(3)

Present Penal
Law Section

ARTICLE 11
7
8

9
10

ARTICLE 12
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8*
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19*
20
21
22
23
24

25
26

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

OFFENSES RELATING TO FIREARMS,contd.
Hunting violations, penalty
Mechanical knives, unlawful
Violation, mechanical knives,
penalty
Possession of firearms or deadly
weapons by certain felons

25-7
27-1
27-1
27-1

OFFENSES RELATING TO PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY
Blackmail, penalty
Bribery of athletes, umpires,
judges
Participants, defined
Violation, bribery of athletes,
penalty
Body snatching, penalty
Public drinking vessels prohibited
Violation, public drinking
vessels, penalty
Jurisdiction
Exercise of police powers
Endurance contests, conducting,
time limit
Endurance contests, conducting,
number limited
Endurance contests, participants, time limit
Endurance contests, particippants, number limited
Violation, physical endurance
contests, penalty·
Contests exempt
Nuisances
Information, abatement
Support of parent, penalty
Jurisdiction, appeal
Sunday barbering
Penalty for Sunday barbering
Polluting streams, penalty
Unlawful to flow oil into
stream, penalty
Use of white canes
Duty to stop
Penalty
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8-1
23-1
23-1
23-1
25-8
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
25-10
25-10
25-10
25-10
25-10
25-10
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
25-11
25-11
25-12
25-12
25-13
25-13
25-13

(1)

(2)

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

ARTICLE 13
l
2
3

4*
5

6*
ARTICLE 14
l
2

3
4

5

6*
7
8
9

10

11
12
13

14

15
16
17
18
19*

20

21

22
23

24

(3)

Proposed Penal Law
Section

OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN
Child, health or life endangered
Cigarettes, sale to children
Penalty
Judge may issue warrant
Penalty for selling or giving
tobacco to children
Jurisdiction of county court

Omitted
25-14
25-14
Omitted
25-14
Omitted

FRAUD IN OBTAINING PROPERTY
OR SERVICES
Fraud to delay creditors, indictment
Obtaining goods or services
under false pretenses, penalty
Selling land twice, penalty
Obtaining vehicle with intent
not to pay, penalty
Copy of section 40-10-4 posted
Jurisdiction of county court
Purchase under fictitious name,
penalty
Unlawful to purchase on credit
and hypothecate
Purchase on credit and abscond,
penalty
Giving no account check, draft
or order, penalty
False weights and scales, penalty
False weights in making toll at
mill, penalty
False pretenses of responsibility,
penalty
Fraudulent operation of coin
machines
Manuf~cture, sale or gift of
slug
Obtaining hospital services
fraudulently, penalty
Prima facie evidence of fraud
Notice to be posted
County courts to have jurisdiction, appeals
Short checks, penalty
Obtaining goods or services by
fraudulent use of credit devices
Stealing credit card
Posses~ion of fictitious card
or device
Venue
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8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1

Omitted
Omitted
8-1
8-1
8-1

8-1
8-1

8-1

8-1

8-1
8-1
8-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
8-1
8-1
8-1

8-1
Omitted

( l)

Present Penal
Law Section

ARTICLE 15
l

2
3

4*
5

6
7
8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

ARTICLE 16
l
2

3
4

(2)

( ~)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

FRAUD TO EFFECT SALES
Misrepresentations to effect
sale, penalty
Violation, penalty
Not to apply to newspaper
Jurisdiction
False representations, corporate stock
Description of offense
Defense
Sections liberally construed
Foreign produce, reshipment,
penalty
Shipping bill, contents
Violation, penalty
False statements as to circulation, penalty
False registration of livestock, penalty
Signing fraudulent stock
certificate, penalty
Issuing or transferring stock
fraudulently, penalty
Mingling base matter with ore,
penalty
Misrepresent fineness of gold
in article, test
Use of words "sterling" and
"coin," penalty
Unlawful use of "gold plate"
and "gold filled"
Unlawful use of "~ilver plate"
and "silver electro-plate"
Violation of sections, penalty
Changing farm machinery serial
numbers prohibited, penalty
American Indian handicrafts
Imitation American Indian
handicrafts
Penalty

8-1
8-1
Omitted
Omitted
8-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
8-1
~-1

8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-l

8-1
8-1
8-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

LOTTERIES AND TRADING STAMPS
Lotteries unlawful, penalty
Lotteries for lands forbidden,
penalty
Advertising lottery, penalty
Newspapers advertising lottery,
penalty
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26-2

26-2

Omitted
Omitted

(1)

(2)

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

ARTICLE 16
~

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

ARTICLE 17
l
2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

(3)

Proposed Penal Law
Section

LOTTERIES AND TRADING STAMPS
Selling tickets, penalty
Proof, presumption, evidence
Indictment, when
Purchaser, competent witness
Gift enterprise business forbidden
Penalty
Trading stamps and premium devices unlawful
Premiums prohibited
Giving evidences of liability
prohibited
Premium devices prohibited
Redeemable bonuses prohibited
Violation, penalty
Municipal regulation

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

FALSE IMPERSONATION -- MESSAGES -- EMBLEMS
False impersonation defined
False impersonation in
character of relative
False impersonation, penalty
Divulging telegraph message,
penalty
Sending false message, penalty,
damages
Opening message, persona ting
another, penalty
Clandestinely reading message,
penalty, damages
Bribing operator, penalty
Unauthorized wearing of insignia,
penalty
Unauthorized use of letters
G.A.R., penalty
Unlawful to counterfeit or sell
badge
Counterfeiting or selling badge,
penalty
Unlawful wearing of badge of
society, penalty
Facsimile of badge filed, fees
Action for unlawful manufacture,
sale or wearing
Action pn behalf of society
Badge must be distinctive

-
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32-13, 32-14
Omitted
32-13, 32-14
Omitted

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

(1)
Present Penal
Law Section

ARTICLE 17

(2)

(3)

Subject Matter
FALSE IMPERSONATION -- MESSAGES -- EBLEMS

18
19
20

Penalty
Jurisdiction of justice
Application of law

ARTICLE 18

FRAUDULENT AND MALICIOUS
MISCHIEF

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8-iHf-

9

10
11*
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22**
23
24

Proposed Penal Law
Section

Unlawful to destroy or damage
property belonging to another person
Killing, entrapping homing
pigeons
False statements of bank's
solvency unlawful
Misdemeanor, penalty
Injuring fences, penalty
Destroying or injuring jail,
penalty
Removal of timber from state
lands, penalty
Jurisdiction of courts,
prosecution
Firing woods or prairie,
penalty
Extinguish camp fire, penalty
Cemeteries, trespass of
animals, penalty
Trespass to injure dam or em6-1,
bankment, penalty
Trespass upon garden or
orchard, penalty
Taking specimens from cave,
penalty
Wrecking train, penalty
6-1,
9-2
Attack on train, penalty
Stopping or delaying train,
penalty
Whoever counsels, aids or
abets, deemed principal
Intention, how proved
Unlawful handling of switches
Penalty for maliciously turning
switch
Jurisdiction, appeal
Unlawful use of railroad tracks
Penalty for unlawfully using
railroad track
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Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

6-1. 6-2
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
6-1, 6-2
6-1, 6-2
8-1
Omitted
4-2, 4 .. 4
4-2, 4-4

6-1
6-2, 6-4
6-4

6-2, 6-4
6-2, 9-1,
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
6-2
6-2
Omitted
6-4

6-4

(3)

(2)

(1)

Present Penal
Law Section

ARTICLE 18
25iHf26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36
37
38**
39
40
41

ARTICLE 19
1
2

3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

FRAUDULENT AND MALICIOUS
MISCHIEF
Jurisdiction. appeal
Molesting railroad or mine
carriage or attachment
Throwing stones at train.
penalty
Removing landmark. penalty
Destroying landmarks. penalty
Defacing historical monuments.
penalty
Removing guard around shaft.
penalty
Effacing instruments, books or
records, penalty
Defacing law or proclamation
posted, penalty
Injuring animals, penalty
Liability, triple damages, attachments
Automobile defined
Tampering with automobile,
penalty
Jurisdiction
Fire prohibited, highways,
private lands, penalty
Dumping trash on private property, penalty
Dumping trash on public property, penalty

Omitted
6-2
6-2
6-2
6-2
6-2
6-2
6-2, 8-1
6-2
24-1
Omitted

Omitted
8-1, 8-2

Omitted
4-4

6-2, 6-4
6-2, 6-4

OFFENSES INVOLVING PUBLIC
FUNDS
State and county officers not
to deal in warrants, penalty
County_ and municipal officers not
to deal in warrants, penalty
Public funds for private purposes,
penalty
Loan of public money, penalty
No officer to derive benefit from
contract
Making unlawful contract, penalty
Refusing to pay warrant, penalty
Failure to call warrants, penalty
Emitting bill or note for circulation, penalty
Interest in contract prohibited
Penalty for violation of section
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29-4, 30-2
29-4, 30-2
29-4
29-4
29-4, 30-2
29-4, 30-2
29-4
29-4
Omitted
29-4, 30-2
29-4, 30-2

(1)

Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 20
1
2
3
4

5*
6
7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27

ARTICLE 21
1
2
3
4
5

6

(2)

(3)

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
Overdriving, starving, penalty
Care of impounded animals
Failure to feed impounded
animals, seizure
Keeping fowls or animals to
fight
Arrest, trial, fine
Officers shall prevent cruelty
to animals .
Bureau agents' to make arrest and
take animal, action for expense
Animals detained until expense
paid
Officers may take charge of
abandoned animals
Injured animals may be killed
Lien upon animals for care and
maintenance
Proceeds of sale, disposition
Badges and certificates of
bureau off ice rs
Bureau may require arrest, fees
Construction of words
Sheepherder abandoning sheep
without notice
Violation, penalty
Unlawful to dock horse's tail
When docked horses may be imported
Prima facie evidence of docking
Penalty for docking
Killing animals in contest
Violation, penalty
Dumb animals, malicious use,
sport or wager
Spectators held as accessories
Penalty
Influencing results of race,
stimulating or depressing dog
or horse

24-1
24-1
24-1
24-1

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
24·-l
24-1
24-1

Omitted.
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
24-1
24-1

Omitted

Omitted
Omitted
24-2

DEFACING NATURAL SCENERY
Painting, penalty
Actions for damages, exception
Effaced by county, expense
Presumption from benefit
Using name of another wrongfully,
penalty
Defacing any sign or notice
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6-2

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
6-2

(3)

(2)

( l)

Present Penal
Law Section
ARTICLE 22

Subject Matter
SABOTAGE

12

Definitions
Intentional 1nJury to or
interference with property
Intentionally defective workmanship
Wrongful discovery of secrets
Unlawful entry on property
Questioning and detaining
suspected persons
Closing and restricting highway
Going upon closed highway,
penaltv
Rights of labor
Short title
Relation to other statutes
When article is in force

ARTICLE 23

ANARCHY - SEDITION - DISLOYALTY

l
2
3
4
0

6
7

8
9

10
11

1
2
3
4

5

6*
7

8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

ARTICLE 24
1

Proposed Penal Law
Section

Unlawful to display foreign flag,
exception
Penalty
Mutilation of flag, penalty
Display of red flag prohibited
Penalty
Peace officers to enforce
sections
Anarchy and sedition defined
Inciting to destruction of life
or property
Anarchistic and seditious
associations
Membership in unlawful association
Distribution of literature
Unlawful conspiracy
Penalty
Death caused in violation of
sections
Person defined
Star Spangled Banner, regulations
Penalty

Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted

28-2
28-2

28-1
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
34-1
Omitted
Omitted
Omitted
28-3
28-3

CLAIRVOYANCY
Practice of clairvoyancy,
unlawf·u1
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22-1

(1)

(2)

(3)

Present Penal
Law Section

Subject Matter

Proposed Penal Law
Section

ARTICLE 24
2

3

ARTICLE 25
1

2
3

4
5

CLAIRVOYANCY
Advertisements barred
Penalty

22-1
22-1

INCHOATE CRIMES
Criminal attempt
Conduct in aid of another
Defenses available, not
available
Multiple convictions
Penalties
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33-1
33-2
33-3
33-4
33-5

